The Complete Works Friedrich Nietzsche Vol XIV : The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values

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THE COMPLETE WORKS

or

RIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

The Pint Complete and Authorised English Translation

EDITED BY

DR. OSCAR LEVY

VOLUME FOURTEEN

THE WILL TO POWER

BOOKS ONE AND TWO

Of the Third Impression making

Four Thousand Five Hundred

Copies this is

No.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

PAGE

PR JE i

FIRST BOOK. EUROPEAN NIHILISM.
PLAN- ...... 5

NIHILISM

i. Nihilism as an Outcome of the Valuations
and Interpretations of Existence which have
prevailed hitherto .... 8
Further Cau s of Nihilism - - -23

The Nihilis c Movement as an Expression of

Decadenc' - - - - 31

The Crisis : Nihilism and the Idea of Recur-
rence - - - - - -47

CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN

NIHILISM

a) Modern Gloominess - - - 55

>) The Last Centurier - - -73

Signs of Increasing Strength - 91

ND BOOK. A CRITICISM OF THE
IGHEST VALUES .THAT HAVE PREVAILED
'ilTHERTO.

I. CRITICISM OF RELIGION

1. Concerning the Origin of Religions - 113

2. Concerning the His / of Christianity 132

3. Christian Ideals - - - - - 179

VI CONTENTS OF VOL. L

JAGB

II. A CRITICISM OF MORALITY

1. The Origin of Moral Valuations * 210

2. The Herd - - - -1-226

3. General Observations concerning Morality ' " 237

4. How Virtue is made to Dominate - - 24?

5. The Moral Ideal

A. A Criticism of Ideals- - - - 264

& A Criticism of the "Good Man," of the

Saint, etc. - 282

C. Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil

Qualities - - - - - 291

D. A Criticism of the Words : Improving, Per-

fecting, Elevating - - - -312

6. Concluding Remarks concerning the Criticism

of Morality ----- 320

III. CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY

1. General Remarks .... 327

2. A Criticism of Greek Philosophy - - 345

3. The Truths and Errors of Philosophers - 369

4. Concluding Remarks in the Criticism of Philo-

sophy 378

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

THE two volumes of The Will to Power have
been revised afresh by their translator. He, the
most gifted and conscientious of my collaborators,
would have added his corrections to the second
edition of these books, had it not been that five
years of war and war-service prevented him from
accomplishing a task which he always judged
necessary. The changes made are numerous and
well able to throw light upon many a dark passage,
but the actual faults of translation were few in
number, so that the first and second editions are
by no means invalidated by this third one.

OSCAR LEVY.

PARIS, ist March 1924.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

IN the volume before us we have the first two books
of what was to be Nietzsche's greatest theoretical
and philosophical prose work. The reception
given to Thus Spake Zaratkustra had been so
unsatisfactory, and misunderstandings relative to
its teaching had become so general, that, within a
year of the publication of the first part of that
famous philosophical poem, Nietzsche was already
beginning to see the necessity of bringing his
doctrines before the public in a more definite and
unmistakable form. During the years that fol-
lowed that is to say, between 1883 an d 1886
this plan was matured, and although we have no
warrant, save his sister's own word and the internal
evidence at our disposal, for classing Beyond Good
and Evil (published 1886) among the contributions
to Nietzsche's grand and final philosophical scheme,
"The Will to Power," it is now impossible to separate
it entirely from his chief work as we would naturally
separate The Birth of Tragedy, the Thoughts out
of Season, the volumes entitled Human, ail-too-
Human, The Dawn of Day, and Joyful Wisdom.

Beyond Good and Evil, then, together with its
sequel, he Genealogy of Morals, and the two
little volumes, The Twilight of the Idols and the

viii TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

Antichrist (published in 1889 and 1894 respec-
tively), must be regarded as forming part of the
general plan of which The Will to Power was to
be the opus magnum.

Unfortunately, The Witt to Power was never
completed by its author. The text from which
this translation was made is a posthumous publi-
cation, and it suffers from all the disadvantages
that a book must suffer from which has been ar-
ranged and ordered by foster hands. When those
who were responsible for its publication undertook
the task of preparing it for the press, it was very
little more than a vast collection of notes and rough
drafts, set down by Nietzsche from time to time,
as the material for his chief work ; and, as any
liberty taken with the original manuscript, save
that of putting it in order, would probably have
resulted in adding or excluding what the author
would on no account have added or excluded him-
self, it follows that in some few cases the paragraphs
are no more than hasty memoranda of passing
thoughts, which Nietzsche must have had the in-
tention of elaborating at some future time. In
these cases the translation follows the German as
closely as possible, and the free use even of a con-
junction has in certain cases been avoided, for fear
lest the meaning might be in the slightest degree
modified It were well, therefore, if the reader
could bear these facts in mind whenever he is struck
by a certain clumsiness, either of expression or dis-
position, in the course of reading this translation.

It may be said that, from the day when
Nietzsche first recognised the necessity of making

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. ix

a more unequivocal appeal to his public than the
Zarathustra had been, that is to say, from the
spring of 1883, his work in respect of The Will
to Power suffered no interruption whatsoever, and
that it was his chief preoccupation from that
period until his breakdown in 1889.

That this span of six years was none too long
for the task he had undertaken, will be gathered
from the fact that, in the great work he had planned,
he actually set out to show that the life-principle,
" Will to Power," was the prime motor of all living
organisms.

To do this he appeals both to the animal world
and to human society, with its subdivisions, religion,
art, morality, politics, etc. etc., and in each of these
he seeks to demonstrate the activity of the prin-
ciple which he held to be the essential factor of
all existence.

Frau Foerster-Nietzsche tells us that the notion
that " The Will to Power " was the fundamental
principle of all life, first occurred to her brother in
the year 1870, at the seat of war, while he was
serving as a volunteer in a German army ambul-
ance. On one occasion, at the close of a very
heavy day with the wounded, he happened to
enter a small town which lay on one of the chief
military roads. He was wandering through it in
a leisurely fashion when, suddenly, as he turned
the corner of a street that was protected on either
side by lofty stone walls, he heard a roaring noise,
as of thunder, which seemed to come from the
immediate neighbourhood. He hurried forward a
step or two, and what should he see, but a magni-

x TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

ficent cavalry regiment gloriously expressive of
the courage and exuberant strength of a people
ride past him like a luminous stormcloud. The
thundering din waxed louder and louder, and lo
and behold ! his own beloved regiment of field
artillery dashed forward at full speed, out of the
mist of motes, and sped westward amid an uproar
of clattering chains and galloping steeds. A
minute or two elapsed, and then a column of in-
fantry appeared, advancing at the double the
men's eyes were aflame, their feet struck the hard
road like mighty hammer-strokes, and their ac-
coutrements glistened through the haze. While
this procession passed before him, on its way to
war and perhaps to death, so wonderful in its
vital strength and formidable courage, and so per-
fectly symbolic of a race that will conquer and
prevail, or perish in the attempt, Nietzsche was
struck with the thought that the highest will to
live could not find its expression in a miserable
" struggle for existence," but in a will to war, a
Will to Power, a will to overpower !

This is said to be the history of his first con-
ception of that principle which is at the root of
all his philosophy, and twelve years later, in Thus
Spake Zarathustra, we find him expounding it
thus :

" Wherever I found a living thing, there found
I Will to Power; and even in the will of the
servant found I the will to be master.

" Only where there is life, is there also will :
not, however, Will to Life, but so teach I thee
Will to Power 1

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. XI

"Much is reckoned higher than life itself by
the living one; but out of the very reckoning
speaketh the Will to Power ! "

And three years later still, in Beyond Good and
Evil> we read the following passage :

"Psychologists should bethink themselves be-
fore putting down the instinct of self-preservation
as the cardinal instinct of an organic being.
A living thing seeks above all to discharge its
strength life itself is Will to Power ; self-preser-
vation is only one of the indirect and most frequent
results thereof."

But in this volume, and the one that is to
follow, we shall find Nietzsche more mature, more
sober, and perhaps more profound than in the
works above mentioned. All the loves and hates
by which we know him, we shall come across
again in this work ; but here he seems to stand
more above them than he had done heretofore;
having once enunciated his ideals vehemently and
emphatically, he now discusses them with a certain
grim humour, with more thoroughness and detail,
and he gives even his enemies a quiet and respect-
ful hearing. His tolerant attitude to Christianity
on pages 89, 107, 323, for instance, is a case in
point, and his definite description of what we are
to understand by his pity (p. 293) leaves us in no
dc bt as to the calm determination of this work.
BOOK One will not seem so well arranged or so
well worked out as Book Two ; the former being
more sketchy and more speculative than the latter.
Be this as it may, it contains deeply interesting
things, inasmuch as it attempts to trace the ele-

xii TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

ments of Nihilism as the outcome of Christian
values in all the institutions of the present
day.

In the Second Book Herbert Spencer comes in
for a number of telling blows, and not the least of
these is to be found on page 237, where, although
his name is not mentioned, it is obviously implied.
Here Nietzsche definitely disclaims all ideas of an
individualistic morality, and carefully states that
his philosophy aims at a new order of rank.

It will seem to some that morality is dealt with
somewhat cavalierly throughout the two books ;
but, in this respect, it should not be forgotten that
Nietzsche not only made a firm stand in favour of
exceptional men, but that he also believed that
any morality is nothing more than a mere system
of valuations which are determined by the condi-
tions in which a given species lives, Hence his
words on page 107: " Beyond Good and Evil,
certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional
and strict preservation of herd-morality " ; and on
page 323: "Suppose the strong were masters in
all respects, even in valuing : let us try and think
what their attitude would be towards illness, suffer-
ing, and sacrifice ! Self -contempt on the part of the
weak would be the result: they would do their
utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind.
And would this be desirablel should we really
like a world in which the subtlety, the considera-
tion, the intellectuality, the plasticity in fact, the
whole influence of the weak was lacking ? "

It is obvious from this passage that Nietzsche
only objected to the influence of herd-morality

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. xiii

outside the herd that is to say, among excep-
tional and higher men who may be wrecked by it.
Whereas most other philosophers before him had
been the" Altruists " of the lower strata of humanity,
Nietzsche may aptly be called the Altruist of the
exceptions, of the particular lucky cases among
men. For such "varieties," he thought, the
morality of Christianity had done all it could do,
and the gh he in no way wished to underrate the
value it tad sometimes been to them in the past,
he saw that at present, in any case, it might prove
a great danger. With Goethe, therefore, he
believed that " Hypotheses are only the pieces of
scaffolding which are erected round a building during
the course of its construction, and which are taken
away as soon as the edifice is completed. To the
workman, they are indispensable ; but he must be
careful not to confound the scaffolding with the
building." *

It is deeply to be deplored that Nietzsche was
never able to complete his life-work. The frag-
ments of it collected in volumes i. and ii. of
The Will to Power are sufficiently remarkable to
convey some idea of what the whole work would
have been if only its author had been able to
arrange and complete it according to his original
design.

It is to be hoped that we are too sensible now-
adays to allow our sensibilities to be shocked by
serious and well-meditated criticism, even of the

* Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen (Weimar Edition,
i. n, p. 132).

xiv TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

most cherished among our institutions, and an
honest and sincere reformer ought no longer to
find us prejudiced to the extent of deafness-
against him, more particularly when he comes
forward with a gospel " The Will to Power "
which is, above all, a test of our power to will.

ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI.

PREFACE.

CONCERNING great things one should either be
silent or one should speak loftily : loftily that
is to say, cynically and innocently.

2.

What I am now going to relate is the history
of the next two centuries. I shall describe what
will happen, what must necessarily happen : the
triumph of Nihilism. This history can be written
already ; for necessity itself is at work in bringing
it about. This future is already proclaimed by a
hundred different omens ; as a destiny it announces
its advent everywhere ; for this music of to-morrow
all ears are already pricked. The whole of our
culture in Europe has long been writhing in an
agony of suspense which increases from decade
to decade as if in expectation of a catastrophe :
restless, violent, helter-skelter, like a torrent that
will reach its bourne^ and refuses to reflect yea,
that even dreads reflection.

3-

On the other hand, the present writer has done
little else, hitherto, than reflect and meditate^ like
VOL. i. A

2 PREFACE.

an instinctive philosopher and anchorite, who found
his advantage in isolation in remaining outside, in
patience, procrastination, and lagging behind ; like
a weighing and testing spirit who has already lost
his way in every labyrinth of the future ; like a
prophetic bird-spirit that looks backwards when it
would announce what is to come; like the first
perfect European Nihilist, who, however,has already
outlived Nihilism in his own soul who has out-
grown, overcome, and dismissed it.

For the reader must not misunderstand the
meaning of the title which has been given to this
Evangel of the Future. " The Will to Power ;
An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values"
with this formula a counter-movement finds ex-
pression, in regard to both a principle and a
mission ; a movement which in some remote
future will supersede this perfect Nihilism ; but
which nevertheless regards it as a necessary step^
both logically and psychologically, towards its own
advent, and which positively cannot come, except
on top of and out of it. For, why is the triumph
of Nihilism inevitable now? Because the very
values current amongst us to-day will arrive at
their logical conclusion in Nihilism, because
Nihilism is the only possible outcome of our
greatest values and ideals, because we must first
experience Nihilism before we can realise what the
actual worth of these " values " was. . . . Sooner
or later we shall be in need of new values,

FIRST BOOK.
EUROPEAN NIHILISM.

EUROPEAN NIHILISM.

A PLAN.

i . NIHILISM is at our door : whence comes this
most gruesome of all guests to us? To begin
with, it is a mistake to point to "social evils,"
" physiological degeneration," or even to corrup-
tion as a cause of Nihilism. This is the most
straightforward and most sympathetic age that
ever was. Evil, whether spiritual, physical, or
intellectual, is, in itself, quite unable to introduce
Nihilism, z>., the absolute repudiation of worth,
purpose, desirability. These evils allow of yet
other and quite different explanations. But there
is one very definite explanation of the phenomena :
Nihilism harbours in the heart of Christian
morals.

2. The downfall of Christianity, through its
morality (which is insuperable), which finally turns
against the Christian God Himself (the sense of
truth, highly developed through Christianity,
ultimately revolts against the falsehood and ficti-
tiousness of all Christian interpretations of the
world and its history. The recoil-stroke of <c God

6 THE WILL TO POWER.

is Truth" in the fanatical Belief, is: "All is
false." Buddhism of action. . . .)

3. Doubt in morality is the decisive factor.
The downfall of the moral interpretation of the
universe, which loses its raison d'etre once it has
tried to take flight to a Beyond, meets its end
in Nihilism. " Nothing has any purpose " (the
inconsistency of one explanation of the world, to
which men have devoted untold energy, gives
rise to the suspicion that all explanations may
perhaps be false). The Buddhistic feature : a
yearning for nonentity (Indian Buddhism has
no fundamentally moral development at the back
of it ; that is why Nihilism in its case means only
morality not overcome ; existence is regarded as
a punishment and conceived as an error ; error is
thus held to be punishment a moral valuation).
Philosophical attempts to overcome the "moral
God" (Hegel, Pantheism}. The vanquishing of
popular ideals: the wizard, the saint, the bard.
Antagonism of "true" and "beautiful" and
" good."

4. Against " purposelessness " on the one hand,
against moral valuations on the other : how far has
all science and philosophy been cultivated hereto-
fore under the influence of moral judgments ? And
have we not got the additional factor the enmity
of science, into the bargain? Or the prejudice
against science ? Criticism of Spinoza. Christian
valuations everywhere present as remnants in
socialistic and positivistic systems. A criticism of
Christian morality is altogether lacking.

5. The Nihilistic consequences of present natural

EUROPEAN NIHILISM. ^

science (along with its attempts to escape into a
Beyond). Out of its practice there finally arises a
certain self-annihilation, an antagonistic attitude
towards itself a sort of anti-scientificality. Since
Copernicus man has been rolling away from the
centre towards x.

6. The Nihilistic consequences of the political
and politico-economical way of thinking, where all
principles at length become tainted with the atmo-
sphere of the platform : the breath of mediocrity, in-
significance, dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchy,
etc. Punishment. Everywhere the deliverer is
missing, either as a class or as a single man the
justifier.

7. Nihilistic consequences of history and of the
"practical historian," i.e., the romanticist. The
attitude of art is quite unoriginal in modern life.
Its gloominess. Goethe's so-called Olympian State.

8. Art and the preparation of Nihilism. Roman-
ticism (the conclusion of Wagner's Ring of the
Nibelung).

I.

NIHILISM.

i. NIHILISM AS AN OUTCOME OF THE
VALUATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF
EXISTENCE WHICH HAVE PREVAILED
HERETOFORE.

2.

What does Nihilism mean ? That the highest
values are losing their value. There is no bourne.
There is no answer to the question : " to what
purpose ? "

3-

Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life
is absurd, in the light of the highest values
already discovered ; it also includes the view that
we have not the smallest right to assume the
existence of transcendental objects or things in
themselves, which would be either divine or
morality incarnate.

This view is a result of fully developed " truth-
fulness " : therefore a consequence of the belief in
morality.

4-

What advantages did the Christian hypothesis
of morality offer ?

NIHILISM. 9

(1) It bestowed an intrinsic value upon men,
which contrasted with their apparent insignifi-
cance and subordination to chance in the eternal
flux of becoming and perishing.

(2) It served the purpose of God's advocates,
inasmuch as it granted the world a certain perfec-
tion despite its sorrow and evil it also granted
the world that proverbial " freedom " : evil seemed
full of meaning.

(3) It assumed that man could have a know-
ledge of absolute values, and thus granted him
adequate perception for the most important things.

(4) It prevented man from despising himself as
man, from turning against life, and from being
driven to despair by knowledge: it was a self-
preservative measure.

In short: Morality was the great antidote
against practical and theoretical Nihilism.

5.

But among the forces reared by morality, there
was truthfulness-, this in the end turns against
morality, exposes the teleology of the latter, its
interestedness, and now the recognition of this lie
so long incorporated, from which we despaired of
ever freeing ourselves, acts just like a stimulus.
We perceive certain needs in ourselves, implanted
during the long dynasty of the moral interpreta-
tion of life, which now seem to us to be needs
of untruth : on the other hand, those very needs
represent the highest values owing to which we
are able to endure life. We have ceased from

IO THE WILL TO POWER.

attaching any worth to what we know, and we
dare not attach any more worth to that with
which we would fain deceive ourselves from this
antagonism there results a process of dissolution.

6,

This is the antinomy :

In so far as we believe in morality, we con-
demn existence.

7.

The highest values in the service of which
man ought to live, more particularly when they
oppressed and constrained him most these social
values^ owing to their tone-strengthening tenden-
cies, were built over men's heads as though they
were the will of God, or " reality," or the actual
world, or even a hope of a world to come. Now
that the lowly origin of these values has become
known, the whole universe seems to have been
transvalued and to have lost its significance but
this is only an intermediate stage.

8.

The consequence of Nihilism (disbelief in all
values) as a result of a moral valuation : We
have grown to dislike egotism (even though we have
realised the impossibility of altruism) ; we have
grown to dislike what is most necessary (although
we have recognised the impossibility of a liberum

NIHILISM. 1 1

arbitrium and of an " intelligible freedom " *). We
perceive that we do not reach the spheres in
which we have set our values at the same time
.lose other spheres in which we live have not
thereby gained one iota in value. On the contrary,
we are tired, because we have lost the main in-
centive to live. " All in vain hitherto ! "

9-
Pessimism as a preparatory state to Nihilism.

10.

A. Pessimism viewed as strength in what re-
spect? In the energy of its logic, as anarchy,
Nihilism, and analysis.

B. Pessimism regarded as collapse in what
sense? In the sense of its being a softening
influence, a sort of cosmopolitan befingering, a
" tout comprendre," and historical spirit.

Critical tension : extremes make their appear-
ance and become dominant.

II.

The logic of Pessimism leads finally to Nihilism :
what is the force at work? The notion that there
are no values, and no purpose : the recognition of
the part that moral valuations have played in all
other lofty values.

* This is a Kantian term. Kant recognised two T : nds of
Freedom the practical and the transcendental kind. 1 lie
first belongs to the phenomenal, the second to the intelligible
world. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

12 THE WILL TO POWER.

Result : moral valuations are condemnations ', ne-
gations ; morality is the abdication of the will to
live. . . .

12.

THE COLLAPSE OF COSMOPOLITAN VALUES.

A.

Nihilism will have to manifest itself as a psycho-
logical condition, first when we have sought in all
that has happened a purpose which is not there :
so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage.
Nihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness
of the long waste of strength, the pain of " futility,"
uncertainty, the lack of an opportunity to recover
in some way, or to attain to a state of peace
concerning anything shame in one's own pres-
ence, as if one had cheated oneself too long. . . .
The purpose above-mentioned might have been
achieved : in the form of a " realisation " of a most
high canon of morality in all worldly phenomena,
the moral order of the universe ; or in the form of
the increase of love and harmony in the traffic of
humanity ; or in the nearer approach to a general
condition of happiness ; or even in the march to-
wards general nonentity any sort of goal always
constitutes a purpose. The common factor to all
these appearances is that something will be at-
tained, through the process itself: and now we
perceive that Becoming has been aiming at nothing,
and has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusion-
ment in regard to a so-called purpose in existence,
as a cause of Nihilism ; whether this be in re-

NIHILISM. 13

spect of a very definite purpose, or generalised into
the recognition that all the hypotheses are false
which have hitherto been offered as to the object
of life, and which relate to the whole of " Evolu-
tion " (man no longer an assistant in, let alone
the culmination of, the evolutionary process).

Nihilism will manifest itself as a psychological
condition, in the second place, when man has fixed
a totality, a systematisation, even an organisation
in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul
thirsting for respect and admiration will wallow in
the general idea of a highest ruling and adminis-
trative power (if it be the soul of a logician,
the sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning
will suffice to conciliate everything). A kind of
unity, some form of " monism " : and as a result
of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feel-
ing of profound relativity and dependence in the
presence of an All which is infinitely superior to
him, a sort of divinity. " The general good exacts
the surrender of the individual . . . " but lo, there
is no such general good ! At bottom, man loses
the belief in his own worth when no infinitely
precious entity manifests itself through him that
is to say, he conceived such an All, in order to be
able to believe in his own worth.

Nihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a
third and last form. Admitting these two points
of view : that no purpose can be assigned to Be-
coming, and that no great entity rules behind all
Becoming, in which the individual may completely
lose himself as in an element of superior value ;
there still remains the subterfuge which would con-

14 THE WILL TO POWER.

sist in condemning this whole world of Becoming
as an illusion, and in discovering a world which
would lie beyond it, and would be a real world.
The moment, however, that man perceives that
this world has been devised only for the purpose
of meeting certain psychological needs, and that
he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form
of Nihilism comes into being, which comprises a
denial of a metaphysical world, and which forbids
itself all belief in a real world. From this stand-
point, the reality of Becoming is the only reality
that is admitted : all bypaths to back-worlds and
false godheads are abandoned but this world is no
longer endured^ although no one wishes to disown it.
What has actually happened ? The feeling of
worthlessness was realised when it was understood
that neither the notion of " Purpose? nor that of
" Unity? nor that of " Truth? could be made to
interpret the general character of existence. Noth-
ing is achieved or obtained thereby; the unity
which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is
entirely lacking : the character of existence is not
" true," it is false ; there is certainly no longer
any reason to believe in a real world. In short,
the categories, "Purpose," " Unity," " Being," by
means of which we had lent some worth to life,
we have once more divorced from it and the
world now appears worthless to us. ...

B.

Admitting that we have recognised the impos-
sibility of interpreting 'the world by means of these

NIHILISM. IS

three categories, and that from this standpoint the
world begins to be worthless to us ; we must ask
ourselves whence we derived our belief in these
three categories. Let us see if it is possible to
refuse to believe in them. If we can deprive
them of their value, the proof that they cannot be
applied to the world, is no longer a sufficient reason
for depriving that world of its value.

Result : The belief in the categories of reason *
is the cause of Nihilism we have measured the
worth of the world according to categories which
can only be applied to a purely fictitious world.

Conclusion: All values with which we have
tried, hitherto, to lend the world some worth, from
our point of view, and with which we have there-
fore deprived it of all worth (once these values have
been shown to be inapplicable) all these values,
are, psychologically, the results of certain views
of utility, established for the purpose of maintain-
ing and increasing the dominion of certain com-
munities : but falsely projected into the nature of
things. It is always man's exaggerated ingenuous-
ness to regard himself as the sense and measure of
all things.

Nihilism represents an intermediary pathological
condition (the vast generalisation, the conclusion
that there is no purpose in anything, is pathological) :

* This probably refers to Kant's celebrated table of twelve
categories. The four classes, quantity, quality, relation, and
modality, are each provided with three categories. TRANS-
LATOR'S NOTE.

1 6 THE WILL TO POWER.

whether it be that the productive forces are not
yet strong enough or that decadence still hesi-
tates and has not yet discovered its expedients.

The conditions of this hypothesis\ That there
is no truth ; that there is no absolute state of
affairs no " thing-in-itself." This itself is only
Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind. It finds
that the value of things consists precisely in the
fact that these values are not real and never have
been real, but that they are only a symptom of
strength on the part of the valuer, a simplification
serving ti\z purposes of existence.

14- v'

Values and their modification are related to the
growth of power of the valuer.

The measure of disbelief and of the " freedom
of spirit " which is tolerated, viewed as an expres-
sion of the growth of power.

" Nihilism ' viewed as the ideal of the highest
spiritual power, of the over-rich life, partly destruc-
tive, partly ironical.

15. ^

What is beliefl How is a belief born ? All
belief assumes that something is true.

The extremest form of Nihilism would mean
that all belief all assumption of truth is false :
because no real world is at hand. It were there-
fore : only an appearance seen in perspective, whose
origin must be found in us (seeing that we are
constantly in need of a narrower, a shortened, and
simplified world).

NIHILISM. 17

This should be realised, that the extent to
which we can, in our heart of hearts, acknowledge
appearance, and the necessity of falsehood, with-
out going to rack and ruin, is the measure of
strength.

In this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the nega-
tion of a real world and of Being, might be a
divine view of the world.

1 6.

If we are disillusioned, we have not become so
in regard to life, but owing to the fact that our
eyes have been opened to all kinds of " desiderata."
With mocking anger we survey that which is
called " Ideal" : we despise ourselves only because
we are unable at every moment of our lives to
quell that absurd emotion which is called " Ideal-
ism." This pampering by means of ideals is
stronger than the anger of the disillusioned one.

To what extent does Schopenhauerian Nihilism
continue to be the result of the same ideal as that
which gave rise to Christian Theism? The
amount of certainty concerning the most exalted
desiderata, the highest values and the greatest
degree of perfection, was so great, that the
philosophers started out from it as if it had been
an a priori and absolute fact \ " God " at the head,
as the given quantity Truth. " To become like
God," " to be absorbed into the Divine Being "
VOL. i. B

1 8 THE WILL TO POWER.

these were for centuries the most ingenuous and
most convincing desiderata (but that which con-
vinces is not necessarily true on that account:
it is nothing more nor less than convincing. An
observation for donkeys).

The granting of a personal-reality to this accre-
tion of ideals has been unlearned : people have
become atheistic. But has the ideal actually been
abandoned? The latest metaphysicians, as a
matter of fact, still seek their true " reality " in it
the "thing-in-itself" beside which everything
else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that
because our world of appearance is so obviously
not the expression of that ideal, it therefore cannot
be " true " and at bottom does not even lead
back to that metaphysical world as cause. The
unconditioned, in so far as it stands for that
highest degree of perfection, cannot possibly
be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopen-
hauer, who desired it otherwise, was obliged to
imagine this metaphysical basis as the antithesis
to the ideal, as " an evil, blind will " : thus it could
be "that which appears," that which manifests
itself in the world of appearance. But even so, he
did not give up that ideal absolute he circum-
vented it. ...

(Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of
"intelligible freedom,"* in order to relieve the
ens perfectum of the responsibility of having con-
trived this world as it is, in short, in order to
explain evil : scandalous logic for a philosopher !).

* See Note on p. n.

NIHILISM. 19

1 8.

The most general sign of modern times : in his
own estimation, man has lost an infinite amount of
dignity. For a long time he was the centre and
tragic hero of life in general ; then he endeavoured
to demonstrate at least his relationship to the
most essential and in itself most valuable side of
life as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold
fast to the dignity of man> in their belief that
moral values are cardinal values. He who has
let God go, clings all the more strongly to the
belief in morality,

19.

Every purely moral valuation (as, for instance,
the Buddhistic) terminates in Nihilism-. Europe
must expect the same thing ! It is supposed that
one can get along with a morality bereft of a
religious background ; but in this direction the road
to Nihilism is opened. There is nothing in religion
which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing
creatures.

20.

The question which Nihilism puts, namely, " to
what purpose ? " is the outcome of a habit, hitherto,
to regard the purpose as something fixed, given and
exacted/jr0w outside that is to say,by some super-
natural authority. Once the belief in this has been
unlearned, the force of an old habit leads to the
search after another authority, which would know
how to speak unconditionally \ and could point to

20 THE WILL TO POWER.

goals and missions. The authority of the conscience
now takes the first place (the more morality is
emancipated from theology, the more imperative
does it become) as a compensation for the personal
authority* Or the authority of reason. Or the
gregarious instinct (the herd). Or history with its
immanent spirit, which has its goal in itself, and to
which one can abandon oneself. One would like
to evade the will, as also the willing of a goal and
the risk of setting oneself a goal. One would like
to get rid of the responsibility (Fatalism would
be accepted). Finally: Happiness, and with a
dash of humbug, the happiness of the greatest
number.

It is said :

(1) A definite goal is quite unnecessary.

(2) Such a goal cannot possibly be foreseen.
Precisely now, when will in its fullest strength

were necessary, it is in the weakest and most /#./-
lanimous condition. Absolute mistrust concerning
the organising power of the will.

21.

The perfect Nihilist. The Nihilist's eye idealises
in an ugly sense, and is inconstant to what it
remembers : it allows its recollections to go astray
and to fade, it does not protect them from that
cadaverous coloration with which weakness dyes all
that is distant and past. And what it does not do
for itself it fails to do for the whole of the past of
mankind as well that is to say, it allows it to drop

NIHILISM. 21

22.

Nihilism. It may be two things :

A. Nihilism as a sign of enhanced spiritual
strength : active Nihilism.

B. Nihilism as a sign of the collapse and decline
of spiritual strength : passive Nihilism.

23.

Nihilism, a normal condition.

It may be a sign of strength ; spiritual vigour
may have increased to such an extent that the
goals toward which man has marched hitherto
(the " convictions," articles of faith) are no longer
suited to it (for a faith generally expresses the
exigencies of the conditions of existence, a submis-
sion to the authority of an order of things which
conduces to the prosperity, the growth and power of
a living creature . . .) ; on the other hand, a sign
of insufficient strength, to fix a goal, a " wherefore,"
and a faith for itself.

It reaches its maximum of relative strength, as
a powerful destructive force, in the form of active
Nihilism.

Its opposite would be weary Nihilism, which no
longer attacks: its most renowned form being
Buddhism : as passive Nihilism, a sign of weakness :
spiritual strength may be fatigued, exhausted, so
that the goals and values which have prevailed
hitherto are no longer suited to it and are no longer
believed in so that the synthesis of values and
goals (upon which every strong culture stands)

22 THE WILL TO POWER.

decomposes, and the different values contend with
one another : Disintegration^ then everything which
is relieving, which heals, becalms, or stupefies, steps
into the foreground under the cover of various dis-
guises, either religious, moral, political or aesthetic,
etc.

24.

Nihilism is not only a meditating over the " in
vain ! " not only the belief that everything de-
serves to perish; but one actually puts one's
shoulder to the plough ; one destroys. This, if you
will, is illogical ; but the Nihilist does not believe
in the necessity of being logical. ... It is the
condition of strong minds and wills ; and to these
it is impossible to be satisfied with the negation of
judgment: the negation by deeds proceeds from
their nature. Annihilation by the reasoning
faculty seconds annihilation by the hand

25.

Concerning the genesis of the Nihilist. The
courage of all one really knows comes but late
in life. It is only quite recently that I have ac-
knowledged to myself that heretofore I have been
a Nihilist from top to toe. The energy and
thoroughness with which I marched forward as a
Nihilist deceived me concerning this fundamental
fact. When one is progressing towards a goal
it seems impossible that " aimlessness per se"
should be one's fundamental article of faith.

NIHILISM. 23

26.

The Pessimism of strong natures. The " where-
fore " after a terrible struggle, even after victory.
That something may exist which is a hundred
times more important than the question, whether
we feel well or unwell, is the fundamental instinct of
all strong natures and consequently too, whether
the others feel well or unwell. In short, that we
have a purpose, for which we would not even
hesitate to sacrifice men> run all risks, and bend
our backs to the worst : this is the great passion.

2. FURTHER CAUSES OF NIHILISM.

27.

The causes of Nihilism : (i) The higher species is
lacking^ i.e., the species whose inexhaustible fruit-
fulness and power would uphold our belief in Man
(think only of what is owed to Napoleon almost
all the higher hopes of this century).

(2) The inferior species (" herd," " mass,"
" society ") is forgetting modesty, and inflates its
needs into cosmic and metaphysical values. In
this way all life is vulgarised', for inasmuch as the
mass of mankind rules, it tyrannises over the ex-
ceptions, so that these lose their belief in themselves
and become Nihilists.

All attempts to conceive of a new species come to
nothing (" romanticism," the artist, the philosopher ;
against Carlyle's attempt to lend them the highest
moral values).

24 THE WILL TO POWER.

The result is that higher types are resisted.

The downfall and insecurity of all higher types.
The struggle against genius ("popular poetry,"
etc.). Sympathy with the lowly and the suffering
as a standard for the elevation of the soul.

The philosopher is lacking, the interpreter of
deeds, and not alone he who poetises them.

28.

Imperfect Nihilism its forms: we are now
surrounded by them.

All attempts made to escape Nihilism, which
do not consist in transvaluing the values that
have prevailed hitherto, only make the matter
worse; they complicate the problem.

29.

The varieties of self - stupefaction. In one's
heart of hearts, not to know, whither ? Empti-
ness. The attempt to rise superior to it all by
means of emotional intoxication : emotional in-
toxication in the form of music, in the form of
cruelty in the tragic joy over the ruin of the
noblest, and in the form of blind, gushing en-
thusiasm over individual men or distinct periods
(in the form of hatred, etc.). The attempt to
work blindly, like a scientific instrument ; to keep
an eye on the many small joys, like an investi-
gator, for instance (modesty towards oneself) ; the
mysticism of the voluptuous joy of eternal empti-

NIHILISM. 25

ness ; art " for art's sake " ( le fait "), " immaculate
investigation," in the form of narcotics against the
disgust of oneself; any kind of incessant work,
any kind of small foolish fanaticism ; the medley
of all means, illness as the result of general pro-
fligacy (dissipation kills pleasure).

(1) As a result, feeble will-power.

(2) Excessive pride and the humiliation of
petty weakness felt as a contrast

30.

The time is coming when we shall have to pay
for having been Christians for two thousand years :
we are losing the firm footing which enabled us to
live for a long while we shall not know in what
direction we are travelling. We are hurling our-
selves headlong into the opposite valuations, with
that degree of energy which could only have been
engendered in man by an overvaluation of himself.

Now, everything is false from the root, words
and nothing but words, confused, feeble, or over-
strained.

(a) There is a seeking after a sort of earthly
solution of the problem of life, but in the same
sense as that of the final triumph of truth, love,
justice (socialism : " equality of persons ").

() There is also an attempt to hold fast to
the moral ideal (with altruism, self-sacrifice, and
the denial of the will, in the front rank).

(c) There is even an attempt to hold fast to
a " Beyond " : were it only as an antilogical x ;
but it is forthwith interpreted in such a way that

26 THE WILL TO POWER.

a kind of metaphysical solace, after the old style,
may be derived from it.

(d) There is an attempt to read the pheno-
mena of life in such a way as to arrive at the
divine guidance of old, with its powers of reward-
ing, punishing, educating, and of generally con-
ducing to a something better in the order of
things.

(e) People once more believe in good and
evil; so that the victory of the good and the
annihilation of the evil is regarded as a duty (this
is English, and is typical of that blockhead, John
Stuart Mill).

(/) The contempt felt for "naturalness," for
the desires and for the ego : the attempt to regard
even the highest intellectuality and art as a result
of an impersonal and disinterested attitude.

(g) The Church is still allowed to meddle in
all the essential occurrences and incidents in the
life of the individual, with a view to consecrat-
ing it and giving it a loftier meaning: we still
have the "Christian State" and the "Christian
marriage."

There have been more thoughtful and more
destructively thoughtful * times than ours : times
like those in which Buddha appeared, for instance,
in which the people themselves, after centuries of
sectarian quarrels, had sunk so deeply into the
abyss of philosophical dogmas, as, from time to

* zerdachtcre>

NIHILISM. 27

time, European people have done in regard to the
fine points of religious dogma. " Literature " and
the press would be the last things to seduce one
to any high opinion of the spirit of our times :
the millions of Spiritists, and a Christianity
with gymnastic exercises of that ghastly ugliness
which is characteristic of all English inventions,
throw more light on the subject.

European Pessimism is still in its infancy a
fact which argues against it: it has not yet
attained to that prodigious and yearning fixity of
sight to which it attained in India once upon a
time, and in which nonentity is reflected ; there
is still too much of the " ready-made," and not
enough of the " evolved " in its constitution, too
much learned and poetic Pessimism ; I mean that
a good deal of it has been discovered, invented,
and " created," but not caused.

32.

Criticism of the Pessimism which has prevailed
hitherto. The want of the eudaemonological
standpoint, as a last abbreviation of the question :
what is the purpose of it all ? The reduction of
gloom.

Our Pessimism : the world has not the value
which we believed it to have, our faith itself has
so increased our thirst for knowledge that we are
compelled to say this to-day. In the first place, it
seems of less value : at first it is felt to be of less
value, only in this sense are we pessimists, that
is to say, with the will to acknowledge this

28 THE WILL TO POWER.

transvaluation without reserve, and no longer, as
heretofore, to deceive ourselves and chant the old
old story.

It is precisely in this way that we find the
pathos which urges us to seek for new values. In
short : the world might have far more value than
we thought we must get behind the naivett of
our ideals^ for it is possible that, in our conscious
effort to give it the highest interpretation, we have
not bestowed even a moderately just value upon it.

What has been deified ? The valuing instinct
inside the community (that which enabled it to
survive).

What has been calumniated"* That which has
tended to separate higher men from their inferiors,
the instincts which cleave gulfs and build barriers.

33.

Causes effecting the rise of Pessimism :

(1) The most powerful instincts and those
which promised most for the future have hitherto
been calumniated, so that life has a curse upon it.

(2) The growing bravery and the more daring
mistrust on the part of man have led him to dis-
cover the fact that these instincts cannot be cut
adrift from life y and thus he turns to embrace
life.

(3) Only the most mediocre ', who are not
conscious of this conflict, prosper; the higher
species fail, and as an example of degeneration
tend to dispose all hearts against them on the
other hand, there is some indignation caused by

NIHILISM. 29

the mediocre positing themselves as the end and
meaning of all things. No one can any longer
reply to the question : " Why ? "

(4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest,
haste, and confusion are steadily increasing the
materialisation of all these tendencies, which is
called"civilisation,"becomes every day more simple,
with the result that, in the face of the monstrous
machine, the individual despairs and surrenders.

34-

Modern Pessimism is an expression of the use-
lessness only of the modern world, not of the
world and existence as such.

35-

The " preponderance of pain over pleasure? or
the reverse (Hedonism) ; both of these doctrines
are already signposts to Nihilism. . . .

For here, in both cases, no other final purpose
is sought than the phenomenon pleasure or pain.

But only a man who no longer dares to posit
a will, a purpose, and a final goal can speak in
this way according to every healthy type of
man, the worth of life is certainly not measured
by the standard of these secondary things. And
a preponderance of pain would be possible and, in
spite of it) a mighty will, a saying of yea to life,
and a holding of this preponderance for necessary.

"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation";
" what is the good of tears ? " this is a feeble and

30 THE WILL TO POWER.

sentimental attitude of mind. " Un monstre gai
vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux"

The philosophic Nihilist is convinced that all
phenomena are without sense and are in vain, and
that there ought to be no such thing as Being
without sense and in vain. But whence comes
this " There ought not to be ? " whence this
"sense" and this standard f At bottom the
Nihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate,
useless Being is unsatisfying to the philosopher,
and fills him with desolation and despair. This
aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensi-
bilities as a philosopher. It leads to the absurd
conclusion that the character of existence must
perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher if it is to
have any right to subsist.

Now it is easy to understand that happiness
and unhappiness, within the phenomena of this
world, can only serve the purpose of means : the
question yet remaining to be answered is, whether
it will ever be possible for us to perceive the
"object" and "purpose" of life whether the
problem of purposelessness or the reverse is not
quite beyond our ken.

37.

The development of Nihilism out of Pessimism.
The denaturalisation of Values. Scholasticism
of values, The values isolated, idealistic, instead

NIHILISM. 31

of ruling and leading action, turn against it and
condemn it.

Opposites introduced in the place of natural
gradations and ranks. Hatred of the order of
rank. Opposites are compatible with a plebeian
age, because they are more easy to grasp.

The rejected world is opposed to an artificially
constructed "true and valuable" one. At last
we discover out of what material the " true "
world was built; all that remains, now, is the
rejected world, and to the account of our reasons
for rejecting it we place our greatest disillusionment*

At this point Nihilism is reached ; the directing
values have been retained nothing more !

This gives rise to the problem of strength and
weakness :

(1) The weak fall to pieces upon it;

(2) The strong destroy what does not fall to
pieces of its own accord ;

(3) The strongest overcome the directing
values.

The whole condition of affairs produces the
tragic age.

3. THE NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT AS AN
EXPRESSION OF DECADENCE.

38.

Just lately an accidental and in every way
inappropriate term has been very much misused :
everywhere people are speaking of "Pessimism?

32 THE WILL TO POWER.

and there is a fight around the question (to which
some replies must be forthcoming): which is
right Pessimism or Optimism ?

People have not yet seen what is so terribly
obvious namely, that Pessimism is not a problem
but a symptom, that the term ought to be re-
placed by " Nihilism," that the question, " to be
or not to be," is itself an illness, a sign of
degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.

The Nihilistic movement is only an expression
of physiological decadence.

39-

To be understood: That every kind of decline
and tendency to sickness has incessantly been at
work in helping to create general evaluations:
that in those valuations which now dominate,
decadence has even begun to preponderate, that
we have not only to combat the conditions which
present misery and degeneration have brought
into being; but that all decadence, previous to
that of our own times, has been transmitted and
has therefore remained an active force amongst
us. A universal departure of this kind, on the
part of man, from his fundamental instincts, such
universal decadence of the valuing judgment, is
the note of interrogation par excellence, the real
riddle, which the animal " man " sets to all
philosophers.

40.

The notion " decadence " : Decay, decline, and
waste, are, per se> in no way open to objection ;

NIHILISM. 33

they are the natural consequences of life and vital
growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just
as necessary to life as advance or progress is : we
are not in a position which enables us to suppress
it. On the contrary, reason would have it retain -
its rights.

It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists
to argue that circumstances and social combina-
tions could be devised which would put an end
to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.
. . . But that is tantamount to condemning
Life ... a society is not at liberty to remain
young. And even in its prime it must bring
forth ordure and decaying matter. The more
energetically and daringly it advances, the richer
will it be in failures and in deformities, and the
nearer it will be to its fall. Age is not deferred by
means of institutions. Nor is illness. Nor is vice.

41.

Fundamental aspect of the nature of decadence :
what has heretofore been regarded as its causes
are its effects.

In this way, the whole perspective of the
problems of morality is altered.

All the struggle of morals against vice, luxury,
crime, and even against illness, seems a natvetf, a
superfluous effort : there is no such thing as
" improvement " (a word against repentance).

Decadence itself is not a thing that can be
withstood : it is absolutely necessary and is proper
to all ages and all peoples. That which must be
VOL. i. C

34 THE WILL TO POWER.

withstood, and by all means in our power, is the
spreading of the contagion among the sound parts
of the organism.

Is that done ? The very reverse is done. It
is precisely on this account that one makes a
stand on behalf of humanity.

How do the highest values created hitherto
stand in relation to this fundamental question in
biology ? Philosophy, religion, morality, art, etc.

(The remedy : militarism, for instance, from
Napoleon onwards, who regarded civilisation as
his natural enemy.)

42.

All those things which heretofore have been
regarded as the causes of degeneration^ are really
its effects.

But those things also which have been regarded
as the remedies of degeneration are only palliatives
of certain effects thereof: the "cured" are types
of the degenerate.

The results of decadence; vice viciousness;
illness sickliness ; crime criminality ; celibacy
sterility; hysteria the weakness of the will;
alcoholism ; pessimism, anarchy ; debauchery (also
of the spirit). The calumniators, underminers,
sceptics, and destroyers.

43-

Concerning the notion " decadence."
(i) Scepticism is a result of decadence: just
as spiritual debauchery is.

NIHILISM. 35

(2) Moral corruption is a result ot decadence
(the weakness of the will and the need of strong
stimulants).

(3) Remedies, whether psychological or moral,
do not alter the march of decadence, they do
not arrest anything ; physiologically they do not
count.

A peep into the enormous futility of these
pretentious " reactions " ; they are forms of
anaesthetising oneself against certain fatal
symptoms resulting from the prevailing condition
of things; they do not eradicate the morbid
element ; they are often heroic attempts to cancel
the decadent man, to allow only a minimum of
his deleterious influence to survive.

(4) Nihilism is not a cause, but only the
rationale of decadence.

(5) The "good" and the "bad" are no more
than two types of decadence : they come together
in all its fundamental phenomena.

(6) The social problem is a result of decadence.

(7) Illnesses, more particularly those attacking
the nerves and the head, are signs that the
defensive strength of strong nature is lacking ; a
proof of this is that irritability which causes
pleasure and pain to be regarded as problems of
the first order.

44.

The most common types of decadence :
(i) In the belief that they are remedies, cures
are chosen which only precipitate exhaustion ;
this is the case with Christianity (to point to the

36 THE WILL TO POWER,

most egregious example of mistaken instinct) ;
this is also the case with " progress."

(2) The power of resisting stimuli is on the
wane chance rules supreme : events are inflated
and drawn out until they appear monstrous . . .
a suppression of the " personality/ 1 a disintegration
of the will; in this regard we may mention a
whole class of morality, the altruistic, that which
is incessantly preaching pity, and whose most
essential feature is the weakness of the personality,
so that it rings in unison, and, like an over-
sensitive string, does not cease from vibrating . . .
extreme irritability. . . .

(3) Cause and effect are confounded : decad-
ence is not understood as physiological, and its
results are taken to be the causes of the general
indisposition : this applies to all religious
morality.

(4) A state of affairs is desired in which suffer-
ing shall cease ; life is actually considered the
cause of all ills unconscious and insensitive states
(sleep and syncope) are held in incomparably
higher esteem than the conscious states ; hence a
method of life.

45.

Concerning the hygiene of the " weak." All
that is done in weakness ends in failure. Moral :
*jlo nothing./ The worst of it is, that precisely the
strength required in order to stop action, and to
cease from reacting, is most seriously diseased
under thfe influence of weakness : that one never

NIHILISM. 37

reacts more promptly or more blindly than when
one should not react at all.

The strength of a character is shown by the
ability to delay and postpone reaction : a certain
aSiatfropia is just as proper to it, as involuntari-
ness in recoiling, suddenness and lack of restraint
in " action," are proper to weakness. The will is
weak : and the recipe for preventing foolish acts
would be : to have a strong will and to do nothing
contradiction. A sort of self-destruction, the
instinct of self-preservation is compromised. . . .
The iveak man injures himself. . . . That is the
decadent type.

As a matter of fact, we meet with a vast
amount of thought concerning the means where-
with impassibility may be induced. To this
extent, the instincts are on the right scent;
for to do nothing is more useful than to do
something. . . .

All the practices of private orders, of solitary
philosophers, and of fakirs, are suggested by a
correct consideration of the fact, that a certain
kind of man is most useful to himself when he
hinders his own action as much as possible.

Relieving measures : absolute obedience,
mechanical activity, total isolation from men
and things that might exact immediate decisions
and actions.

46.

Weakness of Will: this is a fable that can
lead astray. For there is no will, consequently
neither a strong nor a weak one. The multi-

38 THE WILL TO POWER.

plicity and disintegration of the instincts, the want
of system in their relationship, constitute what is
known as a " weak will" ; their co-ordination, under
the government of one individual among them,
results in a "strong will" in the first case
vacillation and a lack of equilibrium is noticeable :
in the second, precision and definite direction.

47-

That which is inherited is not illness, but ^.predis-
position to illness : a lack of the powers of resistance
against injurious external influences,etc.etc., broken
powers of resistance ; expressed morally : resigna-
tion and humility in the presence of the enemy.

I have often wondered whether it would not
be possible to class all the highest values of the
philosophies, moralities, and religions which have
been devised hitherto, with the values of the
feeble, the insane and the neurasthenic \ in a
milder form, they present the same evils.

The value of all morbid conditions consists
in the fact that they magnify certain normal
phenomena which are difficult to discern in
normal conditions. . . .

Health and illness are not essentially different,
as the ancient doctors believed and as a few
practitioners still believe to-day. They cannot
be imagined as two distinct principles or entities
which fight for the living organism and make it
their battlefield. That is nonsense and mere idle?
gossip, which no longer holds water. As a
matter of fact, there is only a difference of

NIHILISM. 39

degree between these two living conditions:
exaggeration, want of proportion, want of harmony
among the normal phenomena, constitute the
morbid state (Claude Bernard).

Just as " evil " may be regarded as exaggeration,
discord, and want of proportion, so can " good " be
regarded as a sort of protective diet against the
danger of exaggeration, discord, and want of
proportion.

Hereditary weakness as a dominant feeling : the
cause of the prevailing values.

N.B. Weakness is in demand why? . , .
mostly because people cannot be anything else
than weak.

Weakening considered a duty : The weakening
of the desires, of the feelings of pleasure and
of pain, of the will to power, of the will to pride,
to property and to more property ; weakening in
the form of humility ; weakening in the form of a
belief; weakening in the form of repugnance and
shame in the presence of all that is natural in
the form of a denial of life, in the form of illness
and chronic feebleness ; weakening in the form of
a refusal to take revenge, to offer resistance, to
become an enemy, and to show anger.

Blunders in the treatment : there is no attempt
at combating weakness by means of any fortifying
system ; but by a sort of justification consisting
of moralising ; fa., by means of interpretation.

Two totally different conditions are confused:
for instance, the repose of strength, which is essen-
tially abstinence from reaction (the prototype of
the gods whom nothing moves), and the peace of

4O THE WILL TO POWER.

exhaustion, rigidity to the point of anaesthesia.
All these philosophic and ascetic modes of pro-
cedure aspire to the second state, but actually
pretend to attain to the first ... for they ascribe
to the condition they have reached the attributes
that would be in keeping only with a divine state.

The most dangerous misunderstanding. There
is one concept which apparently allows of no
confusion or ambiguity, and that is the concept
exhaustion. Exhaustion may be acquired or in-
herited in any case it alters the aspect and
value of things.

Unlike him who involuntarily gives of the
superabundance which he both feels and repre-
sents, to the things about him, and who sees
them fuller, mightier, and more pregnant with pro-
mises, who, in fact, can bestow, the exhausted
one belittles and disfigures everything he sees he
impoverishes its worth : he is detrimental. . . .

No mistake seems possible in this matter : and
yet history discloses the terrible fact, that the
exhausted have always been confounded with those
with the most abundant resources, and the latter
with the most detrimental.

The pauper in vitality, the feeble one, im-
poverishes even life: the wealthy man, in vital
powers, enriches it The first is the parasite of
the second: the second is a bestower of his
abundance. How is confusion possible?

When he who was exhausted came forth with

NIHILISM. 41

the bearing of a very active and energetic man
(when degeneration implied a certain excess of
spiritual and nervous discharge), he was mistaken
for the wealthy man. He inspired terror. The
cult of the madman is also always the cult of him
who is rich in '^vitality, knd who is a powerful
man. The fanatic, the one possessed, the religious
epileptic, all eccentric creatures have been re-
garded as the highest types of power : as divine.

This kind of strength which inspires terror
seemed to be, above all, divine: this was the
starting-point of authority; here wisdom was
interpreted, hearkened to, and sought. Out of
this there was developed, everywhere almost, a
will to " deify," i.e., to a typical degeneration of
spirit, body, and nerves : an attempt to discover
the road to this higher form of being. To make
oneself ill or mad, to provoke the symptoms of
serious disorder was called getting stronger,
becoming more superhuman, more terrible and
more wise. People thought they would thus
attain to such wealth of power, that they would
be able to dispense it. Wheresoever there have
been prayers, some one has been sought who had
something to give away.

What led astray, here, was the experience of
intoxication. This increases the feeling of power
to the highest degree, therefore, to the mind of
the ingenuous, it is power. On the highest rung
of power the most intoxicated man must stand, the
ecstatic. (There are two causes of intoxication :
superabundant life, and a condition of morbid
nutritiorTbf the brain.)

42 THE WILL TO POWER.

49-

Acquired, not inherited exhaustion: (i) inade-
quate nourishment^ often the result of ignorance
concerning diet, as, for instance, in the case of
scholars; (2) erotic precocity: the damnation
more especially of the youth of France Parisian
youths, above all, who are already ruined and
defiled when they step out of their lyctes into the
world, and who cannot break the chains of de-
spicable tendencies ; ironical and scornful towards
themselves galley-slaves with every refinement
(moreover, in the majority of cases, already
a symptom of racial and family decadence, as
all hypersensitiveness is; and examples of the
infection of environment : to be Jnfluenced by
one's environment is also a sign of decadence);
(y alcoholism, not the insTincl :~T>ut~~the habit",
foolish imitation, the cowardly or vain adaptation
to a ruling fashion. What a blessing a Jew is
among Germans ! See the obtuseness, the flaxen
head, the blue eye, and the lack of intellect in the
face, the language, and the bearing ; the lazy habit
of stretching the limbs, and the need of repose
among Germans a need which is not the result
of overwork, but of the disgusting excitation and
over-excitation caused by alcohol.

50.

A theory of exhaustion. Vice, the insane (also
artists), the criminals, the anarchists these are

NIHILISM. 43

not the oppressed classes, but Jhe jnttcasts of the
community of all classesjhitherta

Seeing that all our classes are permeated by
these elements, we have grasped the fact that
modern society is not a " society " or a " body," but
a diseased agglomeration of Chandala, a society
which no longer has the strength even to excrete.

To what extent Tiving together For" centuries
has very much deepened sickliness :
modern virtue

modern intellect
modern science

as forms of disease.

51.

The state of corruption. The interrelation of all
forms of corruption should be understood, and
the Christian form (Pascal as the type), as also
the socialistic and communistic (a result of the
Christian), should not be overlooked (from the
standpoint of natural science, the highest concep-
tion of society according to socialists, is the lowest
in the order of rank among societies) ; the " Be-
yond" corruption: as though outside the real
world of Becoming there were a world of
Being.

Here there must be no compromise, but selec-
tion, annihilation, and war the Christian Nihilistic
standard of value must be withdrawn from all
things and attacked beneath every disguise . . .
for instance, from modern sociology^ music, and
Pessimism (all forms of the Christian ideal of
values)

44 THE WILL TO POWER.

Either one thing or the other is true : true that
is to say, tending to elevate the type man. , . .

The priest, the shepherd of souls, should be
looked upon as a form of life which must be sup-
pressed. All education, hitherto, has been help-
less, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the
contradiction of values.

52.

If Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is
not therefore immoral : the growth of physiological
and moral evils in the human race, is rather the
result of morbid and unnatural morality. The sen-
sitiveness of the majority of men is both morbid
and unnatural.

Why is it that mankind is corrupt in a moral
and physiological respect ? The body degenerates
if one organ is unsound. The right of altruism
cannot be traced to physiology, neither can the
right to help and to the equality of fate : these
are all premiums for degenerates and failures.

There can be no solidarity in a society con-
taining unfruitful, unproductive, and destructive
members, who, by the bye, are bound to have
offspring even more degenerate than they are
themselves.

S3.

Decadence exercises a profound and perfectly
unconscious influence, even over the ideals of
science : all our sociology is a proof of this pro-
position, and it has yet to be reproached with the

NIHILISM. 45

fact that it has only the experience of society in
the process of decay \ and inevitably takes its own
decaying instincts as the basis of sociological
judgment.

The declining vitality of modern Europe formu-
lates its social ideals in its decaying instincts:
and these ideals are all so like those of old and
effete races, that they might be mistaken for one
another.

The gregarious instinct, then, now a sovereign
power, is something totally different from the
instinct of an aristocratic society, and the value
of the sum depends upon the value of the units
constituting it. ... The whole of our sociology
knows no other instinct than that of the herd, />.,
of a multitude of mere ciphers of which every
cipher has " equal rights," and where it is a virtue
to be naught. . . .

The valuation with which the various forms of
society are judged to-day is absolutely the same
with that which assigns a higher place to peace
than to war : but this principle is contrary to the
teaching of biology, and is itself a mere outcome
of decadent life. Life is a result of war, society
is a means to war. . . . Mr. Herbert Spencer was
a decade'nt in biology, as also in morality (he
regarded the triumph of altruism as a de-
sideratum ! ! !).

54.

After thousands of years of error and confusion,
it is my good fortune to have rediscovered the
road which leads to a Yea and to a Nay.

46 THE WILL TO POWER.

I teach people to say Nay in the face of all
that makes for weakness and exhaustion.

I teach people to say Yea in the face of all
that makes for strength, that preserves strength,
and justifies the feeling of strength.

Up to the present, neither the one nor the
other has been taught ; but rather virtue, dis-
interestedness, pity, and even the negation of life.
All these are values proceeding from exhausted
people.

After having pondered over the physiology
of exhaustion for some time, I was led to the
question: to what extent the judgments of ex-
hausted people had percolated into the world of
values.

The result at which I arrived was as startling
as it could possibly be even for one like my-
self who was already at home in many a strange
world : I found that all prevailing values that is
to say, all those which had gained ascendancy
over humanity, or at least over its tamer portions,
could be traced back to the judgment of exhausted
people.

Under the cover of the holiest names, I found
the mosF destructive tendencies; people had
actually given the name " God " to all that renders
weak, teaches weakness, and infects with weakness.
... I found that the " good man " was a formi
of self-affirmation on the part of decadence. ^

That virtue which Schopenhauer still pro-
claimed as superior to all, and as the most funda-
mental of all virtues; even that same pity I
recognised as more dangerous than any vice.

NIHILISM. 47

Deliberately to thwart the law of selection among
species, and their natural means of purging their
stock of degenerate members this, up to my
time, had been the greatest of all virtues. . . .
One should do honour to the fatality which

The opposing of this fatality, the botching of
mankind and the allowing of it to putrefy, was
given the name " God." One shall not take the
name of the Lord one's God in vain. . . .

The race is corrupted not by its vices, but by
its ignorance : it is corrupted because it has not
recognised exhaustion as exhaustion : physio-
fogicaT misunderstandings are the cause of all
evil.

Virtue is our greatest misunderstanding.

Problem: how were the exhausted able to
make the laws of values ? In other words, how
did they who are the last, come to power ? . . .
How did the instincts of the animal man ever get
to stand on their heads ? . .

4. THE CRISIS: NIHILISM AND THE IDEA OF
RECURRENCE.

55.

Extreme positions are^ not relieved Joy more
moderate^ ones, Bu^ by extreme opposite positions.
^ n ^ th us the Belief in the utter immorality of
Mature, and in the absence of all purpose and sense]
are psychologically necessafy^assTons when the

48 THE WILL TO POWER.

belief in God and in an essentially moral ordgrof_
things is no longer tenable. ~~

Nihilism now appears, not because the sorrows
of existence are greater than they were formerly,
but because, in a general way, people have grown
suspicious of the " meaning " which might be given
to evil and even to existence. One interpretation
has been overthrown : but since it was held to be
the interpretation, it seems as though there were
no meaning in existence at all, as though every-
thing were in vain.

*

It yet remains to be shown that this " in vain ! "
is the character of present Nihilism. The mistrust
of our former valuations has increased to such an
extent that it has led to the question : " are not
all ' values ' merely allurements prolonging the
duration of the comedy, without, however, bringing
the unravelment any closer ? " The " long period
of time" which has culminated in an "in vain"
without either goal or purpose, is the most par-
alysing of thoughts, more particularly when one
sees that one is duped without, however, being
able to resist being duped.

*

Let us imagine this thought in its worst form :
existence, as it is, without either a purpose or a
goal, but inevitably recurring, without an end in
nonentity : " Eternal Recurrence?

This is the extremest form of Nihilism : nothing
(purposelessness) eternal 1

NIHILISM. 49

European form of Buddhism: the energy of
knowledge and of strength drives us to such a
belief. It is the most scientific of all possible
hypotheses. We deny final purposes. If exist-
ence had a final purpose it would have reached it.

It should be understood that what is being
aimed at, here, is a contradiction of Pantheism :
for " everything perfect, divine, eternal," also leads
to the belief in Eternal Recurrence. Question:
has this pantheistic and affirmative attitude to all
things also been made impossible by morality?
At bottom only the moral God has been overcome,
Is .there any sense in imagining a God " beyond
good and evil " ? Would Pantheism in this sense
be possible ? Do we withdraw the idea of purpose
from the process, and affirm the process notwith-
standing ? This were so if, within that process,
something were attained every moment and
always the same thing. Spinoza won an affirma-
tive position of this sort, in the sense that every
moment, according to him, has a logical necessity :
and he triumphed by means of his fundamentally
logical instinct over a like conformation of the
world.

But his case is exceptional. If every funda-
mental trait of character^ which lies beneath every
act, and which finds expression in every act, were
recognised by the individual as his fundamental

VOL. i. D

50 THE WILL TO POWER.

trait of character, this individual would be driven
to regard every moment of existence in general,
triumphantly as good. It would simply be neces-
sary for that fundamental trait of character to b&
felt in oneself as something good, valuable, anf!
pleasurable.

Now, in the case of those men and classes of
men who were treated with violence and oppressed
by their fellows, morality saved life from despair
and from the leap into nonentity : for impotence
in relation to mankind and not in relation to
Nature is^w n &t generates the most desperate
bitterness towards existence/ Morality treated
tKe' powerful, tHe violent7~ancT the " masters " in
general, as enemies against whom the common
man must be protected that is to say, emboldened,
strengthened. Morality has therefore always taught
the most profound hatred and contempt of the
fundamental trait of character of all rulers z>.,
their Will to Power. To suppress, to deny, and
to decompose this morality, would mean to regard
this most thoroughly detested instinct with the
reverse of the old feeling and valuation. If the
sufferer and the oppressed man were to lose his
belief in his right to contemn the Will to Power,
his position would be desperate. This would be
so if the trait above-mentioned were essential to
life, in which case it would follow that even
that will to morality was only a cloak to this
" Will to Power," as are also even that hatred and
contempt The oppressed man would then per-

NIHILISM. 51

ceive that he stands on the same platform with the
oppressor, and that he has no individual privilege,
nor any higher rank than the latter.

*

On the contrary \ There is nothing on earth
which can have any value, if it have not a modicum
of power granted, of course, that life itself is the
Will to Power. Morality protected the botched
and bungled against Nihilism, in that it gave every
one of them infinite worth, metaphysical worth,
and classed them altogether in one order which
did not correspond with that of worldly power and
order of rank : it taught submission, humility, etc.
Admitting that the belief in this morality be destroyed,
the botched and the bungled would no longer have
any comfort, and would *

This perishing seems like self-annihilation, like
an instinctive selection of that which must de-
stroy. The symptoms of this self-destruction of
the botched and the bungled: self- vivisection,
poisoning, intoxication, romanticism, and, above
all, the instinctive constraint to acts whereby the
powerful are made into mortal enemies (training,
so to speak, one's own hangmen), the ^vill to destruc-
tion as the will of a still deeper instinct of the
instinct of self-destruction, of the Will to Nonentity.

*

Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled
have no longer any consolation, that they destroy

52 THE WILL TO POWER.

in order to be destroyed, that, having been deprived
of morality, they no longer have any reason to
" resign themselves," that they take up their stand
on the territory of the opposite principle, and will
also exercise power themselves, by compelling the
powerful to become their hangmen. This is the
European form of Buddhism, that active negation,
after all existence has lost its meaning.

*

It must not be supposed that " distress " has
grown more acute, on the contrary 1 " God,
morality, resignation " were remedies in the very
deepest stages of misery: active Nihilism made
its appearance in circumstances which were rela-
tively much more favourable. The fact, alone, that
morality is regarded as overcome, presupposes a
certain degree of intellectual culture; while this
very culture, for its part, bears evidence to a
certain relative well-being. A certain intellectual
fatigue, brought on by the long struggle concerning
philosophical opinions, and carried to hopeless
scepticism against philosophy, shows moreover that
the level of these Nihilists is by no means a low
one. Only think of the conditions in which
Buddha appeared I The teaching of the eternal
recurrence would have learned principles to go
upon (just as Buddha's teaching, for instance, had
the notion of causality, etc.).

What do we mean to-day by the words " botched
and bungled " ? In the first place, they are used

NIHILISM. 53

physiologically and not politically. The unhealthiest
kind of man all over Europe (in all classes) is the
soil out of which Nihilism grows : this species of
man will regard eternal recurrence as damnation
once he is bitten by the thought, he can no longer
recoil before any action,, He would not extirpate
passively, but would cause everything to be extir-
pated which is meaningless and without a goal to
this extent ; although it is only a spasm, or sort of
blind rage in the presence of the fact that everything
has existed again and again for an eternity even
this period of Nihilism and destruction. The value
of such a crisis is that it purifies, that it unites similar
elements, and makes them mutually destructive,
that it assigns common duties to men of opposite
persuasions, and brings the weaker and more un-
certain among them to the light, thus taking the
first step towards a new order of rank among forces
from the standpoint of health : recognising com-
manders as commanders, subordinates as sub-
ordinates. Naturally irrespective of all the
present forms of society.

What class of men will prove they are strongest
in this new order of things ? The most moderate
they who do not require any extreme forms of
belief, they who not only admit of, but actually
like, a certain modicum of chance and nonsense ;
they who can think of man with a very moderate
view of his value, without becoming weak and
small on that account; the most rich in health,

54 THE WILL TO POWER

who are able to withstand a maximum amount
of sorrow, and who are therefore not so very much
afraid of sorrow men who are certain of their
power> and who represent with conscious pride the
state of strength to which man has attained.

*

How could such a man think of Eternal Re-
currence ?

56.

The Periods of European Nihilism.

The Period of Obscurity : all kinds of groping
measures devised to preserve old institutions and
not to arrest the progress of new ones.

The Period of Light; men see that old and
new are fundamental contraries ; that the old
values are born of descending life, and that the
new ones are born of ascending life that all old
ideals are unfriendly to life (born of decadence
and determining it, however much they may be
decked oat in the Sunday finery of morality).
We understand the old, but are far from being
sufficiently strong for the new.

The Periods of the Three Great Passions : con-
tempt, pity, destruction.

The Periods of Catastrophes : the rise of a teach-
ing which will sift mankind . . . which drives
the weak to some decision and the strong also.

II.

CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN NIHILISM.

(a) MODERN GLOOMINESS.

My friends, we had aharcT time as youths; we even
suffered from youth itself as though it were a serious
disease. This is owing to the age in which we were
born an age of enormous internal decay and dis-
integration which, with all its weakness and even
with the best of its strength, is opposed to the
spirit of youth. Disintegration that is to say, un-
certainty is peculiar to this age : nothing stands
on solid ground or on a sound faith. People live
for the morrow, because the day-after-to-morrow is
doubtful. All our road is slippery and dangerous,
while the ice which still bears us has grown un-
conscionably thin : we all feel the mild and grue-
some breath of the thaw-wind soon, where we are
walking, no one will any longer be able to stand 1

5 8.

If this is not an age of decay and of diminishing
vitality, it is at least one of indiscriminate and
arbitrary experimentalising and it is probable
that out of an excess of abortive experiments there

$6 THE WILL TO POWER.

has grown this general impression, as of decay :
and perhaps decay itself.

59-

Concerning the history of modern gloominess.

The state-nomads (officials, etc.): "home-
less".

The break-up of the family.

The " good man " as a symptom of exhaustion.

Justice as Will to Power (Rearing).

Lewdness and neurosis.

Black music : whither has real music gone ?

The anarchist.

Contempt of man, loathing.

Most profound distinction : whether hunger or
superabundance is creative ? The first creates the
Ideals of Romanticism.

Northern unnaturalness.

The need of Alcohol : the " need " of the work-
ing classes.

Philosophical Nihilism.

60.

The slow advance and rise of the middle and
lower classes (including the lower kind of spirit
and body), which was already well under way
before the French Revolution, and would have
made the same progress forward without the latter,
in short, then, the preponderance of the herd
over all herdsmen and bell-wethers, brings in its
train :

(i) Gloominess of spirit (the juxtaposition of
a stoical and a frivolous appearance of happiness,

NIHILISM. 57

peculiar to noble cultures, is on the decline ; much
suffering is allowed to be seen and heard which
formerly was borne in concealment ;

(2) Moral hypocrisy (a way of distinguishing
oneself through morality, but by means of the
values of the herd: pity, solicitude, moderation; and
not by means of those virtues which are recognised
and honoured outside the herd's sphere of power) ;

(3) A really large amount of sympathy with
both pain and joy (a feeling of pleasure resulting
from being herded together, which is peculiar to
all gregarious animals " public spirit," " patriot-
ism/' everything, in fact, which is apart from the
individual).

61.

Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to
mitigate distress, to honour it, and to wage war in
advance with unpleasant possibilities, is an age of
t\\tpoor. Our " rich people " they are the poorest !
The real purpose of all wealth has been forgotten.

62.

Criticism of modern man : " the good man," but
corrupted and misled by bad institutions (tyrants
and priests); reason elevated to a position of
authority ; history-is regarded as the surmounting
of errors ; the future is regarded as progress ;
the Christian state ("God of the armies");
Christian sexual intercourse (as marriage) ; the
realm of "justice" (the cult of "mankind");
" freedom."

The romantic attitudes of the modern man :

58 THE WILL TO POWER.

the noble man (Byron, Victor Hugo, George Sand) ;
taking the part of the oppressed and the bungled
and the botched : motto for historians and
romancers; the Stoics of duty ; disinterestedness
regarded as art and as knowledge ; altruism as
the most mendacious form of egoism (utilitarianism),
the most sentimental form of egoism.

All this savours of the eighteenth century. But
it had other qualities which were not inherited,
namely, a certain insouciance, cheerfulness, ele-
gance, spiritual clearness. The spiritual tempo
has altered ; the pleasure which was begotten by
spiritual refinement and clearness has given room
to the pleasure of colour, harmony, mass, reality,
etc. etc. Sensuality in spiritual things. In short,
it is the eighteenth century of Rousseau.

63-

Taken all in all, a considerable amount of
humanity has been attained by our men of to-day.
That we do not feel this is in itself a proof of the
fact that we have become so sensitive in regard to
small cases of distress, that we somewhat unjustly
overlook what has been achieved.

Here we must make allowances for the fact
that a great deal of decadence is rife, and that,
through such eyes, our world must appear bad and
wretched. But these eyes have always seen in the
same way, in all ages.

(1) A certain hypersensitiveness, even in moral
feelings.

(2) The quantum of bitterness and gloominess,

NIHILISM. 59

which pessimism bears with it in its judgments
both together have helped to bring about the pre-
ponderance of the other and opposite point of view,
that things are not well with our morality.

The fact of credit, of the commerce of the world,
and the means of traffic are expressions of an
extraordinarily mild trustfulness in men. ... To
that may also be added

(3) The deliverance of science from moral and
religious prejudices : a very good sign, though for
the most part misunderstood.

In my own way, I am attempting a justification
of history.

The second appearance of Buddhism. Its pre-
cursory signs: the increase of pity. Spiritual
exhaustion. The reduction of all problems to the
question of pleasure and pain. The glory of war
which calls forth a counter-stroke. Just as the
sharp demarcation of nations generates a counter-
movement in the form of the most hearty
" Fraternity." The fact that it is impossible for
religion to carry on its work any longer with
dogma and fables.

The catastrophe of Nihilism will put an end to
all this Buddhistic culture.

That which is most sorely afflicted to-day is
the instinct and will of tradition : all institutions
which owe their origin to this instinct, are opposed

60 THE WILL TO POWER.

to the tastes of the age. ... At bottom, nothing
is thought or done which is not calculated to tear '
up this spirit of tradition by the roots. Tradition
is looked upon as a fatality; it is studied and
acknowledged (in the form of "heredity"), but
people will not have anything to do with it. The
extension of one will over long periods of time, the
selection of conditions and valuations which make
it possible to dispose of centuries in advance this,
precisely, is what is most utterly anti-modern.
From which it follows, that disorganising principles
give our age its specific character.

66.

" Be simple " a demand which, when made to
us complicated and incomprehensible triers of the
heart and reins, is a simple absurdity. ... Be
natural : but if one should be by nature " un-,
natural,' 1 what then ?

67.

The means employed in former times in order
to arrive at similarly constituted and lasting types,
throughout long generations : entailed property
and the respect of elders (the origin of the faith
in gods and heroes as ancestors).

Now, the subdivision of property belongs to the
opposite tendency. A newspaper instead of the
daily prayers. Railways, the telegraph. The
centralisation of an enormous number of different
interests in one soul : which, to that end^ must be
very strong and mutable.

NIHILISM. 6l

68.

Why does everything become mummery. The
modern man is lacking in unfailing instinct (instinct
being understood here to mean that which is the
outcome of a long period of activity in the same
occupation on the part of one family of men) ; the
incapability of producing anything/*;/^, is simply
the result of this lack of instinct : one individual
alone cannot make up for the schooling his ancestors
should have transmitted to him.

What a morality or book of law creates : that
deep instinct which renders automatism and per-
fection possible in life and in work.

But now we have reached the opposite point ;
yes, we wanted to reach it the most extreme con-
sciousness, through introspection on the part of man
and of history : and thus we are practically most
distant from perfection in Being, doing, and willing :
our desires even our will to knowledge shows
how prodigiously decadent we are. We are striving
after the very reverse of what strong races and strong
natures will have understanding is an end. . . A

That Science is possible in the way in which it
is practised to-day, proves that all elementary
instincts, the instincts which ward off danger and
protect life, are no longer active. We no longer
save, we are merely spending the capital of our
forefathers, even in the way in which we pursue
knowledge.

69.

Nihilistic trait.

(a) In the natural sciences (" purposelessness "),

62 THE WILL TO POWER.

causality, mechanism, " conformity to law," an in-
terval, a rfemnant.

() Likewise in politics : the individual lacks the
belief in his own right, innocence ; falsehood rules
supreme, as also opportunism.

(c) Likewise in political economy : the abolition
of slavery : the lack of a redeeming class, and of
one who justifies the rise of anarchy. "Educa-
tion"?

(d) Likewise in history : fatalism, Darwinism ;
the last attempts at reconciling reason and Godli-
ness fail. Sentimentality in regard to the past :
biographies can no longer be endured ! (Pheno-
menalism even here: character regarded as a
mask; there are no facts.)

(e) Likewise in Art\ romanticism and its
counter-stroke (repugnance towards romantic ideals
and lies). The latter, morally, as a sense of great-
est truthfulness, but pessimistic. Pure " artists "
(indifference as to the " subject "). (The psych-
ology of the father-confessor and puritanical psy-
chology two forms of psychological romanticism :
but also their counter-stroke, the attempt to main-
tain a purely artistic attitude towards " men M but
even in this respect no one dares to make the
opposite valuation.)

70.

Against the teaching of the influence of environ-
ment and external causes : the power coming from
inside is infinitely superior ; much that appears like
influence acting from without is merely the sub-
jection of environment to this inner power. Pre-

NIHILISM. 63

cisely the same environment may be used and
interpreted in opposite ways : there are no facts.
A genius is not explained by such theories con-
cerning origins.

" Modernity " regarded in the light of nutrition
and digestion.

Sensitiveness is infinitely more acute (beneath
moral vestments : the increase of pity), the abund-
ance of different impressions is greater than ever.
The cosmopolitanism of articles of diet, of literature,
newspapers, forms, tastes, and even landscapes.
The speed of this affluence is prestissimo ; im-
pressions are wiped out, and people instinctively
guard against assimilating anything or against
taking anything seriously and " digesting " it ; the
result is a weakening of the powers of digestion.
There begins a sort of adaptation to this accumula-
tion of impressions, .^..Man unlearns^the^art^Qf daing^
and/?// he does is to raft?T^stlHiuli coming_Jrom
his enylFonment. JfeTspends his strength^ partly
in the process of assimilation, partly in defending
himself^ and again partly in responding to stimuli.
Profound enfeeblement of spontaneity: the his-
torian, the critic, the analyst, the interpreter, the
observer, the collector, the reader, all reactive
talents, all science !

Artificial modification of one's own nature in
order to make it resemble a " mirror " ; ong_js
interested, but only epidermall^ : this is system-
aSc^cboliiess, equilibrium, a steady low temperature,

64 THE WILL TO POWER.

just beneath the thin surface on which warmth,
movement, " storm," and undulations play.

Opposition of external mobility to a certain dead
heaviness and fatigue.

72.

Where must our modern world be classed
under exhaustion or under increasing strength ?
Its multiformity and lack of repose are brought
about by the highest form of consciousness.

73-

Overwork, curiosity and sympathy our modern
vices.

74.

A contribution to the characterisation of " Moder-
nity!' Exaggerated development of intermediate
forms ; the decay of types ; the break-up of tradi-
tion, schools ; the predominance of the instincts
(philosophically prepared : the unconscious has the
greater value) after the appearance of the enfeeble-
ment of will power and of the will to an end and
to the means thereto.

75-

A capable artisan or scholar cuts a good figure
if he have his pride in his art, and looks pleasantly
and contentedly upon life. On the other hand,
there is no sight more wretched than that of a
cobbler or a schoolmaster who, with the air of a
martyr, gives one to understand that he was really

NIHILISM. 65

born for something better. There is nothing better
than what is good ! and that is : to have a certain
kind of capacity and to use it. This is virtii in
the Italian style of the Renaissance.

Nowadays, when the state has a nonsensically
oversized belly, in all fields and branches of work
there are " representatives^ over and above the i
real workman": "for instance, in addition to the
scholars, there are the journalists ; in addition to
the suffering masses, thereis a crowd of jabbering
and bragging ne'er-do-wells who " represent " that
suffering not to speak of the professional politi-
cians who, though quite satisfied with their lot,
stand up in Parliament and, with strong lungs,
" represent " grievances. Our modern life is ex-
tremely expensive^ thanks to the host of middlemen
that infest it ; whereas in the city of antiquity,
and in many a city of Spain and Italy to-day,
where there is an echo of the, ancient spirit, the
man himself comes forward and will have nothing
to do with a representative or an intermediary in
the modern style except perhaps to kick him
hence !

The pre-eminence of the merchant and the
middleman^ even in the most intellectual spheres :
the journalist, the "representative," the historian
(as an intermediary between the past and the pre-
sent), the exotic and cosmopolitan, the middleman
between natural science and philosophy, the semi-
theologians.

VOL. i.

66 THE WILL TO POWER.

The men I have regarded with the most loathing,
heretofore, are the parasitesjpf intellect : they are
to be found everywhere, already, in our modern
Europe, and as a matter of fact their conscience is
as light as it possibly can be. They may be a
little turbid, and savour somewhat of Pessimism,
but in the main they are voracious, dirty, dirtying,
stealthy, insinuating, light-fingered gentry, scabby
and as innocent as all small sinners and microbes
are. They live at the expense of those who have
intellect and who distribute it liberally : they know
that it is peculiar to the rich mind to live in a dis-
interested fashion, without taking too much petty
thought for the morrow, and to distribute its wealth
prodigally. For intellect is a bad domestic econo-
mist, and pays no heed whatever to the fact that
everything lives oh it and devours it.

78.
MODERN MUMMERY

The motleyness of modern men and its charm
Essentially a mask and a sign of boredom.
The journalist.

The political man (in the " national swindle ").
Mummery in the arts :

The lack of honesty in preparing and school-
ing oneself for them (Fromentin) ;

NIHILISM. 67

The Romanticists (their lack of philosophy
and science and their excess of literature) ;
The novelists (Walter Scott, but also the
monsters of the Nibelung, with their in-
ordinately nervous music) ;
The lyricists.
" Scientifically."
Virtuosos (Jews).

The popular ideals are overcome, but not yet
in the presence of the people :

The saint, the sage, the prophet.

79-

The want of discipline in the modern spirit con-
cealed beneath all kinds of moral finery. The
show-words are : JToleration (for^the "incapacity
of saying j[es_or jio^; la largeur de sympathie
(^aTtHTrd of indifference, a third of curiosity, and
a third of morbid susceptibility) ; " objectivity "
(the lack of personality and of will, and the in-
ability to " love ") ; " freedom " in regard to the
rule (Romanticism) ; " truth " as opposed to false-
hood and lying (Naturalism); the "scientific
spirit " (the " human document " : or, in plain
English, the serial story which means " addition "
instead of " composition ") ; " passion " in the
place of disorder and intemperance ; " depth " in
the place of confusion and the pell-mell of symbols.

80.

Concerning the criticism of big words. I am full
of mistrust and malice towards what is called

68 THE WILL TO POWER.

" ideal " : this is my Pessimism y that I have recog-
nised to what extent " sublime sentiments " are
a source of evil that is to say, a belittling and
depreciating of man.

Every time "progress" is expected to result
from an ideal, disappointment invariably follows ;
the triumph of an ideal has always been a retro-
grade movement.

Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery,
equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice,
truth : all these big words are only valuable in a
struggle, as banners : not as realities, but as show-
words, for something quite different (yea, even quite
opposed to what they mean !).

81.

The kind of man is known who has fallen in
love with the sentence " tout comprendre dest tout
pardonner? Jt is the weak and, above all, the dis-
illusioned : if there is something to pardon in
everything, there is also something to contemn !
It is the philosophy of disappointment, which here
swathes itself so humanly in pity, and gazes out
so sweetly.

They are Romanticists, whose faith has gone to
pot : now they at least wish to look on and see
how everything vanishes and fades. They call it
fart pour I' art, "objectivity," etc.

82.

The main symptoms of Pessimism : Dinners at
Magny's ; Russian Pessimism (Tolstoy, Dostoiew-

NIHILISM. 69

sky) ; aesthetic Pessimism, Fart pour 1'art, " de-
scription" (the romantic and the anti-romantic
Pessimism); Pessimism in the theory of know-
ledge (Schopenhauer : phenomenalism) ; anarchical
Pessimism ; the " religion of pity," Buddhistic
preparation ; the Pessimism of culture (exoticness,
cosmopolitanism) ; moral Pessimism, myself.

83-

" Without the Christian Faith? said Pascal, " you
would yourselves be like nature and history, un
monstre et un chaos? We fulfilled this prophecy :
once the weak and optimistic eighteenth century
had embellished and rationalised man.

Schopenhauer and Pascal. In one essential point,
Schopenhauer is the first who takes up Pascal's
movement again : un monstre et un chaos, conse-
quently something that must be negatived . . .
history, nature, and man himself !

" Our inability to know the truth is the result of
our corruption, of our moral decay? says Pascal.
And Schopenhauer says essentially the same.
" The more profound the corruption of reason is,
the more necessary is the doctrine of salvation "
or, putting it into Schopenhauerian phraseology,
negation.

8 4 .

Schopenhauer as an epigone (state of affairs
before the Revolution): Pity, sensuality, art,
weakness of will, Catholicism of the most intel-
lectual desires that is, at bottom, the good old
eighteenth century.

70 THE WILL TO POWER.

Schopenhauer y s fundamental misunderstanding
of the will (just as though passion, instinct, and
desire were the essential factors of will) is typical :
the depreciation of the will to the extent of mis-
taking it altogether. Likewise the hatred of
willing : the attempt at seeing something superior
yea, even superiority itself, and that which really
matters, in non-willing, in the "subject-being
without aim or intention." Great symptom of
fatigue or of the weakness of will: for this, in
reality, is what treats the passions as master, and
directs them as to the way and to the measure. . . ,

85.

The undignified attempt has been made to regard
Wagner and Schopenhauer as types of the mentally
unsound : an infinitely more essential understanding
of the matter would have been gained if the exact
decadent type which each of them represents had
been scientifically and accurately defined.

86.

Henrik Ibsen has become very clear to me.
With all his robust idealism and " Will to Truth/'
he never dared to ring himself free from moral-
illusionism which says " freedom," and will not
admit, even to itself, what freedom is : the second
stage in the metamorphosis of the "Will to Power,"
in him who lacks it. In the first stage, one
demands justice at the hands of those who have
power. IfTtEe^second, one speaks of " freedom,"

NIHILISM. 71

that is to say, one wishes to " shake oneself free "
from those who have power. In the third stage,
one speaks of " ejgualjiglits,"- that is to^siayj sq_
long as one is not a predominant personality one
^wishes to prevent bne's competitors from growing
nTpower. ~~

87.

The Decline of Protestantism : theoretically and
historically understood as a half-measure. Un-
deniable predominance of Catholicism to-day:
Protestant feeling is so dead that the strongest
anti- Protestant movements (Wagner's Parsifal, for
instance) are no longer regarded as such. The
whole of the more elevated intellectuality in France
is Catholic in instinct; Bismarck recognised that
there was no longer any such thing as Protest-
antism.

88.

Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and
tiresome form of decadence, in which Christianity
has known how to survive in the mediocre North,
is something incomplete and complexly valuable
for knowledge, in so far as it was able to bring
experiences of different kinds and origins into the
same heads.

89.

What has the German spirit not made out of
Christianity! And, to refer to Protestantism
again, how much beer is there not still in Pro-
testant Christianity ! Can a crasser, more indolent,
and more lounging form of Christian belief be

72 THE WILL TO POWER.

imagined, than that of the average German Pro-
testant ? ... It is indeed a very humble Christi-
anity. J^cdljtjthe Homoeopathy of Christianity !
I am ' remindecT tEat, to-3ay, there also exists a
less humble sort of Protestantism ; it is taught by
royal chaplains and anti-Semitic speculators : but
nobody has ever maintained that any "spirit"
" hovers " over these waters. It is merely a less
respectable form of Christian faith, not by any
means a more comprehensible one.

Progress. Let us be on our guard lest we
uv^ceive ourselves ! Time flies forward apace,
we would fain believe that everything flies forward
with it, that evolution is an advancing develop-
ment. . . . That is the appearance of things which
deceives the most circumspect. But the nineteenth
century shows no advance whatever on the six-
teenth: and the German spirit of 1888 is an
example of a backward movement when compared
with that of 1788. . . . Mankind does not
advance, it does not even- exist. The aspect of
the whole is much more like that of a huge experi-
menting workshop where some things in all ages
succeed, while an incalculable number of things
fail ; where all order, logic, co-ordination, and
responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the
fact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent
movement? that the German Reformation was
a recrudescence of Christian barbarism ? that the
Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisa-

NIHILISM. 73

tion of society on a large scale? . . . Man is not
an example of progress as compared with animals :
the tender son of culture is an abortion compared
with the Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman
is a more successful type that is to say, possess-
ing more lasting powers than the European.

(V) THE LAST CENTURIES.

91.

Gloominess and pessimistic influence necessarily
follow in the wake of enlightenment Towards
1770 a falling-off in cheerfulness was already
noticeable ; women, with that very feminine instinct
which always defends virtue, believed that immor-
ality was the cause of it. Galiani hit the bull's
eye : he quotes Voltaire's verse :

" Un monstre gai vaut mieux
Qu'un sentimental ennuyeux."

If now I maintain that I am ahead, by a
century or two of enlightenment, of Voltaire and
Galiani who was much more profound, how
deeply must I have sunk into gloominess ! This
is also true, and betimes I somewhat reluctantly
manifested some caution in regard to the German
and Christian narrowness and inconsistency of
Schopenhauerian or, worse still, Leopardian Pessim-
ism, and sought the most characteristic form (Asia).
But, in order to endure that extreme Pessimism
(which here and there peeps out of my Birth of
Tragedy), to live alone " without God or morality,"

74 THE WILL TO POWER.

I was compelled to invent a counter-prop for my-
self. Perf^sJLkrLQjy-best why^man is JthSLSPJi
janimaljliat laughs.: he alone^su^rs_so ^xcruciat-
ingly that he w^Wmfefled to invent laughter.
The unhappiest and most melancholy animaLis,
asTmight have been expected, the most cheerful.

92.

In regard to German culture, I have always had
a feeling as of decline. The fact that I learned to
know a declining form of culture has often made
me unfair towards the whole phenomenon of
European culture. The Germans always follow
at some distance behind: they always go to .the
root of things, for instance:

Bependance upon foreigners ; Kant Rousseau,
the sensualists, Hume, Swedenborg.

Schopenhauer the Indians and Romanticism,
Voltaire.

Wagner the French cult of the ugly and of
grand opera, Paris, and the flight into primitive
barbarism (the marriage of brother and sister).

The law of the laggard (the provinces go to
Paris, Germany goes to France).

How is it that precisely Germans discovered the
Greek (the more an instinct is developed, the more
it is tempted to run for once into its opposite).

Music is the last breath of every culture.

93-

Renaissance and Reformation. What does the
Renaissance prove? That the reign of the

NIHILISM. 75

" individual " can be only a short one. The out-
put is too great ; fliere is not even the possibility
of husbanding or of capitalising forces, and ex-
haustion sets in step by step. These are times
when everything is squandered^ when even the
strength itself with which one collects, capitalises,
and heaps riches upon riches, is squandered.
Even the opponents of such movements are driven
to preposterous extremes in the dissipation of
their strength: and they too are very soon
exhausted, used up, and completely sapped.

In the Reformation we are face to face with
a wild and plebeian counterpart of the Italian
Renaissance, generated by similar impulses, except
that the former, in the backward and still vulgar
North, had to assume a religious form there the
concept of a higher life had not yet been divorced
from that of a religious one.

Even the Reformation was a movement for
individual liberty ; " every one his own priest " is
really no more than a formula for libertinage. As a
matter of fact, the words " Evangelical freedom "
would have sufficed and all instincts which had
reasons for remaining concealed broke out like wild
hounds, the most brutal needs suddenly acquired
the courage to show themselves, everything seemed
justified . . . men refused to specify the kind of
freedom they had aimed at, they preferred to shut
their eyes. But the fact that their eyes were
closed and that their lips were moistened with
gushing orations, did not prevent their hands from
being ready to snatch at whatever there was to
snatch at, that the belly became the god of the

76 THE WILL TO POWBR.

" free gospel," and that all lusts of revenge and of
hatred were indulged with insatiable fury.

This lasted for a while : then exhaustion super-
vened, just as it had done in Southern Europe ;
and again here, it was a low form of exhaustion,
a sort of general ruere in servitium. . . . Then the
disreputable century of Germany dawned.

94-

Chivalry the position won by power: its
gradual break-up (and partial transference to
broader and more bourgeois spheres). In the case
of Larochefoucauld we find a knowledge of the
actual impulses of a noble temperament together
with the gloomy Christian estimate of these
impulses.

The protraction of Christianity through the
French Revolution. The seducer is Rousseau ;
he once again liberates woman, who thenceforward
is always represented as ever more interesting
suffering. Then come the slaves and Mrs. Beecher-
Stowe. Then the poor and the workmen. Then
the vicious and the sick all this is drawn into
the foreground (even for the purpose of disposing
people in favour of the genius, it has been custom-
ary for five hundred years to press him forward as
the great sufferer !). Then comes the cursing of
all voluptuousness (Beaudelaire and Schopen-
hauer) ; the most decided conviction that the lust
of power is the greatest vice ; absolute certainty
that morality and disinterestedness are identical
things ; that the " happiness of all " is a goal worth

NIHILISM. 77

striving after (i.e., Christ's Kingdom of Heaven).
We are on the best road to it : the Kingdom of
Heaven of the poor in spirit has begun. Inter-
mediate stages : the bourgeois (as a result of the
nouveau riche) and the workman (as a result of
the machine).

Greek and French culture of the time of Louis
XIV. compared. A decided belief in oneself,
A leisured class which makes things hard for itself
and exercises a great deal of self-control. The
power of form, the will to form oneself. " Happi-
ness " acknowledged as a purpose. Much strength
and energy behind all formality of manners.
Pleasure at the sight of a life that is seemingly so
easy. The Greeks seemed like children to the
French.

95-
The Three Centuries.

Their different kinds of sensitiveness may
perhaps be best expressed as follows :

Aristocracy: Descartes, the reign of reason^
evidence showing the sovereignty of the will.

Feminism : Rousseau, the reign of feeling,
evidence showing the sovereignty of the senses ;
all lies.

-- Animalism: Schopenhauer, the reign ^i passion y
evidence showing the sovereignty of animality,
more honest, but gloomy.

The seventeenth century is aristocratic^ all for
order, haughty towards everything animal, severe
in regard to the heart, " austere," and even free
from sentiment, " non-German," averse to all that

78 THE WILL TO POWER.

is burlesque and natural, generalising and main-
taining an attitude of sovereignty towards the
past' for it believes in itself. At bottom it
partakes very much of the beast of prey, and
practises asceticism in order to remain master.
It is the century of strength of will, as also that of
strong passion.

The eighteenth century is dominated by woman,
it is gushing, spiritual, and flat ; but with intellect
at the service of aspirations and of the heart, it is
a libertine in the pleasures of intellect, undermining
all authorities; emotionally intoxicated, cheerful,
clear, humane, and sociable, false to itself and at
bottom very rascally. . . .

The nineteenth century is more animal, more
subterranean, hateful, realistic, plebeian, and on
that very account " better," " more honest," more
submissive to " reality " of what kind soever, and
truer ; but weak of will, sad, obscurely exacting
and fatalistic. It has no feeling of timidity or
reverence, either in the presence of " reason " or
the " heart " ; thoroughly convinced of the
dominion of the desires (Schopenhauer said " Will,"
but nothing is more characteristic of his philosophy
than that it entirely lacks all actual willing). Even
morality is reduced to an instinct (" Pity ").

Auguste Comte is the contimiation of the
eighteenth century (the dominion of the heart over
the head, sensuality in the theory of knowledge,
altruistic exaltation).

The fact that science has become as sovereign
as it is to-day, proves how the nineteenth century
has emancipated itself from the dominion of ideals.

NIHILISM. 79

A certain absence of " needs " and wishes makes our
scientific curiosity and rigour possible this is
our kind of virtue.

Romanticism is the counterstroke of the
eighteenth century ; a sort of accumulated longing
for its grand style of exaltation (as a matter of fact,
largely mingled with mummery and self-deception :
the desire was to represent strong nature and strong
passion).

The nineteenth century instinctively goes in
search of theories by means of which it may feel
its fatalistic submission to the empire of facts
justified. Hegel's success against sentimentality
and romantic idealism was already a sign of its
fatalistic trend of thought, in its belief that
superior reason belongs to the triumphant side,
and in its justification of the actual " state " (in
the place of " humanity," etc.). Schopenhauer : we
are something foolish, and at the best self-
suppressive. The success of determinism, the
genealogical derivation of obligations which were
formerly held to be absolute, the teaching of
environment and adaptation, the reduction of will
to a process of reflex movement, the denial of the
will as a "working cause"; finally a real
process of re-christening : so little will is observed
that the word itself becomes available for another
purpose. Further theories: the teaching of
objectivity ', " will-less " contemplation, as the only
road to truth, as also to beauty (also the belief
in "genius/* in order to have the right to be
submissive) ; mechanism, the determinable rigidity
of the mechanical process ; so-called " Naturalism,"

80 THE WILL TO POWER.

the elimination of the choosing, directing, inter-
preting subject, on principle.

Kant, with his " practical reason," with his moral
fanaticism, is quite eighteenth century style ; still
completely outside the historical movement, without
any notion whatsoever of the reality of his time, for
instance, revolution ; he is not affected by Greek
philosophy ; he is a phantasist of the notion of duty,
a sensualist with a hidden leaning to dogmatic
pampering.

The return to Kant in our century means a return
to the eighteenth century : people desire to create
themselves a right to the old ideas and to the old
exaltation hence a theory of knowledge which" de-
scribes limits," that is to say, which admits of the
option of fixing a Beyond to the domain of reason.

Hegefa way of thinking is not so very far
removed from that of Goethe : see the latter on
the subject of Spinoza, for instance. The will to
deify the All and Life, in order to find both peace
and happiness in contemplating them : Hegel
looks for reason everywhere in the presence of
reason man may be submissive and resigned. In
Goethe we find a kind of fatalism which is almost
joyous and confiding, which neither revolts nor
weakens, which strives to make a totality out of
itself, in the belief that only in totality does every-
thing seem good and justified, and find itself
resolved.

The period of rationalism followed by a
aeriod of sentimentalitv. To what extent does

NIHILISM. 8 1

Schopenhauer come under " sentimentality " ?
(Hegel under intellectuality ?)

97-

The seventeenth century suffers from humanity
as from a host of contradictions (" Pamas de con-
tradictions " that we are ) ; it endeavours to discover
man, to co-ordinate him, to excavate him : whereas
the eighteenth century tries to forget what is
known of man's nature, in order to adapt him to
its Utopia. " Superficial, soft, humane " gushes
over " humanity."

The seventeenth century tries to banish all
traces of the individual in order that the artist's
work may resemble life as much as possible.
The eighteenth century strives to create interest in
the author by means of the work. The seventeenth
century seeks art in art, a piece of culture ; the
eighteenth uses art in its propaganda for political
and social reforms.

"Utopia," the "ideal man," the deification of
Nature, the vanity of making one's own personality
the centre of interest, subordination to the propa-
ganda of social ideas > charlatanism all this we
derive from the eighteenth century.

The style of the seventeenth century : propre
exact et libre.

The strong individual who is self-sufficient, or
who appeals ardently to God and that obtrusive-
ness and indiscretion of modern authors these
things are opposites. " Showing-oneself-off " what
a contrast to the Scholars of Port- Royal 1

82 THE WILL TO POWER.

Alfieri had a sense for the grand style.

The hate of the burlesque (that which lacks
dignity), the lack of a sense of Nature belongs to
the seventeenth century.

9 8.

Against Rousseau. Alas ! man is no longer
sufficiently evil ; Rousseau's opponents, who say
that " man is a beast of prey," are unfortunately
wrong. Not the corruption of man, but the
softening and moralising of him is the curse. In
the sphere which Rousseau attacked most violently,
the relatively strongest and most successful type
of man was still to be found (the type which still
possessed the great passions intact : Will to Power,
Will to Pleasure, the Will and Ability to Com-
mand). The man of the eighteenth century must
be compared with the man of the Renaissance (also
with the man of the seventeenth century in France)
if the matter is to be understood at all : Rousseau
is a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed
vanity both signs that the dominating will is
lacking : he moralises and seeks the cause of his
own misery after the style of a revengeful man in
the ruling classes.

99-

Voltaire Rousseau. A state of nature is
terrible ; man is a beast of prey : our civilisation
is an extraordinary triumph over this beast of
prey in nature this was Voltaire's conclusion.
He was conscious of the mildness, the refinements,

NIHILISM. 83

the intellectual joys of the civilised state; he
despised obtuseness, even in the form of virtue,
and the lack of delicacy even in ascetics and
monks.

The moral depravity of man seemed to pre-
occupy Rousseau ; the words " unjust," " cruel," are
the best possible for the purpose of exciting the
instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find
themselves under the ban of the vetitum and of
disgrace ; so that their conscience is opposed to their
indulging any insurrectional desires. These
emancipators seek one thing above all : to give
their party the great accents and attitudes of
higher Nature,

100.

Rousseau : the rule founded on sentiment ;
Nature as the source of justice; man perfects
himself in proportion as he approaches Nature
(according to Voltaire, in proportion as he leaves
Nature behind). The very same periods seem to
the one to demonstrate the progress of humanity
and, to the other, the increase of injustice and
inequality.

Voltaire, who still understood umanith in the
sense of the Renaissance, as also virtu (as " higher
culture"), fights for the cause of the " honnetes
gens? "la bonne compagnie" taste, science, arts,
and even for the cause of progress and civilisation.

The flare-up occurred towards ij6o : On the
one hand the citizen of Geneva, on the other le
seigneur de Ferney. It is only from that moment
and henceforward that Voltaire was the man of

84 THE WILL TO POWER.

his age, the philosopher, the representative of
Toleration and of Disbelief (theretofore he had
been merely un bel esprit). His envy and hatred
of Rousseau's success forced him upwards.

"Pour ' la canaille* un dieu rtmuntrateur et
vengeur " Voltaire.

The criticism of both standpoints in regard to
the value of civilisation. To Voltaire nothing
seems finer than the social invention : there is
no higher goal than to uphold and perfect it.
L'honnfaett consists precisely in respecting social
usage ; virtue in a certain obedience towards
various necessary "prejudices" which favour the
maintenance of society. Missionary of Culture^
aristocrat, representative of the triumphant and
ruling classes and their values. But Rousseau
remained a plebeian^ even as hommes de lettres, this
was preposterous ; his shameless contempt for
everything that was not himself.

The morbid feature in Rousseau is the one
which happens to have been most admired and
imitated. (Lord Byron resembled him somewhat,
he too screwed himself up to sublime attitudes
and to revengeful rage a sign of vulgarity ; later
on, when Venice restored his equilibrium, he under-
stood what was more alleviating and did more
good . . . r insouciance.}

In spite of his antecedents, Rousseau is proud
of himself; but he is incensed if he is reminded of
his origin. . . .

In Rousseau there was undoubtedly some brain
trouble; in Voltaire rare health and lightsome-
ness. The revengefulness of the sick ; his periods

NIHILISM. 85

of insanity as also those of his contempt of man,
and of his mistrust

Rousseau's defence of Providence (against Vol-
taire's Pessimism) : he had need of God in order
to be able to curse society and civilisation ; every-
thing must be good per se, because God had
created it ; man alone has corrupted man. The
rt good man " as a man of Nature was pure fantasy ;
but with the dogma of God's authorship he became
something probable and even not devoid of found-
ation.

Romanticism 4 la Rousseau : passion ("the
sovereign right of passion ") ; " naturalness " ; the
fascination of madness (foolishness reckoned as
greatness) ; the senseless vanity of the weak ; the
revengefulness of the masses elevated to the posi-
tion of justice (" in politics, for one hundred years,
the leader has been an invalid ").

101.

. Kant : makes the scepticism of Englishmen, in
regard to the theory of knowledge, possible for
Germans.

(1) By enlisting in its cause the interest of the
German's religious and moral needs : just as the
new academicians used scepticism for the same
reasons, as a preparation for Platonism (vide
Augustine); just as Pascal even used moral
scepticism in order to provoke (to justify) the
need of belief;

(2) By complicating and entangling it with
scholastic flourishes in view of making it more

86 THE WILL TO POWER.

acceptable to the German's scientific taste in form
(for Locke and Hume, alone, were too illuminating,
too clear that is to say, judged according to the
German valuing instinct, " too superficial ").

Kant : a poor psychologist and mediocre judge
of human nature, made hopeless mistakes in
regard to great historical values (the French
Revolution) ; a moral fanatic a la Rousseau ; with
a subterranean current of Christian values; a
thorough dogmatist, but bored to extinction by
this tendency, to the extent of wishing to tyrannise
over it, but quickly tired, even of scepticism ; and
not yet affected by any cosmopolitan thought or
antique beauty ... a dawdler and a go-between,
not at all original (like Leibnitz, something between
mechanism and spiritualism ; like Goethe, something
between the taste of the eighteenth century and
that of the " historical sense " [which is essentially
a sense of exoticism] ; like German music, between
French and Italian music ; like Charles the Great,
who mediated and built bridges between the
Roman Empire and Nationalism a dawdler pa?
excellence).

102.

In what respect have the Christian centuries
with their Pessimism been stronger centuries than
the eighteenth and how do they correspond
with the tragic age of the Greeks ?

The nineteenth century versus the eighteenth.
How was it an heir ? how was it a step backwards
from the latter ? (more lacking in " spirit " and

NIHILISM. 87

in taste) how did it show an advance on the
latter ? (more gloomy, more realistic, stronger).

103.

How can we explain the fact that we feel
something in common with the Campagna romana ?
And the high mountain chain ?

Chateaubriand in a letter to M. de Fontanes
in 1803 writes his first impression of the Campagna
romana.

The President de Brosses says of the "Campagna
romana : "II fallait que Romulus ftit ivre quand il
songea b&tir une ville dans un terrain aussi laid."

Even Delacroix would have nothing to do with
Rome, it frightened him. He loved Venice, just
as Shakespeare, Byron, and Georges Sand did.
The'ophile Gautier's and Richard Wagner's dislike
of Rome must not be forgotten.

Lamartine has the language for Sorrento and
Posilippo.

Victor Hugo raves about Spain, "parce que
aucune autre nation n'a moins emprunte' &
Tantiquite*, parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence
classique."

104.

The two great attempts that were made to
overcome the eighteenth century :

Napoleon, in that he called man, the soldier,
and the great struggle for power, to life again,
and conceived Europe as a united political power.

Goethe, in that he imagined a European culture

88 THE WILL TO POWER.

which would consist of the whole heritage of what
humanity had attained to up to his time.

German culture in this century inspires mistrust
the music of the period lacks that complete
element which liberates and binds as well, to
wit Goethe.

The pre-eminence of music in the romanticists
of 1830 and 1840. Delacroix. Ingres a
passionate musician (admired Gluck, Haydn,
Beethoven, Mozart), said to his pupils in Rome:
" Si je pouvais vous rendre tous musiciens, vous y
gagneriez comme peintres " likewise Horace
Vernet, who was particularly fond of Don Juan (as
Mendelssohn assures us, 1831); Stendhal, too, who
says of himself: " Combien de lieues ne ferais-je
pas & pied, et combien de jours de prison ne me
soumetterais-je pas pour entendre Don Juan ou le
Matrimonio segreto ; et je ne sais pour quelle autre
chose je ferais cet effort/ 1 He was then fifty-six
years old.

The borrowed forms, for instance : Brahms as
a typical " Epigone," likewise Mendelssohn's cul-
tured Protestantism (a former "soul" is turned
into poetry posthumously . . .)

the moral and poetical substitutions in
Wagner, who used one art as a stop-gap to make
up for what another lacked.

the "historical sense," inspiration derived
from poems, sagas.

that characteristic transformation of which
G. Flaubert is the most striking example among
Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most strik-
ing example among Germans, shows how the

NIHILISM. 89

romantic belief in love and the future changes
into a longing for nonentity in 1830-50.

1 06.

How is it that German music reaches its
culminating point in the age of German romanti-
cism ? How is it that German music lacks
Goethe ? On the other hand, how much Schiller,
or more exactly, how much " Thekla " * is there
not in Beethoven !

Schumann has Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine,
Hoffman, Tieck, in him. Richard Wagner has
Freischiitz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic Saga,
the mystic Catholicism of instinct, symbolism,
" the free-spiritedness of passion " (Rousseau's
intention). The Flying Dutchman savours of
France, where le tintbreux (1830) was the type
of the seducer.

The cult of music, the revolutionary romanticism
of form. Wagner synthesizes German and French
romanticism.

107.

From the point of view only of his value to
Germany and to German culture, Richard Wagner
is still a great problem, perhaps a German mis-
fortune: in any case, however, a fatality. But
what does it matter? Is he not very much
more than a German event? It also seems to
me that to no country on earth is he less related
than to Germany ; nothing was prepared there for

* Thekla is the sentimental heroine in Schiller's Wallen-
stein. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

9O THE WILL TO POWER.

his advent ; his whole type is simply strange
amongst Germans ; there he stands in their midst,
wonderful, misunderstood, incomprehensible. But
people carefully avoid acknowledging this : they are
too kind, too square-headed too German for that.
" Credo quia absurdus est " : thus did the German
spirit wish it to be, in this case too hence it is
content meanwhile to believe everything Richard
Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. In
all ages the spirit of Germany has been deficient in
subtlety and divining powers concerning psycho-
logical matters. Now that it happens to be under the
highpressureofpatrioticnonsenseandself-adoration,
it is visibly growing thicker and coarser : how could
it therefore be equal to the problem of Wagner I

108.

The Germans are not yet anything, but they
are becoming something ; that is why they have
not yet any culture; that is why they cannot
yet have any culture ! They are not yet anything :
that means they are all kinds of things. They
are becoming something : that means that they will
one day cease from being all kinds of things. The
latter is at bottom only a wish, scarcely a hope
yet. Fortunately it is a wish with which one
can live, a question of will, of work, of discipline,
a question of training, as also of resentment, of
longing, of privation, of discomfort, yea, even
of bitterness, in short, we Germans will get
something out of ourselves, something that has not
yet been wanted of us we want something more \

NIHILISM. pi

That this "German, as he is not as yet"
has a right to something better than the present
German " culture " ; that all who wish to become
something better, must wax angry when they
perceive a sort of contentment, an impudent
" setting-oneself-at-ease," or "a process of self-
censing," in this quarter: that is my second
principle, in regard to which my opinions have
not yet changed.

(c) SIGNS OF INCREASING STRENGTH.
109.

First Principle: everything that characterises
modern men savours of decay : but side by side
with the prevailing sickness there are signs of a
strength and powerfulness of soul which are still
untried. The same causes which tend to promote
the belittling of men> also force the stronger and
rarer individuals upwards to greatness.

1 10.

General survey : the ambiguous character of our
modern world precisely the same symptoms
might at the same time be indicative of either
decline or strength. And the signs of strength
and of emancipation dearly bought, might in view
of traditional (or hereditary) appreciations con-
cerned with the feelings, be misunderstood as in-
dications of weakness. In short, feeling^ as a
means of fixing valuations, is not on a level with
the times.

92 THE WILL TO POWER.

Generalised: Every valuation is always back-
war d\ it is merely the expression of the con-
ditions which favoured survival and growth in
a much earlier age: it struggles against new
conditions of existence out of which it did not
arise, and which it therefore necessarily misunder-
stands: it hinders, and excites suspicion against,
all that is new.

in.

The problem of the nineteenth century. To dis-
cover whether its strong and weak side belong to
each other. Whether they have been cut from
one and the same piece. Whether the variety of
its ideals and their contradictions are conditioned
by a higher purpose : whether they are something
higher. For it might be the prerequisite of great-
ness, that growth should take place amid such
violent tension. Dissatisfaction, Nihilism, might
be a good sign.

112.

General survey. As a matter of fact, all
abundant growth involves a concomitant process
of crumbling to bits and decay : suffering and the
symptoms of decline belong to ages of enormous
progress; every fruitful and powerful movement
of mankind has always brought about a concurrent
Nihilistic movement Under certain circumstances,
the appearance of the extremest form of Pessimism
and actual Nihilism might be the sign of a process
of incisive and most essential growth, and of man-
kind's transit into completely new conditions of
existence. This is ivhat I have understood.

NIHILISM. 93

A.

Starting out with a thoroughly courageous
appreciation of our men of to-day : we must not
allow ourselves to be deceived by appearance :
this mankind is much less effective, but it gives
quite different pledges of lasting strength^ its
tempo is slower, but the rhythm itself is richer.
Healthiness is increasing, the real conditions of a
healthy body are on the point of being known,
and will gradually be created, " asceticism " is
regarded with irony. The fear of extremes, a
certain confidence in the " right way/' no raving :
a periodical self-habituation to narrower values
(such as " mother-land," " science," etc.).

This whole picture, however, would still be
ambiguous-, it might be a movement either of
increase or decline in Life.

B.

The belief in " progress " in lower spheres of
intelligence, appears as increasing life : but this is
self-deception ;

in higher spheres of intelligence it is a sign
of declining life.

Description of the symptoms,

The unity of the aspect : uncertainty in regard
to the standard of valuation.

Fear of a general " in vain."

Nihilism.

94 THE WILL TO POWER.

114.

As a matter of fact, we are no longer so urgently
in need of an antidote against the first Nihilism :
Life is no longer so uncertain, accidental, and
senseless in modern Europe. All such tremendous
exaggeration of the value of men, of the value of
evil, etc., are not so necessary now ; we can endure
a considerable diminution of this value, we may
grant a great deal of nonsense and accident : the
power man has acquired now allows of a lowering
of the means of discipline, of which the strongest
was the moral interpretation of the universe. The
hypothesis " God " is much too extreme.

115.

If anything shows that our humanisation is a
genuine sign of progress, it is the fact that we no
longer require excessive contraries, that we no
longer require contraries at all. . . .

We may love the senses ; for we have spirit-
ualised them in every way and made them artistic ;

We have a right to all things which hitherto
have been most calumniated.

116.

The reversal of the order of rank. Those pious
counterfeiters thepriests arebecomitigChandala
in our midst: they occupy the position of the
charlatan, of the quack, of the counterfeiter, of the
sorcerer : we regard them as corrupters of the will,

NIHILISM. 95

as the great slanderers and vindictive enemies of
Life, and as the rebels among the bungled and the
botched. We have made our middle class out of
our servant-caste the Sudra that is to say, our
people or the body which wields the political
power.

On the other hand, the Chandala of former
times is paramount: the blasphemers^ the im-
moralists, the independents of all kinds, the artists,
the Jews, the minstrels and, at bottom, all dis-
reputable classes are in the van.

We have elevated ourselves to honourable
thoughts, even more, we determine what honour
is on earth, "nobility." . . . All of us to-day
are advocates of life. We Immoralists are to-day
the strongest power: the other great powers are
in need of us ... we re-create the world in our
own image.

We have transferred the label " Chandala " to
the priests > the backworldsmen, and to the deformed
Christian society which has become associated with
these people, together with creatures of like origin,
the pessimists, Nihilists, romanticists of pity,
criminals, and men of vicious habits the whole
sphere in which the idea of " God " is that of
Saviour. . , .

We are proud of being no longer obliged to be
liars, slanderers, and detractors of Life. . . .

117.

The advance of the nineteenth century upon
the eighteenth (at bottom we good Europeans

96 THE WILL TO POWER.

are carrying on a war against the eighteenth
century) :

(1) "The return to Nature" is getting to be
understood, ever more definitely, in a way which
is quite the reverse of that in which Rousseau used
the phrase away from idylls and operas !

(2) Ever more decided, more anti-idealistic,
more objective, more fearless, more industrious,
more temperate, more suspicious of sudden changes,
anti-revolutionary \

(3) The question of bodily health is being pressed
ever more decidedly in front of the health of " the
soul " : the latter is regarded as a condition brought
about by the former, and bodily health is believed
to be, at least, the prerequisite to spiritual health.

118.

If anything at all has been achieved, it is a more
innocent attitude towards the senses, a happier,
more favourable demeanour in regard to sensuality,
resembling rather the position taken up by Goethe ;
a prouder feeling has also been developed in know-
ledge, and the " reine Thor " * meets with little
faith.

119.

We " objective people? It is not "pity" that
opens up the way for us to all that is most remote
and most strange in life and culture; but our

* This is a reference to Wagner's Parsifal. The character
as is well known, is written to represent a son of heart's
affliction, and a child of wisdom humble, guileless, loving,
pure, and a fool TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

NIHILISM. 97

accessibility and ingenuousness, which precisely
does not " pity," but rather takes pleasure in hun-
dreds of things which formerly caused pain (which
in former days either outraged or moved us, or in
the presence of which we were either hostile or
indifferent). Pain in all its various phases is now
interesting to us : on that account we are certainly
not the more pitiful, even though the sight of pain
may shake us to our foundations and move us to
tears : and we are absolutely not inclined to be
more helpful in view thereof.

In this deliberate desire to look on at all pain
and error, we have grown stronger and more
powerful than in the eighteenth century ; it is a
proof of our increase of strength (we have drawn
closer to the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries).
But it is a profound mistake to regard our " roman-
ticism " as a proof of our " beautified souls." We
want stronger sensations than all coarser ages and
classes have wanted. (This fact must not be con-
founded with the needs of neurotics and decadents ;
in their case, of course, there is a craving for pepper
even for cruelty.)

We are all seeking conditions which are eman-
cipated from the bourgeois, and to a greater degree
from the priestly, notion of morality (every book
which savours at all of priestdom and theology
gives us the impression of pitiful niaiserie and
mental indigence). " Good company," in fact, finds
everything insipid which is not forbidden and con-
sidered compromising in bourgeois circles ; and the
case is the same with books, music, politics, and
opinions on women.

VOL. j. G

98 THE WILL TO POWER.

1 2O.

The simplification of man in the nineteenth cen-
tury (The eighteenth century was that of elegance,
subtlety, and generous feeling). Not " return to
nature " ; for no natural humanity has ever existed
yet. Scholastic, unnatural, and antinatural values
are the rule and the beginning ; man only reaches
Nature after a long struggle he never turns
" back " to her. ... To be natural means, to dare
to be as immoral as Nature is.

We are coarser, more direct, richer in irony
towards generous feelings, even when we are be-
neath them.

Our haute vol/e, the society consisting of our
rich and leisured men, is more natural : people hunt
each other, the love of the sexes is a kind of sport
in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle ;
people entertain each other and live for the sake of
pleasure ; bodily advantages stand in the first rank,
and curiosity and daring are the rule.

Our attitude towards knowledge is more natural ;
we are innocent in our absolute spiritual debauchery,
we hate pathetic and hieratic manners, we delight
in that which is most strictly prohibited, we should
scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we
were bored in acquiring it.

Our attitude to morality is also more natural.
Principles have become a laughing-stock ; no one
dares to speak of his " duty," unless in irony. But
a helpful, benevolent disposition is highly valued.
(Morality is located in instinct and the rest is

NIHILISM. 99

despised. Besides this there are few points of
honour.)

Our attitude to politics is more natural : we see
problems of power, of the quantum of power, against
another quantum. We do not believe in a right
that does not proceed from a power which is able
to uphold it. We regard all rights as conquests.

Our valuation of great men and things is more
natural : we regard passion as a privilege ; we can
conceive of nothing great which does not involve a
great crime ; all greatness is associated in our minds
with a certain standing-beyond-the-pale in morality.

Our attitude to Nature is more natural : we no
longer love her for her " innocence," her " reason,"
her " beauty," we have made her beautifully devilish
and " foolish." But instead of despising her on
that account, since then we have felt more closely
related to her and more familiar in her presence.
She does not aspire to virtue : we therefore respect
her.

Our attitude towards Art is more natural : we
do not exact beautiful, empty lies, etc., from her ;
brutal positivism reigns supreme, and it ascer-
tains things with perfect calm.

In short : there are signs showing that the
European of the nineteenth century is less ashamed
of his instincts ; he has gone a long way towards
acknowledging his unconditional naturalness and
immorality, without bitterness : on the contrary, he
is strong enough to endure this point of view alone.

To some ears this will sound as though corruption
had made strides : and certain it is that man has
not drawn nearer to the " Nature " which Rousseau

IOO THE WILL TO POWER.

speaks about, but has gone one step farther in the
civilisation before which Rousseau stood in horror.
We have grown stronger^ we have drawn nearer to
the seventeenth century, more particularly to the
taste which reigned towards its close (Dancourt,
Le Sage, Regnard).

121.

Culture versus Civilisation. The culminating
stages of culture and civilisation lie apart: one
must not be led astray as regards the fundamental
antagonism existing between culture and civilisa-
tion. From the moral standpoint, great periods
in the history of culture have always been periods
of corruption ; while on the other hand, those periods
in which man was deliberately and compulsorily
tamed (" civilisation ") have always been periods
of intolerance towards the most intellectual and
most audacious natures. Civilisation desires some-
thing different from what culture strives after:
their aims may perhaps be opposed. . . .

122.

What I warn people against: confounding the
instincts of decadence with those of humanity ;

Confounding the dissolving means of civilisa-
tion and those which necessarily promote decadence^
with culture ;

Confounding debauchery, and the principle,
"laisser aller," with the Will to Power (the
latter is the exact reverse of the former).

NIHILISM. 101

123.

The unsolved problems which I set anew : the
problem of civilisation, the struggle between Rous-
seau and Voltaire about the year 1760. Man
becomes deeper, more mistrustful, more " immoral,"
stronger, more self-confident and therefore " more
natural" \ that is "progress." In this way, by a
process of division of labour, the more evil strata
and the milder and tamer strata of society get
separated : so that the general facts are not visible
at first sight. ... It is a sign of strength^ and of
the self-control and fascination of the strong, that
these stronger strata possess the arts in order to
make their greater powers for evil felt as something
"higher? As soon as there is "progress " there is
a transvaluation of the strengthened factors into
the " good."

124.

Man must have the courage of his natural instincts
restored to him.

The poor opinion he has of himself must be
destroyed (not in the sense of the individual, but
in the sense of the natural man . . .)

The contradictions in things must be eradicated,
after it has been well understood that we were
responsible for them

Social idiosyncrasies must be stamped out of
existence (guilt, punishment, justice, honesty,
freedom, love, etc. etc.)

An advance towards " naturalness " : in all politi-
cal questions, even in the relations between parties,
even in merchants 1 , workmen's, or contractors'

102 THE WILL TO POWER.

parties, only questions of power come into play :
" what one can do " is the first question, what one
ought to do is only a secondary consideration.

the tyranny of the meanest and
s, that is to say, the superficial,
the envious, and the mummers, brought to its
zenith, is, as a matter of fact, the logical con-
clusion of "modern ideas" and their latent
anarchy : but in the genial atmosphere of demo-
cratic well-being the capacity for forming resolu-
tions or even for coming to an end at all, is
paralysed. Men follow but no longer their
reason. That is why socialism is on the whole
a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing
more amusing than to observe the discord between
the poisonous and desperate faces of present-day
socialists and what wretched and nonsensical
feelings does not their style reveal to us ! -^and
the child ishjamblike happiness of their hopes and
desires. Nevertheless, in marijTplaces in Europe,
fhere may be violent hand-to-hand struggles and
irruptions on their account : the coming century
is likely to be convulsed in more than one spot,
and the Paris Commune, which finds defenders and
advocates even in Germany, will seem to have
been but a slight indigestion compared with what
is to come. Be this as it may, there will always
be too many people of property for socialism ever
to signify anything more than an attack of illness :
and these people of property are like one man
with one faith, " one must possess something in

NIHILISM. 103

order to be some one." This, however, is the oldest ^
and most wholesome of all instincts ; I should add :
" one must desire more than one has in order to
become more." For this is the teaching which life
itself preaches to all living things : the morality of ,
Development. To have and to wish to have more,
in a word, Growth that is life itself. In the
teaching of socialism " a will to the denial of life "
is but poorly concealed : botched men and races
they must be who have devised a teaching of this
sort. In fact, I even wish a few experiments
might be made to show thatJn^a^DjQialistic^societyj
life denies itself, aricL itself cuts away its own roots,
The earth is big enough and man is still unex-
hausted enough for a practical lesson of this sort
and demonstratio ad absurdum even if it were
accomplished only by a vast expenditure of lives
to seem worth while to me. Still, Socialism, like
a restless mole beneath the foundations of a society
wallowing in stupidity, will be able to achieve
something useful and salutary : it delays " Peace
on Earth" and the whole process of character-
softening of the democratic herding animal; it
forces the European to have an extra supply of
intellect, that is to say, craft and caution, and
prevents his entirely abandoning the manly and
warlike qualities, it also saves Europe awhile from
the marasmus femininus which is threatening it.

126.

The most favourable obstacles and remedies of
modernity :

104 THE WILL TO POWER.

(1) Compulsory military service with real wars
in which all joking is laid aside.

(2) National thick-headedness (which simplifies
and concentrates).

(3) Improved nutrition (meat).

(4) Increasing cleanliness and wholesomeness in
the home.

(5) The predominance of physiology over
theology, morality, economics, and politics.

(6) Military discipline in the exaction and the
practice of one's " duty " (it is no longer customary
to praise).

127.

I am delighted at the military development of
Europe, also at the inner anarchical conditions : the
period of quietude and " Chinadom " which Galiani
prophesied for this century is now over. Personal
and manly capacity, bodily capacity recovers its
value, valuations are becoming more physical,
nutrition consists ever more and more of flesh.
Fine men have once more become possible.
Bloodless sneaks (with mandarins at their head,
as Comte imagined them) are now a matter of
the past. J^he. .sayagg in ..every one of us is
acknowledged, even the wild animal. Precisely on
tJiaTaccomit, pHn6Sophers"will have a better chance.
Kant is a scarecrow !

128.

I have not yet seen any reasons to feel dis-
couraged. He who acquires and preserves a

NIHILISM. 105

strong will, together with a broad mind, has a
more favourable chance now than ever he had.
For the plasticity of man has become exceedingly
great in democratic Europe : men who learn easily,
who readily adapt themselves, are the rule : the
gregarious animal of a high order of intelligence
is prepared. He who would command finds those
who must obey: I have Napoleon and Bismarck
in mind, for instance. The struggle against strong
and unintelligent wills, which forms the surest
obstacle in one's way, is really insignificant. Who
would not be able to knock down these " objective "
gentlemen with weak wills, such as Ranke aind
Renan 1

129.

Spiritual enlightenment \s an unfailing means of
making men uncertain, weak of will, and needful
of succour and support; in short, of developing
the herding instincts in them. That is why all
great artist-rulers hitherto (Confucius in China,
the Roman Empire, Napoleon, Popedom at a
time when they had the courage of their worldliness
and frankly pursued power) in whom, the ruling
instincts, that had prevailed until their time,
culminated, also made use of the spiritual enlighten-
ment ; or at least allowed it to be supreme (after
the style of the Popes of the Renaissance). The
self-deception of the masses on this point, in every
democracy for instance, is of the greatest possible
value: all that makes men smaller and more
amenable is pursued under the title "progress."

106 THE WILL TO POWER.

130.

The highest equity and mildness as a condition
of weakness (the New Testament and the early
Christian community manifesting itself in the
form of utter foolishness in the Englishmen, Darwin
and Wallace). Your equity, ye higher men, drives
you to universal suffrage, etc. ; your " humanity "
urges you to be milder towards crime and stupidity.
In the end you will thus help stupidity and harm-
lessness to conquer.

Outwardly : Ages of terrible wars, insurrections,
explosions. Inwardly : ever more and more weak-
ness among men ; events take the form of excitants.
The Parisian as the type of the European extreme.

Consequences: (i) Savages (at first, of course,
in conformity with the culture that has reigned
hitherto); (2) Sovereign individuals (where power -
ful barbarous masses and emancipation from all
that has been, are crossed). The age of greatest
stupidity, brutality, and wretchedness in the masses,
and in the highest individuals.

An incalculable number of higher individuals
now perish : but he who escapes their fate is as
strong as the devil. In this respect we are re-
minded of the conditions which prevailed in the
Renaissance.

132.

How are Good Europeans sucft as ourselves
distinguished from the patriots ? In the first place,

NIHILISM. 107

we are atheists and immoralists, but we take care
to support the religions and the morality which
we associate with the gregarious instinct : for by
means of them, an order of men is, so to speak,
being prepared, which must at some time or other
fall into our hands, which must actually crave for
our hands.

Beyond Good and Evil, certainly; but we
insist upon the unconditional and strict preserva-
tion of herd-morality.

We reserve ourselves the right to several kinds
of philosophy which it is necessary to learn : under
certain circumstances, the pessimistic kind as a
hammer; a European Buddhism might perhaps
be indispensable.

We should probably support the development
and the maturation of democratic tendencies ; for
it conduces to weakness of will : in " Socialism "
we recognise a thorn which prevents smug ease.

Attitude towards the people. Our prejudices ;
we pay attention to the results of cross-breeding.

Detached, well-to-do, strong : irony concerning
the "press" and its culture. Our care: that
scientific men should not become journalists. We
despise any form of culture that tolerates news-
paper reading or writing.

We make our accidental positions (as Goethe
and Stendhal did), our experiences, a foreground,
and we lay stress upon them, so that we may
deceive concerning our backgrounds. We ourselves
wait and avoid putting our heart into them. They
serve us as refuges, such as a wanderer might require
and use but we avoid feeling at home in them.

108 THE WILL TO POWER.

We are ahead of our fellows in that we have had
a disciplina voluntatis. All strength is directed to
the development of the will, an art which allows
us to wear masks, an art of understanding beyond
the passions (also " super- European " thought at
times).

This is our preparation before becoming the
law-givers of the future and the lords of the earth ;
if not we, at least our children. Caution where
marriage is concerned.

133-

The twentieth century. The Abbe Galiani says
somewhere : " Laprtvoyance est la cause des guerres
actuelles de F Europe. Si Fon voulait se donner la
peine de ne rien prtvoir, tout le monde serait
tranquille, et je ne crois pas qu'on serait plus mal-
heureuxparce qu'on neferaitpas la guerre? As I
in no way share the unwarlike views of my deceased
friend Galiani, I have no fear whatever of saying
something beforehand with the view of conjuring
up in some way the cause of wars.

A condition of excessive consciousness , after the
worst of earthquakes : with new questions.

134.

It is the time of the great noon, of the most
appalling enlightenment : my particular kind of
Pessimism : the great starting-point.

(i) Fundamental contradiction between civil-
isation and the elevation of man.

NIHILISM. 109

(2) Moral valuations regarded as a history of
lies and the art of calumny in the service of the
Will to Power (of the will of the herd, which rises
against stronger men).

(3) The conditions which determine every
elevation in culture (the facilitation of a selection
being made at the cost of a crowd) are the con-
ditions of all growth.

(4). The multiformity of the world as a question
of strength^ which sees all things in the perspective
of their growth. The moral Christian values to
be regarded as the insurrection and mendacity of
slaves (in comparison with the aristrocratic values
of the ancient world).

SECOND BOOK.

A CRITICISM % OF THE HIGHEST
VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED
HITHERTO.

1.

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.

ALL the beauty and sublimity with which we
have invested real and imagined things, I will
show to be the property aa^ product of man,
and this should be his most beautiful apology.
Man as a poet, as a thinker, as a god, as love, as
power. J3h,_the regal liberality with which he
has lavished gifts upon things , in _qrder_ to im m
jj^rish himself and make himself feel wretchedj
HMierto, tins has been his greatest disinterested-
ness, that he admired and worshipped, and knew
how to conceal from himself that he it was who
had created what he admired.

i. CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIONS.

The origin of religion. Just as the illiterate
man of to-day believes that his wrath is the cause
of his being angry, that his mind is the cause of
his thinking, that his soul is the cause of his
feeling, in short, just as a mass of psychological
entities are still unthinkingly postulated as causes ;

VOL. i, H

114 THE WILL TO POWER.

so, in a still more primitive age, the same pheno-
mena were interpreted by man by means of
personal entities. Those conditions of his soul
which seemed strange, overwhelming, and raptur-
ous, he regarded as obsessions and bewitching
influences emanating from the power of some
personality. (Thus the Christian, the most
puerile and backward man of this age, traces
hope, peace, and the feeling of deliverance to a
psychological inspiration on the part of God :
being by nature a sufferer and a creature in need
of repose, states of happiness, peace, and resigna-
tion, perforce seem strange to him, and seem to
need some explanation.) Among intelligent,
strong, and vigorous races, the epileptic is mostly
the cause of a belief in the existence of some
foreign power \ but all such examples of apparent
subjection as, for instance, the bearing of the
exalted man, of the poet, of the great criminal,
or the passions, love and revenge lead to the
invention of supernatural powers. A condition
is made concrete by being identified with a
personality, and when this condition overtakes
anybody, it is ascribed to that personality. In
other words : in the psychological concept of God,
!a certain state of the soul is personified as a cause
in order to appear as an effect.

The psychological logic is as follows : when the
feeling of power suddenly seizes and overwhelms
a man, and this takes place in the case of all
the great passions, a doubt arises in him con-
cerning his own person : he date not think himself
the cause of this astonishing sensation and thus

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 11$

he posits a stronger person, a Godhead as its cause.
In short, the origin of religion lies in the extreme
feelings of power, which, being strange^ take men
by surprise : and just as the sick man, who feels
one of his limbs unaccountably heavy, concludes
that another man must be sitting on it, so the
ingenuous homo religiosus, divides himself up into
several people. Religion is an example of the
" alteration de la personnalite? A sort of fear and
sensation of terror in one's own presence. ... But
also a feeling of inordinate rapture and exaltation.
Among sick people, the sensation of health suffices
to awaken a belief in the proximity of God.

s*

136. X

Rudimentary psychology of the religious man :
All changes are effects ; all effects are effects of
will (the notion of " Nature " and of " natural law,"
is lacking) ; all effects presuppose an agent.
Rudimentary psychology : one is only a cause
oneself, when one knows that one has willed
something.

Result: States of power impute to man the
feeling that he is not the cause of them, that he
is not responsible for them : they come without
being willed to do so consequently we cannot be
their originators : will that is not free (that is to
say, the knowledge of a change in our condition
which we have not helped to bring about) requires
a strong will.

Consequence of this rudimentary psychology:
Man has never dared to credit himself with his

11(5 THE WILL TO POWER.

strong and startling moods, he has always con-
ceived them as " passive/' as " imposed upon him
from outside " : Religion is the offshoot of a
doubt concerning the entity of the person, an
alteration of the personality : in so far as every-
thing great and strong in man was considered
superhuman &&&foreign> man belittled himself,
he laid the two sides, the very pitiable and weak
side, and the very strong and startling side apart,
in two spheres, and called the one " Man " and the
other " God."

And he has continued to act on these lines;
during the period of the moral idiosyncrasy he
did not interpret his lofty and sublime moral
states as " proceeding from his own will " or as
the "work" of the person. Even the Christian
himself divides his personality into two parts, the
one a mean and weak fiction which he calls man,
and the other which he calls God (Deliverer and
Saviour).

Reiigion has lowered the concept " man " ; its
ultimate conclusion is that all goodness, greatness,
and truth are superhuman, and are only obtainable
by the grace of God.

137-

One way of raising man out of his self-abase-
ment, which brought about the decline of the point
of view that classed all lofty and strong states of
the soul, as strange, was the theory of relation-
ship. These lofty and strong states of the soul
could t least be interpreted as the influence of
our forebears \ we belonged to each other, we were

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. Ii;

irrevocably joined ; we grew in our own esteem,
by acting according to the example of a model
known to us all.

There is an attempt on the part of noble
families to associate religion with their own
feelings of self-respect. Poets and seers do the
same thing ; they feel proud that they have been
worthy, that they have been selected for such
association, they esteem it an honour, not to be
considered at all as individuals, but as mere
mouthpieces (Homer).

Man gradually takes possession of the highest
and proudest states of his soul, as also of his acts
and his works. Formerly it was believed that
one paid oneself the greatest honour by denying
one's own responsibility for, the highest deeds one
accomplished, and by ascribing them to God.
The will which was not free, appeared to be that
which imparted a higher value to a deed : in those
days a god was postulated as the author of the deed.

138.

Priests are the actors of something which is
supernatural, either in the way of ideals, gods, or
saviours, and they have to make people believe in
them ; in this they find their calling, this is the
purpose of their instincts ; in order to make it as
credible as possible, they have to exert themselves
to the utmost extent in the art of posing ; their
actor's sagacity must, above all, aim at giving
them a clean conscience, by means of which, alone,
it is possible to persuade effectively.

118 THE WILL TO POWER

139-

The priest wishes to make it an understood
thing that he is the highest type of man, that he
rules even over those who wield the power, that
he is invulnerable and unassailable, that he is
the strongest power in the community, not by any
means to be replaced or undervalued.

Means thereto : he alone knows ; he alone is the
man of virtue ; he alone has sovereign poiuer over
himself \ he alone is, in a certain sense, God, and
ultimately goes back to the Godhead ; he alone
is the middleman between God and others] the
Godhead administers punishment to every one
who puts the priest at a disadvantage, or who
thinks in opposition to him.

Means thereto: Truth exists. There is only
one way of attaining to it, and that is to become
a priest. Every good in order, nature, or tradition,
is to be traced to the wisdom of the priests. The
Holy Book is their work. The whole of nature is
only a fulfilment of the maxims which it contains.
No other source of goodness exists than the priests.
Every other kind of perfection, even the warrior's^
is different in rank from that of the priests.

Consequence: If the priest is to be the highest
type, then the degrees which lead to his virtues
must be the degrees of value among men. Study >
emancipation from material things, inactivity -, im
passibility^ absence of passion^ solemnity ; the
opposite of all this is found in the lowest type of
man.

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 119

The priest has taught a kind of morality which
conduced to his being considered the highest type
of man. He conceives a type which is the reverse
of his own : the Chandala. By making these as
contemptible as possible, some strength is lent to
the order of castes. The priest'o excessive fear of
sensuality also implies that the latter is the most
serious threat to the order of castes (that is to say,
order in general). . . . Every " free tendency " in
puncto puncti overthrows the laws of marriage.

140.

The philosopher considered as the development
of the priestly type: He has the heritage of the
priest in his blood ; even as a rival he is compelled
to fight with the same weapons as the priest of his
time ; he aspires to the highest authority.

What is it that bestows authority upon men who
have no physical power to wield (no army, no
arms at all . . .)? How do such men gain
authority over those who are in possession of
material power, and who represent authority?
(Philosophers enter the lists against princes, vic-
torious conquerors, and wise statesmen.)

They can do it only by establishing the belief
that they are in possession of a power which is
higher and stronger God. Nothing is strong
enough : every one is in need of the mediation and
the services of priests. They establish themselves
as indispensable intercessors. The conditions of
their existence are: (i) That people believe in
the absolute superiority of their god, in fact believe

120 THE WILL TO POWER.

in their god \ (2) that there is no other access, no
direct access to god, save through them. The
second condition alone gives rise to the concept
" heterodoxy " ; the first to the concept " dis-
believers" (that is to say, he who believes in
another god).

141.

A Criticism of the Holy Lie. That a lie is
allowed in pursuit of holy ends is a principle
which belongs to the theory of all priestcraft,
and the object of this inquiry is to discover to
what extent it belongs to its practice.

But philosophers, too, whenever they intend
taking over the leadership of mankind, with the
ulterior motives of priests in their minds, have
never failed to arrogate to themselves the right to
lie : Plato above all. But the most elaborate of
lies is the double lie, developed by the typically
Arian philosophers of the Vedanta : two systems,
contradicting each other in all their main points,
but interchangeable, complementary, and mutually
expletory, when educational ends were in question.
The lie of the one has to create a condition in
which the truth of the other can alone become
intelligible. . . .

How far does the holy lie of priests and philo-
sophers go? The question here is, what hypo-
theses do they advance in regard to education,
and what are the dogmas they are compelled to
invent in order to do justice to these hypotheses ?

First : they must have power, authority, and
absolute credibility on their side.

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 121

Secondly : they must have the direction of the
whole of Nature, so that everything affecting the
individual seems to be determined by their law.

Thirdly : their domain of power must be very
extensive, in order that its control may escape
the notice of those they subject : they must know
the penal code of the life beyond of the life
" after death," and, of course, the means where-
by the road to blessedness may be discovered.
They have to put the notion of a natural course
of things out of sight, but as they are intelligent
and thoughtful people, they are able to promise a
host of effects, which they naturally say are con-
ditioned by prayer or by the strict observance of
their law. They can, moreover, prescribe a large
number of things which are exceedingly reasonable
only they must not point to experience or
empiricism as the source of this wisdom, but to
revelation or to the fruits of the u most severe
exercises of penance."

The holy lie, therefore, applies principally to the
purpose of an action (the natural purpose, reason,
is made to vanish : a moral purpose, the observ-
ance of some law, a service to God, seems to be
the purpose) : to the conseqttence of an action (the
natural consequence is interpreted as something
supernatural, and, in order to be on surer ground,
other incontrollable and supernatural consequences
are foretold).

In this way the concepts good and evil are
created, and seem quite divorced from the natural
concepts: "useful," "harmful," "life-promoting,"
" life- reducing," indeed, inasmuch as another life

122 THE WILL TO POWER.

is imagined, the former concepts may even be
antagonistic to Nature's concepts of good and evil.
In this way, the proverbial concept " conscience "
is created : an inner voice, which, though it makes
itself heard in regard to every action, does not
measure the worth of that action according to its
results, but according to its intention or the con-
formity of this intention to the " law."

The holy lie therefore invented: (i) a^vrfwho
punishes and rewards, who recognises and carefully
observes the law-book of the priests, and who is
particular about sending them into the world as
his mouthpieces and plenipotentiaries ; (2) an
After Life, in which, alone, the great penal machine
is supposed to be active to this end the immor-
tality of the soul was invented ; (3) a conscience in
man, understood as the knowledge that good and
evil are permanent values that God himself
speaks through it, whenever its counsels are in
conformity with priestly precepts ; (4) Morality as
the denial of all natural processes, as the subjection
of all phenomena to a moral order, as the inter-
pretation of all phenomena as the effects of a
moral order of things (that is to say, the concept
of punishment and reward), as the only power and
only creator of all transformations ; (5) Truth as
given, revealed, and identical with the teaching of
the priests : as the condition to all salvation and
happiness in this and the next world.

In short : what is the price paid for the improve-
ment supposed to be due to morality? The
unhinging of reason, the reduction of all motives to
fear and hope (punishment and reward) ; dependence

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 123

upon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary
exactitude which is supposed to express a divine
will ; the implantation of a " conscience " which
establishes a false science in the place of experience
and experiment : as though all one had to do or
had not to do were predetermined a kind of
castration of the seeking and striving spirit ; in
short: the worst mutilation of man that can be
imagined, and it is pretended that "the good
man " is the result.

Practically speaking, all reason, the whole heri-
tage of intelligence, subtlety, and caution, the first
condition of the priestly canon, is arbitrarily re-
duced, when it is too late, to a simple mechanical
process : conformity with the law becomes a pur-
pose in itself, it is the highest purpose ; Life no
longer contains any problems \ the whole conception
of the world is polluted by the notion of punish-
ment \ Life itself, owing to the fact that the
priests life is upheld as the non plus ultra of
perfection, is transformed into a denial and pol-
lution of life ; the concept " God " represents an
aversion to Life, and even a criticism and a con-
temning of it. Truth is transformed in the mind,
into priestly prevarication ; the striving after truth,
into the study of the Scriptures^ into the way to
become a theologian..

142.

A criticism of the Law-Book of Manu. The
whole book is founded upon the holy lie. Was
it the well-being of humanity that inspired the
whole of this system? Was this kind of man,

124 THE WILL TO POWER.

who believes in the interested nature of every
action, interested or not interested in the success
of this system ? The desire to improve mankind
whence comes the inspiration to this feeling?
Whence is the concept improvement taken ?

We find a class of men, the sacerdotal class, who
consider themselves the standard pattern, the
highest example and most perfect expression of
the type man. The notion of " improving " man-
kind, to this class of men, means to make man-
kind like themselves. They believe in their own
superiority, they will be superior in practice : the
cause of the holy lie is The Will to Power. . . .

Establishment of the dominion : to this end,
ideas which place a non plus ultra of power with
the priesthood are made to prevail. Power ac-
quired by lying was the result of the recognition
of the fact that it was not already possessed
physically, in a military form. . . . Lying as a
supplement to power this is a new concept of
" truth."

It is a mistake to presuppose unconscious and
innocent development in this quarter a sort of
self-deception. Fanatics are not the discoverers
of such exhaustive systems of oppression. . . .
Cold-blooded reflection must have been at work
here; the same sort of reflection which Plato
showed when he worked out his " State " " One
must desire the means when one desires the end."
Concerning this political maxim, all legislators
have always been quite clear.

We possess the classical model, and it is speci-
fically Arian : we can therefore hold the most

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 125

gifted and most reflective type of man responsible
for the most systematic lie that has ever been
told. . . . Everywhere almost the lie was copied,
and thus Arian influence corrupted the world. . . .

143.

Much is said to-day about the Semitic spirit of
the New Testament : but the thing referred to is
merely priestcraft, and in the purest example
of an Arian law-book, in Manu, this kind of
" Semitic spirit " that is to say, Sacerdotalism, is
worse than anywhere else.

The development of the Jewish hierarchy is not
original : they learnt the scheme in Babylon it
is Arian, When, later on, the same thing became
dominant in Europe, under the preponderance
of Germanic blood, this was in conformity to the
spirit of the ruling race : a striking case of atavism.
The Germanic middle ages aimed at a revival of
the Arian order of castes.

Mohammedanism in its turn learned from
Christianity the use of a " Beyond " as an instru-
ment of punishment.

The scheme of a permanent community^ with
priests at its head this oldest product of Asia's
great culture in the domain of organisation
naturally provoked reflection and imitation in every
way. Plato is an example of this, but above all,
the Egyptians.

144-

Moralities and religions are the principal means
by which one can modify men into whatever one

126 THE WILL TO POWER.

likes ; provided one is possessed of an overflow
of creative power, and can cause one's will to pre-
vail over long periods of time.

145-

If one wish to see an affirmative Arian religion
which is the product of a ruling class, one should
read the law-book of Manu. (The deification of
the feeling of power in the Brahmin : it is in-
teresting to note that it originated in the warrior-
caste, and was later transferred to the priests.)

If one wish to see an affirmative religion of the
Semitic order, which is the product of the ruling
class, one should read the Koran or the earlier
portions of the Old Testament. (Mohammedan-
ism> as a religion for men, has profound contempt
for the sentimentality and prevarication of Christi-
anity, . . . which, according to Mohammedans,
is a woman's religion.)

If one wish to see a negative religion of the
Semitic order, which is the product of the op-
pressed class, one should read the New Testament
(which, according to Indian and Arian points
of view, is a religion for the Chandala).

If one wish to see a negative Arian religion,
which is the product of the ruling classes, one
should study Buddhism.

It is quite in the nature of things that we have
no Arian religion which is the product of the
oppressed classes; for that would have been a
contradiction : a race of masters is either para-
mount or else it goes to the dogs.

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 12?

146.

Religion, per se, has nothing to do with
morality ; yet both offshoots of the Jewish religion
are essentially moral religions which prescribe the
rules of living, and procure obedience to their
principles by means of rewards and punishment.

147.

Paganism Christianity. Paganism is that
which says yea to all that is natural, it is innocence
in being natural, " naturalness." Christianity is
that which says no to all that is natural, it is a
certain lack of dignity in being natural ; hostility
to Nature.

" Innocent " : Petronius is innocent, for in-
stance. Beside this happy man a Christian is
absolutely devoid of innocence. But since even
the Christian status is ultimately only a natural
condition, though it must not be regarded as such,
the term "Christian" soon begins to mean the
counterfeiting of the psychological interpretation.

148.

The Christian priest is from the root a mortal
enemy of sensuality : one cannot imagine a greater
contrast to his attitude than the guileless, slightly
awed, and solemn attitude, which the religious
rites of the most honourable women in Athens
maintained in the presence of the symbol of sex.
In all non-ascetic religions the procreative act is
the secret per se : a sort of symbol of perfection

128 THE WILL TO POWER.

and of the designs of the future: re-birth, im-
mortality.

149*

Our belief in ourselves is the greatest fetter,
the most telling spur, and the strongest pinion.
Christianity ought to have elevated the innocence
of man to the position of an article of belief
men would then have become gods : in those
days believing was still possible.

150.

The egregious lie of history : as if it were the
corruption of Paganism that opened the road to
Christianity. As a matter of fact, it was the
enfeeblement and moralisation of the man of
antiquity. The new interpretation of natural
functions, which made them appear like vices ^ had
already gone before 1

151.

Religions are ultimately wrecked by the belief
in morality. The idea of the Christian moral
God becomes untenable, hence " Atheism," as
though there could be no other god.

Culture is likewise wrecked by the belief in
morality. For when the necessary and only
possible conditions of its growth are revealed,
nobody will any longer countenance it (Buddh-
ism).

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 129

The physiology of Nihilistic religions. All in
all, the Nihilistic religions are systematised histories
of sickness described in religious and moral ter-
minology.

In pagan cultures it is around the interpretation
of the great annual cycles that the religious cult
turns; in Christianity it is around a cycle of
paralytic phenomena.

153-

This Nihilistic religion gathers together all the
decadent elements and things of like order which
it can find in antiquity, viz. :

(a) The weak and the botched (the refuse of the
ancient world, and that of which it rid itself with
most violence).

() Those who are morally obsessed and anti-
pagan.

(c) Those who are weary of politics and in-
different (the blast Romans), the denationalised,
who know not what they are.

{d) Those who are tired of themselves who
are happy to be party to a subterranean conspiracy.

154.

Buddha versus Christ. Among the Nihilistic
religions, Christianity and Buddhism may always
be sharply distinguished. Buddhism is the ex-
pression of a fine evening, perfectly sweet and
mild it is a sort of gratitude towards all that

I3O THE WILL TO POWER.

lies hidden, including that which it entirely
lacks, viz., bitterness, disillusionment, and resent-
ment. Finally it possesses lofty intellectual love ;
it has got over all the subtlety of philosophical
contradictions, and is even resting after it, though
it is precisely from that source that it derives its
intellectual glory and its glow as of a sunset
(it originated in the higher classes).

Christianity is a degenerative movement, con-
sisting of all kinds of decaying and excremental
elements : it is not the expression of the downfall
of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration
of all the morbid elements which are mutually
attractive and which gravitate to one another.
... It is therefore not a national religion, not
determined by race : it appeals to the disinherited
everywhere ; it consists of a foundation of resent-
ment against all that is successful and dominant :
it is in need of a symbol which represents the
damnation of everything successful and dominant.
It is opposed to every form of intellectual move-
ment, to all philosophy : it takes up the cudgels
for idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect.
Resentment against those who are gifted, learned,
intellectually independent : in all these it suspects
the element of success and domination.

155-

In Buddhism this thought prevails : " All
passions, everything which creates emotions and
leads to blood, is a call to action " to this extent
alone are its believers warned against evil. For

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 131

action has no sense, it merely binds one to
existence. All existence, however, has no sense.
Evil is interpreted as that which leads to irration-
alisrn : to the affirmation of means whose end is
denied. A road to nonentity is the desideratum,
hence all emotional impulses are regarded with
horror. For instance : " On no account seek after
revenge ! Be the enemy of no one ! " The
Hedonism of the weary finds its highest expression
here. Nothing is more utterly foreign to Buddhism
than the Jewish fanaticism of St. Paul: nothing
could be more contrary to its instinct than the
tension, fire, and unrest of the religious man, and,
above all, that form of sensuality which sanctifies
Christianity with the name " Love." Moreover,
it is the cultured and very intellectual classes who
find blessedness in Buddhism : a race wearied and
besotted by centuries of philosophical quarrels,
but not beneath all culture as those classes
were from which Christianity sprang. ... In the
Buddhistic ideal, there is essentially an emancipa-
tion from good and evil : a very subtle suggestion
of a Beyond to all morality is thought out in its
teaching, and this Beyond is supposed to be
compatible with perfection, the condition being,
that even good actions are only needed pro tern.,
merely as a means, that is to say, in order to be
free from all action.

1 56.

How very curious it is to see a Nihilistic religion
such as Christianity, sprung from, and in keeping
with, a decrepit and worn-out people, who have

132 THE WILL TO POWER.

outlived all strong instincts, being transferred step
by step to another environment that is to say,
to a land of young people, who have not yet lived
at all. The joy of the final chapter, of the fold
and of the evening, preached to barbarians and
Germans! How thoroughly all of it must first
have been barbarised, Germanised ! To those
who had dreamed of a Walhalla: who found
happiness only in war ! A sufiernational religion
preached in the midst of chaos, where no nations
yet existed even.

157.

The only way to refute priests and religions is
this: to show that their errors are no longer
beneficent that they are rather harmful ; in short,
that their own " proof of power " no longer holds
good. . . .

2. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.

158.

Christianity as an historical reality should not
be confounded with that one root which its name
recalls. The other roots, from which it has
sprung, are by far the more important. It is an
unprecedented abuse of names to identify such
manifestations of decay and such abortions as
the "Christian Church," "Christian belief," and
"Christian life," with that Holy Name. What
did Christ deny1 Everything which to-day is
called Christian.

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 133

159.

The whole of the Christian creed all Christian
"truth," is idle falsehood and deception, and is
precisely the reverse of that which was at the
bottom of the first Christian movement

All that which in the ecclesiastical sense is
Christian, is just exactly what is most radically
anti- Christian : crowds of things and people appear
instead of symbols, history takes the place of
eternal facts, it is all forms, rites, and dogmas
instead of a " practice " of life. To be really
Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent
to dogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology.

The practice of Christianity is no more an im-
possible phantasy than the practice of Buddhism
is : it is merely a means to happiness.

1 60.

Jesus goes straight to the point, the " Kingdom
of Heaven " in the heart, and He does not find the
means in duty to the Jewish Church; He even
regards the reality of Judaism (its need to main-
tain itself) as nothing; He is concerned purely
with the inner man.

Neither does He make anything of all the
coarse forms relating to man's intercourse with
God : He is opposed to the whole of the teaching
of repentance and atonement ; lie points out how
man ought to live in order to feel himself" deified,"
and how futile it is on his part to hope to live
properly by showing repentance and contrition

134 THE WILL TO POWER.

for his sins. " Sin is of no account " is practically
his chief standpoint.

Sin, repentance, forgiveness, all this does not
belong to Christianity ... it is Judaism or
Paganism which has become mixed up with Christ's
teaching.

161.

The Kingdom of Heaven is a state of the heart
(of children it is written, " for theirs is the
Kingdom of Heaven ") : it has nothing to do with
superterrestrial things. The Kingdom of God
" cometh," not chronologically or historically, not
on a certain day in the calendar ; it is not something
which one day appears and was not previously
there ; it is a " change of feeling in the individual,"
it is something which may come at any time and
which may be absent at any time. . . .

162.

The thief on the cross ; -When the criminal him-
self, who endures a painful death, declares : " the
way this Jesus suffers and dies, without a murmur
of revolt or enmity, graciously and resignedly, is
the only right way," he assents to the gospel ; and
by this very fact he is in Paradise. . , .

Jesus bids us : not to resist, either by deeds or
in our heart, him who ill-treats us ;

He bids us admit of no grounds for separating
ourselves from our wives ;

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 135

He bids us make no distinction between
foreigners and fellow-countrymen, strangers and
familiars ;

He bids us show anger to no one, and treat no
one with contempt ; give alms secretly ; not to
desire to become rich ; not to swear ; not to
stand in judgment ; become reconciled with our
enemies and forgive offences ; not to worship
in public.

" Blessedness " is nothing promised : it is here,
with us, if we only wish to live and act in a par-
ticular way,

164.

Subsequent Additions : The whole of the
prophet- and thaumaturgist-attitudes and the
bad temper ; while the conjuring-up of a supreme
tribunal of justice is an abominable corruption
(see Mark vi. 1 1 : " And whosoever shall not
receive you. . . . Verily I say unto you, It shall
be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha," etc.).
The "fig tree" (Matt. xxi. 18, 19) : "Now in the
morning as he returned into the city, he hungered.
And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came
to it, and found nothing thereon, but leaves only,
and said unto it, Let no fruit grow on thee hence-
forward for ever. And presently the fig tree
withered away."

165.

The teaching of rewards and punishments has
become mixed up with Christianity in a way
which is quite absurd ; everything is thereby spoilt.

136 THE WILL TO POWER.

In the same way, the practice of the first ecclesia
militanS) of the Apostle Paul and his attitude, is
put forward as if it had been commanded or pre-
determined.

The subsequent glorification of the actual life
and teaching of the first Christians : as if every-
thing had been prescribed beforehand and had been

only a matter of following' directions And

as for the fulfilment of scriptural prophecies : how
much of all that is more than forgery and cooking ?

1 66.

Jesus opposed a real life, a life in truth, to
ordinary life : nothing could have been more
foreign to His mind than the somewhat heavy
nonsense of an "eternal Peter," of the eternal
duration of a single person, Precisely what He
combats is the exaggerated importance of the
"person": how can He wish to immortalise it?

He likewise combats the hierarchy within the
community ; He never promises a certain propor-
tion of reward for a certain proportion of deserts :
how can He have meant to teach the doctrine of
punishment and reward in a Beyond ?

167.

Christianity is an ingenuous attempt at bringing
about a Buddhistic movement in favour of peace,
sprung from the very heart of the resenting masses
. . . but transformed by Paul into a mysterious
pagan cult, which was ultimately able to accord

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 137

with the whole of State organisation . . . and
which carries on war, condemns, tortures, conjures,
and hates.

Paul bases his teaching upon the need of
mystery felt by the great masses capable of
religious emotions : he seeks a victim^ a bloody
phantasmagoria, which may be equal to a contest
with the images of a secret cult: God on the
cross, the drinking of blood, the unio mystica with
the " victim."

He seeks the prolongation of life after death
(the blessed and atoned after-life of the individual
soul) which he puts in causal relation with the
victim already referred to (according to the type
of Dionysos, Mithras, Osiris).

He feels the necessity of bringing notions of
guilt and sin into the foreground, not a new
practice of life (as Jesus Himself demonstrated and
taught),but a new cult,a newbelief,a beliefin a mira-
culous metamorphosis (" Salvation " through belief).

He understood the great needs of the pagan
world) and he gave quite an absolutely arbitrary
picture of those two plain facts, Christ's life and
death. He gave the whole a new accent, altering
the equilibrium everywhere . . , he was one of
the most active destroyers of primitive Christianity.

The attempt made on the life of priests and theo-
logians culminated, thanks to Paul, in a new priest-
hood and theology a ruling caste and a Church.

The attempt made to suppress the fussy im-
portance of the " person," culminated in the belief
in the eternal " personality " (and in the anxiety
concerning " eternal salvation " . . .), and in the

138 THE WILL TO POWER.

most paradoxical exaggeration of individual
egoism.

This is the humorous side of the question
tragic humour : Paul again set up on a large scale
precisely what Jesus had overthrown by His life.
At last, when the Church edifice was complete, it
even sanctioned the existence of the State.

1 68.

The Church is precisely that against which
Jesus inveighed and against which He taught
His disciples to fight.

169.

A God who died for our sins, salvation through
faith, resurrection after death all these things
are the counterfeit coins of real Christianity, for
which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be
held responsible.

The life which must serve as an example consists
in love and humility ; in the abundance of hearty
emotion which does not even exclude the lowliest ;
in the formal renunciation of all desire of making
its rights felt, of all defence ; of conquest, in the
sense of personal triumph ; in the belief in salva-
tion in this world, despite all sorrow, opposition, and
death ; in forgiveness and the absence of anger and
contempt; in the absence of a desire to be rewarded ;
in the refusal to be bound to anybody ; abandon-
ment to all that is most spiritual and intellectual ;

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 139

in fact, a very proud life controlled by the will
of a servile and poor life.

Once the Church had allowed itself to take
over all the Christian practice, and had formally
sanctioned the State, that kind of life which Jesus
combats and condemns, it was obliged to lay
the sense of Christianity in other things than early
Christian ideals that is to say, in the faith in
incredible things, in the ceremonial of prayers,
worship, feasts, etc. etc. The notions " sin," " for-
giveness," " punishment," " reward " everything,
in fact, which had nothing in common with, and
was quite absent from, primitive Christianity, now
comes into the foreground.

An appalling stew of Greek philosophy and
Judaism ; asceticism ; continual judgments and
condemnations ; the order of rank, etc.

170.

Christianity has, from the first, always trans-
formed the symbolical into crude realities :

(1) The antitheses "true life" and " false life"
were misunderstood and changed into " life here "
and " life beyond."

(2) The notion "eternal life," as opposed to
the personal life which is ephemeral, is translated
into " personal immortality " ;

(3) The process of fraternising by means of
sharing the same food and drink, after the Hebrew-
Arabian manner, is interpreted as the " miracle of
transubstantiation."

(4) " Resurrection " which was intended to

140 THE WILL TO POWER.

mean the entrance to the " true life," in the sense
of being intellectually " born again," becomes an
historical contingency, supposed to take place at
some moment after death ;

(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the
" Son of God," that is to say, the life-relationship
between man and God, becomes the " second
person of the Trinity," and thus the filial relation-
ship of every man even the lowest to God, is
done away with \

(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that
there is no other way to this filial relationship to
God, save through the practice of life taught by
Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that
there is a miraculous way of atoning for all sin ;
though not through our own endeavours, but by
means of Christ :

For all these purposes, " Christ on the Cross "
had to be interpreted afresh. The death itself
would certainly not be the principal feature of the
event ... it was only another sign pointing to
the way in which one should behave towards the
authorities and the laws of the world that one
was not to defend oneself this was the exemplary
life.

171.

Concerning the psychology of Paul. The im-
portant fact is Christ's death. This remains to
be explained. . . . That there may be truth or
error in an explanation never entered these
people's heads : one day a sublime possibility
strikes them, " His death might mean so and so "

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 14!

and it forthwith becomes so and so. An hypo-
thesis is proved by the sublime ardour it lends to
its discoverer. . . .

"The proof of strength": i.e., a thought is
demonstrated by its effects ("by their fruits," as
the Bible ingenuously says) ; that which fires en-
thusiasm must be true, what one loses one's
blood for must be true

In every department of this world of thought,
the sudden feeling of power which an idea imparts
to him who is responsible for it, is placed to the
credit of that idea : and as there seems no other
way of honouring an idea than by calling it true,
the first epithet it is honoured with is the word
true. . . . How could it have any effect other-
wise ? It was imagined by some power : if that
power were not real, it could not be the cause of
anything. . . . The thought is then understood
as inspired-, the effect it causes has something of
the violent nature of a demoniacal influence

A thought which a decadent like Paul could
not resist and to which he completely yields, is
thus " proved " true \ \ \

All these holy epileptics and visionaries did
not possess a thousandth part of the honesty in
self-criticism with which a philologist, nowadays,
reads a text, or tests the truth of an historical
event. . . . Beside us, such people were moral
cretins.

172,

It matters little whether a thing be true,
provided it be effective : total absence of intellectual

142 THE WILL TO POWER.

uprightness. Everything is good, whether it be
lying, slander, or shameless "cooking," provided
it serve to heighten the degree of heat to the
point at which people " believe."

We are face to face with an actual school for
the teaching of the means wherewith men are
seduced to a belief: we see systematic contempt for
those spheres whence contradiction might come
(that is to say, for reason, philosophy, wisdom,
doubt, and caution) ; a shameless praising and
glorification of the teaching, with continual refer-
ences to the fact that it was God who presented
us with it that the apostle signifies nothing
that no criticism is brooked, but only faith, ac-
ceptance; that it is the greatest blessing and
favour to receive such a doctrine of salvation ;
that the state in which one should receive it,
ought to be one of the profoundest thankfulness
and humility. . . .

The resentment which the lowly feel against all
those in high places, is continually turned to
account : the fact that this teaching is revealed to
them as the reverse of the wisdom of the world,
against the power of the world, seduces them to
it. This teaching convinces the outcasts and the
botched of all sorts and conditions; it promises
blessedness, advantages, and privileges to the most
insignificant and most humble men ; it fanaticises
the poor, the small, and the foolish, and fills them
with insane vanity, as though they were the mean-
ing and salt of the earth.

Again, I say, all this cannot be sufficiently
contemned, we spare ourselves a criticism of the

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 143

teaching ; it is sufficient to take note of the means
it uses in order to be aware of the nature of the
phenomenon one is examining. It identified itself
with virtue, it appropriated the whole of the fasci-
nating power of virtue^ shamelessly, for its own
purposes ... it availed itself of the power of
paradox, and of the need, manifested by old
civilisations, iur pepper and absurdity ; it amazed
and revolted at the same time ; it provoked per-
secutions and ill-treatment.

It is the same kind of well-thouglit-out meanness
with which the Jewish priesthood established their
power and built up their Church. . . .

One must be able to discern: (i) that warmth
of passion " love " (resting on a base of ardent
sensuality) ; (2) the thoroughly ignoble character of
Christianity : the continual exaggeration and
verbosity ; the lack of cool intellectuality and
irony ; the unmilitary character of all its instincts ;
the priestly prejudices against manly pride,
sensuality, the sciences, the arts.

173.

Paul: seeks power against ruling Judaism,
his attempt is too weak. . . . Transvaluation of
the notion " Jew " : the " race " is put aside : but that
means denying the very basis of the whole struc-
ture. The " martyr," the " fanatic," the value of
all strong belief. Christianity is inform of decay
of the old world, after the latter's collapse, and it is
characterised by the fact that it brings all the most
sickly and unhealthy elements and needs to the top.

144 THE WILL TO POWER.

Consequently other instincts had to step into the
foreground, in order to constitute an entity, a power
able to stand alone in short, a condition of tense
sorrow was necessary, like that out of which the
Jews had derived their instinct of self-preserva-
tion. . . .

The persecution of Christians was invaluable for
this purpose.

Unity in the face of danger ; the conversion of
the masses becomes the only means of putting an
end to the persecution of the individual. (The
notion " conversion " is therefore made as elastic
as possible.)

174-

The Christian Judaic life : here resentment did
not prevail. The great persecutions alone could
have driven out the passions to that extent as
also the ardour of love and hate.

When the creatures a man most loves are
sacrificed before his eyes for the sake of his faith,
that man becomes aggressive ; the triumph of
Christianity is due to its persecutors.

Asceticism is not specifically Christian : this is
what Schopenhauer misunderstood. It only shoots
up in Christianity, wherever it would have existed
without that religion.

Melancholy Christianity, the torture and tor-
ment of the conscience, is also only a peculiarity of
a particular soil, where Christian values have taken
root: it is not Christianity properly speaking.
Christianity has absorbed all the different kinds
of diseases which grow from morbid soil : one could

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 145

reproach it simply with the fact that it did not
know how to resist any contagion. But that
precisely is the essential feature of it. Christi-
anity is a type of decadence.

I7S.

The reality on which Christianity was able to
build up its power consisted of the small dispersed
Jeivish families, with their warmth, tenderness, and
peculiar readiness to help, which, to the whole of
the Roman Empire, was perhaps the most incom-
prehensible and least familiar of their character-
istics ; they were also united by their pride at
being a " chosen people," concealed beneath a
cloak of humility, and by their secret denial of all
that was uppermost and that possessed power
and splendour, although there was no shade of
envy in their denial. To have recognised this as a
power > to have regarded this blessed state as com-
municable, seductive, and infectious even where
pagans were concerned this constituted Paul's
genius : to use up the treasure of latent energy
and cautious happiness for the purposes of "a
Jewish Church of free confession," and to avail
himself of all the Jewish experience, their propa-
ganda, and their expertness in the preservation of
a community under a foreign power this is what
he conceived to be his duty. He it was who
discovered that absolutely unpolitical and isolated
body of paltry people, and their art of asserting
themselves and pushing themselves to the front,
by means of a host of acquired virtues which are
VOL. i. K

146 THE WILL TO POWER.

made to represent the only forms of virtue (" the
self-preservative measure and weapon of success
of a certain class of man ").

The principle of love comes from the small
community of Jewish people: a very passionate
soul glows here, beneath the ashes of humility and
wretchedness : it is neither Greek, Indian, nor
German. The song in praise of love which Paul
wrote is not Christian ; it is the Jewish flare of that
eternal flame which is Semitic. If Christianity has
done anything essentially new in a psychological
sense, it is this, that it has increased the temperature
of the soul among those cooler and more noble
races who were at that time at the head of affairs ;
it discovered that the most wretched life could be
made rich and invaluable, by means of an eleva-
tion of the temperature of the soul. . . .

It is easily understood that a transfer of this sort
could not take place among the ruling classes : the
Jews and Christians were at a disadvantage owing
to their bad manners spiritual strength and
passion, when accompanied by bad manners, only
provoke loathing (I become aware of these bad
manners while reading the New Testament). It
was necessary to be related both in baseness and
sorrow with this type of lower manhood in order
to feel anything attractive in him. . . . The atti-
tude a man maintains towards the New Testament
is a test of the amount of classical taste he may
have in him (see Tacitus) ; he who is not revolted
by it, he who does not feel honestly and deeply
that he is in the presence of a sort of fceda
superstitio when reading it, and who does not draw

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 147

his hand back so as not to soil his fingers such a
man does not know what is classical. A man
must feel about " the cross " as Goethe did.*

176.

The reaction of paltry people : Love provides
the feeling of highest power. It should be under-
stood to what extent, not man in general, but only
a certain kind of man is speaking here.

" We are godly in love, we shall be ' the children
of God ' ; God loves us and wants nothing from
us save love " ; that is to say : all morality, obedi-
ence, and action, do not produce the same feeling
of power and freedom as love does ; a man does
nothing wicked from sheer love, but he does much
more than if he were prompted by obedience and
virtue alone.

Here is the happiness of the herd, the communal
feeling in big things as in small, the living senti-
ment of unity felt as the sum of the feeling of life.
Helping, caring for, and being useful, constantly
kindle the feeling of power; visible success, the

* Vieles kann ich ertragen. Die meisten beschwerlichen

Dinge

Duld' ich mit ruhigem Mut, wie es ein Gott mir gebeut.
Wenige sind mir jedoch wie Gift und Schlange zuwider ;
Viere : Rauch des Tabaks, Wanzen, und Knoblauch und >J.
Goethe's Venetian Epigrams^ No. 67.

Much can I bear. Things the most irksome
I endure with such patience as comes from a god.
Four things, however, repulse me like venom :
Tobacco smoke, garlic, bugs, and the cross.

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.)

148 THE WILL TO POWER.

expression of pleasure, emphasise the feeling of
power ; pride is not lacking either, it is felt in the
form of the community, the House of God, and
the " chosen people."

As a matter of fact, man has once more experi-
enced an " alteration " of his personality : this time
he called his feeling of love God. The awaken-
ing of such a feeling must be pictured ; it is a sort
of ecstasy, a strange language, a " Gospel " it was
this newness which did not allow man to attribute
love to himself he thought it was God leading
him on and taking shape in his heart. "God
descends among men," one's neighbour is trans-
figured and becomes a God (in so far as he provokes
the sentiment of love). Jesus is the neighbour , the
moment He is transfigured in thought into a God,
and into a cause provoking the feeling of power.

177.

Believers are aware that they owe an infinite
amount to Christianity, and therefore conclude
that its Founder must have been a man of the
first rank. . . . This conclusion is false, but it is
typical of the reverents. Regarded objectively,
it is, in the first place, just possible that they are
mistaken concerning the extent of their debt to
Christianity: a man's convictions prove nothing
concerning the thing he is convinced about, and
in religions they are more likely to give rise to
suspicions. . . . Secondly, it is possible that the
debt owing to Christianity is not due to its
Founder at all, but to the whole structure, the

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 149

whole thing to the Church, etc. The notion
" Founder" is so very equivocal, that it may stand
even for the accidental cause of a movement:
the person of the Founder has been inflated in
proportion as the Church has grown : but even
this process of veneration allows of the conclusion
that, at one time or other, this Founder was some-
thing exceedingly insecure and doubtful in the
beginning. . . . Let any one think of the free and
easy way in which Paul treats the problem of the
personality of Jesus, how he almost juggles with
it : some one who died, who was seen after His
death, some one whom the Jews delivered up to
death all this was only the theme Paul wrote
the music to it.

The founder of a religion may be quite insignifi-
cant a wax vesta and no more \

179-

Concerning the psychological problem of Christi-
anity. The driving forces are : resentment,
popular insurrection, the revolt of the bungled and
the botched. (In Buddhism it is different : it is
not born of resentment. It rather combats resent-
ment because the latter leads to action?)

This party, which stands for freedom, under-
stands that the abandonment of antagonism in
thought and deed is a condition of distinction and
preservation. Here lies the psychological difficulty
which has stood in the way of Christianity being

ISO THE WILL TO POWER.

understood : the force which created it, urges to
a struggle against itself.

Only as a party standing to? peace and innocence
can this insurrectionary movement hope to be
successful : it must conquer by means of excessive
mildness, sweetness, softness, and its instincts are
aware of this. The feat was to deny and con-
demn the force, of which man is the expression,
and to press the reverse of that force continually
to the fore, by word and deed.

1 80.

The pretence of youthfulness. It is a mistake
to imagine that, with Christianity, an ingenuous
and youthful people rose against an old culture ;
the story goes that it was out of the lowest levels
of society, where Christianity flourished and shot
its roots, that the more profound source of life
gushed forth afresh : but nothing can be under-
stood of the psychology of Christianity, if it be
supposed that it was the expression of revived
youth among a people, or of the resuscitated
strength of a race. It is rather a typical form of
decadence, of moral-softening and of hysteria,
amid a general hotch-potch of races and people
that had lost all aims and had grown weary and
sick. The wonderful company which gathered
round this master-seducer of the populace, would
not be at all out of place in a Russian novel : all
the diseases of the nerves seem to give one
another a rendezvous in this crowd the
absence of a known duty, the feeling that every-

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 151

thing is nearing its end, that nothing is any longer
worth while, and that contentment lies in dolce
far niente.

The power and certainty of the future in the
Jew's instinct, its monstrous will for life and for
power, lies in its ruling classes ; the people who
upheld primitive Christianity are best dis-
tinguished by this exhausted condition of their
instincts. On the one hand, they are sick of every-
thing ; on the other, they are content with each
other, with themselves and for themselves.

181.

Christianity regarded as emancipated Judaism
(just as a nobility which is both racial and in-
digenous ultimately emancipates itself from these
conditions, and goes in search of kindred
elements. . . .).

(1) As a Church (community) on the territory
of the State, as an unpolitical institution.

(2) As life, breeding, practice, art of living.

(3) As a religion of sin (sin committed against
God, being the only recognised kind, and the only
cause of all suffering), with a universal cure for it.
There is no sin save against God ; what is done
against men, man shall not sit in judgment upon,
nor call to account, except in the name of God.
At the same time, all commandments (love):
everything is associated v/ith God, and all acts are
performed according to God's will. Beneath this
arrangement there lies exceptional intelligence
(a very narrow life, such as that led by the

152 THE WILL TO POWER.

Esquimaux, can only be endured by most peaceful
and indulgent people : the Judaeo- Christian dogma
turns against sin in favour of the " sinner ").

182.

The Jewish priesthood understood how to
present everything it claimed to be right as a
divine precept, as an act of obedience to God, and
also to introduce all those things which conduced
to preserve Israel and were the conditions of its
existence (for instance: the large number of
" works " : circumcision and the cult of sacrifices, as
the very pivot of the national conscience), not as
Nature, but as God.

This process contimied ; within the very heart of
Judaism, where the need of these " works " was not
felt (that is to say, as a means of keeping a race
distinct), a priestly sort of man was pictured, whose
bearing towards the aristocracy was like that of
" noble nature " ; a spontaneous and non - caste
sacerdotalism of the soul, which now, in order to
throw its opposite into strong relief, attaches value,
not to the "dutiful acts" themselves, but to the
sentiment. . . .

At bottom, the problem was once again, how
to make a certain kind of soul prevail : it was also
a popular insurrection in the midst of a priestly
people a pietistic movement coming from below
(sinners, publicans, women, and children). Jesus
of Nazareth was the symbol of their sect. And
again, in order to believe in themselves, they were
in need of a theological transfiguration-, they
require nothing less than " the Son of God " in

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 153

order to create a belief for themselves. And just
as the priesthood had falsified the whole history
of Israel, another attempt was made, here, to alter
and falsify the whole history of mankind in such
a way as to make Christianity seem like the most
important event it contained. This movement
could have originated only upon the soil of Judaism,
the main feature of which was the confounding of
guilt with sorro^v and the reduction of all sin to
sin against God. Of all this, Christianity is the
second degree of poiver.

The symbolism of Christianity is based upon
that of Judaism, which had already transfigured
all reality (history, Nature) into a holy and
artificial unreality which refused to recognise
real history, and which showed no more interest
in a natural course of things.

184.

The Jews made the attempt to prevail, after
two of their castes the warrior and the agri-
cultural castes, had disappeared from their midst.

In this sense they are the u castrated people" : they
have their priests and then their Chandala. . . .

How easily a disturbance occurs among them
an insurrection of their Chandala. This was the
origin of Christianity.

Owing to the fact that they had no knowledge of
warriors except as their masters, they introduced

154 THE WILL TO POWER.

enmity towards the nobles, the men of honour,
pride, and power, and the ruling classes, into their
religion : they are pessimists from indignation. . . .

Thus they created a very important and novel
position: the priests in the van of the Chandala
against the noble classes. . . .

Christianity was the logical conclusion of this
movement : even in the Jewish priesthood, it still
scented the existence of the caste, of the privileged
and noble minority it therefore did away with
priests.

Christ is the unit of the Chandala who removes
the priest . . . the Chandala who redeems
himself. . . .

That is why the French Revolution is the lineal
descendant and the continuator of Christianity
it is characterised by an instinct of hate towards
castes, nobles, and the last privileges.

185.

The "Christian Ideal" put on the stage with
Jewish astuteness these are the fundamental
psychological forces of its " nature " :

Revolt against the ruling spiritual powers ;

The attempt to make those virtues which facili-
tate the happiness of the lowly > a standard of all
values in fact, to call God that which is no
more than the self-preservative instinct of that
class of man possessed of least vitality ;

Obedience and absolute abstention from war
and resistance, justified by this ideal ;

155

The love of one another as a result of the love
of God.

The trick : The denial of all natural mobilia,
and their transference to the spiritual world
beyond . . . the exploitation of virtue and its
veneration for wholly interested motives, gradual
denial of virtue in everything that is not Christian.

1 86.

The profound contempt with which the Christian
was treated by the noble people of antiquity, is of
the same order as the present instinctive aversion
to Jews: it is the hatred which free and self-
respecting classes feel towards those ivho wish to
creep in secretly, and who combine an awkward
bearing with foolish self-sufficiency.

The New Testament is the gospel of a com-
pletely ignoble species of man ; its pretensions to
highest values yea, to all values, is, as a matter
of fact, revolting even nowadays.

How little the subject matters ! It is the spirit
which gives the thing life ! What a quantity c*
stuffy and sick-room air there is in all that chatter
about " redemption/' " love," " blessedness," " faith/ 1
" truth," " eternal life " ! Let any one look into a
really pagan book and compare the two ; for in-
stance, in Petronius, nothing at all is done, said,
desired, and valued, which, according to a bigoted
Christian estimate, is not sin, or even deadly sin.
And yet how happy one feels with the purer air, the

156 THE WILL TO POWER.

superior intellectuality, the quicker pace, and the free
overflowing strength which is certain of the future !
In the whole of the New Testament there is not
one bouffonnerie : but that fact alone would suffice
to refute any book. . . .

188.

The profound lack of dignity with which all life,
which is not Christian, is condemned : it does not
suffice them to think meanly of their actual oppon-
ents, they cannot do with less than a general
slander of everything that is not themselves. . . .
An abject and crafty soul is in the most perfect
harmony with the arrogance of piety, as witness
the early Christians.

The future : they see that they are heavily paid
for it. . . . Theirs is the muddiest kind of spirit
that exists. The whole of Christ's life is so arranged
as to confirm the prophecies of the Scriptures :
He behaves in suchwise in order that they may be
right. . . .

189.

The deceptive interpretation of the words, the
doings, and the condition of dying people ; the
natural fear of death, for instance, is systematically
confounded with the supposed fear of what is to
happen " after death." . . .

190.

The Christians have done exactly what the Jews
did before them. They introduced what they

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 157

conceived to be an innovation and a thing
necessary to self-preservation into their Master's
teaching, and wove His life into it. They likewise
credited Him with all the wisdom of a maker of
proverbs in short^ they represented their every-
day life and activity as an act of obedience, and
thus sanctified their propaganda.

What it all depends upon, may be gathered
from Paul : it is not much. What remains is
the development of a type of saint, out of the
values which these people regarded as saintly.

The whole of the " doctrine of miracles," in-
cluding the resurrection, is the result of self-
glorification on the part of the community, which
ascribed to its Master those qualities it ascribed
to itself, but in a higher degree (or, better still, it
derived its strength from Him. . . .).

191.

The Christians have never led the life which
Jesus commanded them to lead, and the impudent
fable of the " justification by faith/' and its unique
and transcendental significance, is only the result
of the Church's lack of courage and will in acknow-
ledging those "works" which Jesus commanded.

The Buddhist behaves differently from the non-
Buddhist ; but the Christian behaves as all the rest
of the world does> and possesses a Christianity of
ceremonies and states of the soul.

The profound and contemptible falsehood of
Christianity in Europe makes us deserve the con-
tempt of the Arabs, Hindoos, and Chinese. . . t

I $8 THE WILL TO POWER.

Let any one listen to the words of the first German
statesman, concerning that which has preoccupied
Europe for the last forty years.

192.

" Faith " or " works " ? But that the " works,"
the habit of particular works may engender a certain
set of values or thoughts ', is just as natural as it
would be unnatural for " works " to proceed from
mere valuations. Man must practise, not how to
strengthen feelings of value, but how to strengthen
action : first of all, one must be able to do some-
thing. . . . Luther's Christian Dilettantism. Faith
is an asses 1 bridge. The background consists of
a profound conviction on the part of Luther and
his peers, that they are unable to accomplish
Christian " works," a personal fact, disguised
under an extreme doubt as to v/hether all action
is not sin and devil's work, so that the worth of
life depends upon isolated and highly-strained
conditions of inactivity (prayer, effusion, etc.).
Ultimately, Luther would be right : the instincts
which are expressed by the whole bearing of the
reformers are the most brutal that exist Only
in turning absolutely away from themselves, and in
becoming absorbed in the opposite of themselves,
only by means of an illusion ("faith") was
existence endurable to them.

193-

" What was to be done in order to believe ? "
an absurd question. That which is wrong with

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 159

Christianity is, that it does none of the things
that Christ commanded.

It is a mean life, but seen through the eye of
contempt.

194.

The entrance into the real life a man saves
his own life by living the life of the multitude.

195.

Christianity has become something fundament-
ally different from what its Founder wished it to
be. It is the great anti-pagan movement of anti-
quity, formulated with the use of the life, teaching,
and " words " of the Founder of Christianity, but
interpreted quite arbitrarily, according to a scheme
embodying profoundly different needs : translated
into the language of all the subterranean religions
then existing.

It is the rise of Pessimism (whereas Jesus
wished to bring the peace and the happiness of
the lambs) : and moreover the Pessimism of the
weak, of the inferior, of the suffering, and of the
oppressed.

Its mortal enemies are (i) Power, whether in
the form of character, intellect, or taste, and
" worldliness " ; (2) the "good cheer" of classical
times, the noble levity and scepticism, hard pride,
eccentric dissipation, and cold frugality of the sage,
Greek refinement in manners, words, and form.
Its mortal enemy is as much the Roman as the
Greek.

I6O THE WILL TO POWER.

The attempt on the part of anti-paganism to
establish itself on a philosophical basis, and to
make its tenets possible : it shows a taste for the
ambiguous figures of antique culture, and above
all for Plato, who was, more than any other, an
anti- Hellene and Semite in instinct. ... It also
shows a taste for Stoicism, which is essentially
the work of Semites ("dignity" is regarded as
severity, law ; virtue is held to be greatness, self-
responsibility, authority, greatest sovereignty over
oneself this is Semitic. The Stoic is an Arabian
sheik wrapped in Greek togas and notions.

196.

Christianity only resumes the fight which had
already been begun against the classical ideal and
noble religion.

As a matter of fact, the whole process of
transformation is only an adaptation to the
needs and to the level of intelligence of religious
masses then existing: those masses which
believed in Isis, Mithras, Dionysos, and the
" great mother," and which demanded the follow-
ing things of a religion: (i) hopes of a beyond,
(2) the bloody phantasmagoria of animal sacrifice
(the mystery), (3) holy legend and the redeeming
deed) (4) asceticism, denial of the world, super-
stitious "purification," (5) a hierarchy as a part
of the community. In short, Christianity
everywhere fitted the already prevailing and
increasing anti-pagan tendency those cults which
Epicurus combated, or more exactly, those

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. l6l

religions proper to the lower herd, women, slaves,
and ignoble classes.

The misunderstandings are therefore the
following :

(1) The immortality of the individual;

(2) The assumed existence of another world ;

(3) The absurd notion of punishment and
expiation in the heart of the interpretation of
existence ;

(4) The profanation of the divine nature of
man, instead of its accentuation, and the con-
struction of a very profound chasm, which can
only be crossed by the help of a miracle or by
means of the most thorough self-contempt ;

(5) The whole world of corrupted imagination
and morbid passion, instead of a simple and
loving life of action, instead of Buddhistic
happiness attainable on earth ;

(6) An ecclesiastical order with a priesthood,
theology, cults, and sacraments ; in short, every-
thing that Jesus of Nazareth combated \

(7) The miraculous in everything and every-
body, superstition too : while precisely the trait
which distinguished Judaism and primitive
Christianity was their repugnance to miracles and
their relative rationalism.

197.

The psychological f re-requisites : Ignorance and
lack of ' culture , the sort of ignorance which has un-
learned every kind of shame : let any one imagine
those impudent saints in the heart of Athens ;

VOL i. L

1 62 THE WILL TO POWER.

The Jewish instinct of a chosen people : they
appropriate all the virtues, without further ado,
as their own, and regard the rest of the world as
their opposite ; this is a profound sign of spiritual
depravity ;

The total lack of real aims and real duties, for
which other virtues are required than those of the
bigot the State undertook this work for them :
and the impudent people still behaved as though
they had no need of the State. " Except ye
become as little children " oh, how far we are
from this psychological ingenuousness !

198.

The Founder of Christianity had to pay dearly
for having directed His teaching at the lowest
classes of Jewish society and intelligence. They
understood Him only according to the limitations
of their own spirit. ... It was a disgrace to concoct
a history of salvation, a personal God, a personal
Saviour, a personal immortality, and to have
retained all the meanness of the " person," and of
the "history" of a doctrine which denies the
reality of all that is personal and historical.

The legend of salvation takes the place of the
symbolic " now " and " all time," of the symbolic
"here" and " everywhere"; and miracles appear
instead of the psychological symbol.

199.

Nothing is less innocent than the New Testa-
ment, The soil from which it sprang is known.

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 163

These people, possessed of an inflexible will to
assert themselves, and who, once they had lost
all natural hold on life, and had long existed
without any right to existence, still knew how to
prevail by means of hypotheses which were as
unnatural as they were imaginary (calling them-
selves the chosen people, the community of
saints, the people of the promised land, and the
" Church ") : these people made use of their pia
fraus with such skill, and with such "clean
consciences," that one cannot be too cautious
when they preach morality. When Jews step
forward as the personification of innocence, the
danger must be great. While reading the New
Testament a man should have his small fund of
intelligence, mistrust, and wickedness constantly
at hand.

People of the lowest origin, partly mob, out-
casts not only from good society, but also from
respectable society ; grown away from the
atmosphere of culture, and free from discipline ;
ignorant, without even a suspicion of the fact that
conscience can also rule in spiritual matters ; in a
word the Jews : an instinctively crafty people,
able to create an advantage, a means of seduction
out of every conceivable hypothesis of superstition,
even out of ignorance itself.

200.

I regard Christianity as the most fatal and
seductive lie that has ever yet existed as the
greatest and most impious lie : I can discern the

164 THE WILL TO POWER,

last sprouts and branches of its ideal beneath
every form of disguise, I decline to enter into any
compromise or false position in reference to it
I urge people to declare open war with it.

The morality of paltry people as the measure
of all things : this is the most repugnant kind of
degeneracy that civilisation has ever yet brought
into existence. And this kind of ideal is hanging
still, under the name of " God/' over men's
heads ! !

2OI.

However modest one's demands may be
concerning intellectual cleanliness, when one
touches the New Testament one cannot help
experiencing a sort of inexpressible feeling of dis-
comfort ; for the unbounded cheek with which
the least qualified people will have their say in
its pages, in regard to the greatest problems
of existence, and claim to sit in judgment on
such matters, exceeds all limits. The impudent
levity with which the most unwieldy problems
are spoken of here (life, the world, God, the
purpose of life), as if they were not problems at
all, but the most simple things which these little
bigots know all about \ \ \

202.

This was the most fatal form of insanity that
has ever yet existed on earth : when these
little lying abortions of bigotry begin laying claim
to the words "God," "last judgment," "truth,"

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 165

"love," "wisdom," "Holy Spirit," and thereby
distinguishing themselves from the rest of the
world ; when such men begin to transvalue values
to suit themselves, as though they were the sense,
the salt, the standard, and the measure of all
things ; then all that one should do is this :
build lunatic asylums for their incarceration. To
persecute them was an egregious act of antique
folly : this was taking them too seriously ; it was
making them serious.

The whole fatality was made possible by the
fact that a similar form of megalomania was
already in existence, the Jewish form (once the
gulf separating the Jews from the Christian-Jews
was bridged, the Christian-Jews were compelled to
employ those self-preservative measures afresh
which were discovered by the Jewish instinct, for
their own self-preservation, after having accent-
uated them) ; and again through the fact that
Greek moral philosophy had done everything
that could be done to prepare the way for
moral-fanaticism, even among Greeks and Romans,
and to render it palatable. . . . Plato, the
great importer of corruption, who was the first
who refused to see Nature in morality, and who
had already deprived the Greek gods of all their
worth by his notion "good? was already tainted
with Jewish bigotry (in Egypt ? ).

203.

These small virtues of gregarious animals do
not bv anv means lead to " eternal life " : to put

1 66 THE WILL TO POWER.

them on the stage in such a way, and oneself
with them is perhaps very smart ; but to him who
keeps his eyes open, even here, it remains, in spite
of all, the most ludicrous performance. A man by
no means deserves privileges, either on earth or
in heaven, because he happens to have attained
to perfection in the art of behaving like a good-
natured little sheep ; at best, he only remains a
dear, absurd little ram with horns provided, of
course, he does not burst with vanity or excite
indignation by assuming the airs of a supreme
judge.

What a terrible glow of false colouring here
floods the meanest virtues as though they were
the reflection of divine qualities!

The natural purpose and utility of every
virtue is systematically hushed up ; it can only be
valuable in the light of a divine command or
model, or in the light of the good which belongs
to a beyond or a spiritual world. (This is
magnificent ! As if it were a question of
the salvation of the soul: but it was a means
of making things bearable here with as many
beautiful sentiments as possible.)

204.

The law, which is the fundamentally realistic
formula of certain self-preservative measures of a
community, forbids certain actions that have a
definite tendency to jeopardise the welfare of that
community : it does not forbid the attitude of mind
which gives rise to these actions for in the pur-

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. l6/

suit of other ends the community requires these
forbidden actions, namely, when it is a matter of
opposing its enemies. The moral idealist now
steps forward and says : " God sees into men's
hearts: the action itself counts for nothing; the
reprehensible attitude of mind from which it pro-
ceeds must be extirpated. . . ." In normal
conditions men laugh at such things ; it is only
in exceptional cases, when a community lives quite
beyond the need of waging war in order to main-
tain itself, that an ear is lent to such things. Any
attitude of mind is abandoned, the utility of which
cannot be conceived.

This was the case, for example, when Buddha
appeared among a people that was both peaceable
and afflicted with great intellectual weariness.

This was also the case in regard to the first
Christian community (as also the Jewish), the
primary condition of which was the absolutely
unpolitical Jewish society. Christianity could grow
only upon the soil of Judaism that is to say,
among a people that had already renounced the
political life, and which led a sort of parasitic
existence within the Roman sphere of government,
Christianity goes a step farther : it allows men to
" emasculate " themselves even more ; the circum-
stances actually favour their doing so. Nature is
expelled from morality when it is said, " Love ye
your enemies " : for Nature's injunction, " Ye shall
love your neighbour and Jtate your enemy," has
now become senseless in the law (in instinct) ;
now, even the love a man feels for his neighbour
must first be based upon something (a sort of love

1 68 THE WILL TO POWER.

of God}. God is introduced everywhere, and
utility is withdrawn ; the natural origin of morality
is denied everywhere : the veneration of Nature,
which lies in acknowledging a natural morality, is
destroyed to the roots. ...

Whence comes the seductive charm of this
emasculate ideal of man ? Why are we not disgusted
by it, just as we are disgusted at the thought of a
eunuch ? . . . The answer is obvious : it is not the
voice of the eunuch that revolts us, despite the
cruel mutilation of which it is the result ; for, as a
matter of fact, it has grown sweeter. . . . And
owing to the very fact that the " male organ " has
been amputated from virtue, its voice now has
a feminine ring, which, formerly, was not to be
discerned.

On the other hand, we have only to think of
the terrible hardness, dangers, and accidents to
which a life of manly virtues leads the life of a
Corsican, even at the present day, or that of a
heathen Arab (which resembles the Corsican's life
even to the smallest detail : the Arab's songs might
have been written by Corsicans) in order to
perceive how the most robust type of man, was
fascinated and moved by the voluptuous ring of
this " goodness " and " purity." ... A pastoral
melody ... an idyll . . . the " good man " : such
things have most effect in ages when tragedy is
abroad.

With this, we have realised to what extent the
idealist " (the ideal eunuch) also proceeds from a

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 169

definite reality and is not merely a visionary. . . ,
He has perceived precisely that, for his kind of
reality, a brutal injunction of the sort which pro-
hibits certain actions has no sense (because the
instinct which would urge him to these actions is
weakened^ thanks to a long need of practice, and
of compulsion to practise). The castrator formu-
lates a host of new self-preservative measures for
a perfectly definite species of men : in this sense
he is a realist. The means to which he has
recourse for establishing his legislation, are the
same as those of ancient legislators : he appeals
to all authorities, to " God," and he exploits the
notions " guilt and punishment " that is to say,
he avails himself of the whole of the older ideal,
but interprets it differently ; for instance : punish-
ment is given a place in the inner self (it is called
the pang of conscience).

In practice this kind of man meets with his end
the moment the exceptional conditions favouring
his existence cease to prevail a sort of insular
happiness, like that of Tahiti, and of the little Jews
in the Roman provinces. Their only natural foe
is the soil from which they spring : they must wage
war against that, and once more give their offensive
and defensive passions rope in order to be equal to
it : their opponents are the adherents of the old
ideal (this kind of hostility is shown on a grand
scale by Paul in relation to Judaism, and by Luther
in relation to the priestly ascetic ideal). The
mildest form of this antagonism is certainly that
of the first Buddhists ; perhaps nothing has given
rise to so much work, as the enfeeblement and

I/O THE WILL TO POWER.

discouragement of the feeling of antagonism. The
struggle against resentment almost seems the
Buddhist's first duty ; thus only is his peace of soul
secured. To isolate oneself without bitterness,
this presupposes the existence of a surprisingly
mild and sweet order of men, saints. . . .

The Astuteness of moral castration. How is war
waged against the virile passions and valuations?
No violent physical means are available ; the war
must therefore be one of ruses, spells, and lies in
short, a " spiritual war."

First recipe : One appropriates virtue in general,
and makes it the main feature of one's ideal ; the
older ideal is denied and declared to be the reverse
of all ideals. Slander has to be carried to a fine
art for this purpose.

Second recipe : One's own type is set up as a
general standard \ and this is projected into all
things, behind all things, and behind the destiny
of all things as God.

Third recipe : The opponents of one's ideal are
declared to be the opponents of God ; one arro-
gates to oneself a right to great pathos, to power,
and a right to curse and to bless.

Fourth recipe: All suffering, all gruesome,
terrible, and fatal things are declared to be the
results of opposition to ons ideal all suffering is
punishment even in the case of one's adherents
(except it be a trial, etc.).

Fifth recipe: One goes so far as to regard
Nature as the reverse of one's ideal, and the lengthy

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. I/I

sojourn amid natural conditions is considered a
great trial of patience a sort of martyrdom ; one
studies contempt, both in one's attitudes and one's
looks towards all " natural things."

Sixth recipe : The triumph of anti-naturalism
and ideal castration, the triumph of the world of
the pure, good, sinless, and blessed, is projected
into the future as the consummation, the finale,
the great hope, and the " Coming of the Kingdom
of God."

I hope that one may still be allowed to laugh
at this artificial hoisting up of a small species of
man to the position of an absolute standard of all
things ?

205.

What I do not at all like in Jesus of Nazareth
and His Apostle Paul, is that they stuffed so much
into the heads of paltry people^ as if their modest
virtues were worth so much ado. We have had
to pay dearly for it all ; for they brought the most
valuable qualities of both virtue and man into ill
repute ; they set the guilty conscience and the
self-respect of noble souls at loggerheads, and
they led the braver \ more magnanimous > more daring,
and more excessive tendencies of strong souls astray
even to self-destruction.

206.

In the New Testament,^and especially in the
Gospels, I discern absolutely no sign of a " Divine "
voice : but rather an indirect form of the most

172 THE WILL TO POWER.

subterranean fury, both in slander and destructive-
ness one of the most dishonest forms of hatred.
It lacks all knowledge of the qualities of a higher
nature. It makes an impudent abuse of all
kinds of plausibilities, and the whole stock of
proverbs is used up and foisted upon one in its
pages. Was it necessary to make a God come in
order to appeal to those publicans and to say to
them, etc. etc. ?

Nothing could be more vulgar than this struggle
with the Pharisees ', carried on with a host of absurd
and unpractical moral pretences ; the mob, of course,
has always been entertained by such feats. Fancy
the reproach of " hypocrisy ! " coming from those
lips ! Nothing could be more vulgar than this
treatment of one's opponents a most insidious
sign of nobility or its reverse. . . .

207.

Primitive Christianity is the abolition of the
State : it prohibits oaths, military service, courts of
justice, self-defence or the defence of a community,
and denies the difference between fellow-country-
men and strangers, as also the order of castes.

Christ's example : He does not withstand those
who ill-treat Him; He does not defend Himself;
He does more, He " offers the left cheek " (to the
demand : " Tell us whether thou be the Christ ? "
He replies : " Hereafter shall ye see the Son of
man sitting on the right hand of power, and
coming in the clouds of heaven "). He forbids His
disciples to defend Him; He calls attention to

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 173

the fact that He could get help if He wished to,
but will not.

Christianity also means the abolition of society ',
it prizes everything that society despises, its very
growth takes place among the outcasts, the con-
demned, and the leprous of all kinds, as also among
"publicans," "sinners/ 1 prostitutes, and the most
foolish of men (the " fisher folk ") ; it despises the
rich, the scholarly, the noble, the virtuous, and the
"punctilious." . . .

208.

The war against the noble and the powerful,
as it is waged in the New Testament, is reminis-
cent of Reynard the Fox and his methods : but
plus the priestly unction and the more absolute
refusal to recognise one's own craftiness.

209.

The Gospel is the announcement that the road
to happiness lies open for the lowly and the
poor that all one has to do is to emancipate
one's self from all institutions, traditions, and the
tutelage of the higher classes. Thus Christianity
is no more than the typical teaching of Socialists.

Property, acquisitions, mother-country, status
and rank, tribunals, the police, the State, the
Church, Education, Art, militarism : all these are
so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so
many mistakes, snares, and devil's artifices, on
which the Gospel passes sentence all this is
typical of socialistic doctrines.

Behind all this there is the outburst, the ex-

174 THE WILL T POWER.

plosion, of a concentrated loathing of the
" masters," the instinct which discerns the
happiness of freedom after such long oppression. . . .
(Mostly a symptom of the fact that the inferior
classes have been treated too humanely, that their
tongues already taste a joy which is forbidden
them. ... It is not hunger that provokes revolu-
tions, but the fact that the mob have contracted
an appetite en mangeant. . . ,)

210.

Let the New Testament only be read as a book
of seduction : in it virtue is appropriated, with
the idea that public opinion is best won with it,
and as a matter of fact it is a very modest kind of
virtue, which recognises only the ideal gregarious
animal and nothing more (including, of course,
the herdsmen) : a puny, soft, benevolent, helpful,
and gushingly-satisfied kind of virtue which to
the outside world is quite devoid of pretensions,
and which separates the "world" entirely from
itself. The crassest arrogance which fancies that
the destiny of man turns around it, and it alone,
and that on the one side the community of
believers represents what is right, and on the
other the world represents what is false and
eternally to be reproved and rejected. The most
imbecile hatred of all things in power, which, how-
ever, never goes so far as to touch these things.
A kind of inner detachment which, outwardly,
leaves everything as it was (servitude and slavery ;
and knowing how to convert everything into a
means oC serving God and virtue).

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 175

21 I.

Christianity is possible as the most private
form of life; it presupposes the existence of a
narrow, isolated, and absolutely unpolitical society
it belongs to the conventicle. On the other
hand, a "Christian State? "Christian politics," are
pieces of downright impudence ; they are lies, like,
for instance, a Christian leadership of an army,
which in the end regards " the God of hosts " as
chief of the staff. Even the Papacy has never
been able to carry on politics in a Christian
way . . .; and when Reformers indulge in politics,
as Luther did, it is well known that they are just
as ardent followers of Machiavelli as any other im-
moralists or tyrants.

212.

Christianity is still possible at any moment.
It is not bound to any one of the impudent
dogmas that have adorned themselves with its
name: it needs neither the teaching of the
personal God, nor of sin, nor of immortality, nor of
redemption, rior of faith ; it has absolutely no need
whatever of metaphysics, and it needs asceticism
and Christian " natural science " still less. Christi-
anity is a method of life, not a system of belief.
It tells us how we should behave, not what we
should believe.

He who says to-day : " I refuse to be a
soldier," " I care not for tribunals," " I lay no
claim to the services of the police," " I will not do
anything that disturbs the peace within me:

176 THE WILL TO POWER.

and if I must suffer on that account, nothing can
so well maintain my inward peace as suffering "
such a man would be a Christian.

213-

Concerning the history of Christianity. Con-
tinual change of environment : Christian teaching
is thus continually changing its centre of gravity.
The favouring of low and paltry people. . . . The
development of caritas. . . . The type "Chris-
tian " gradually adopts everything that it originally
rejected (and in the rejection of which it asserted
its right to exist). The Christian becomes a
citizen, a soldier, a judge, a workman, a merchant,
a scholar, a theologian, a priest, a philosopher, a
farmer, an artist, a patriot, a politician, a prince
... he re-enters all those departments of active
life which he had forsworn (he defends himself,
he establishes tribunals, he punishes, he swears,
he differentiates between people and people, he
contemns, and he shows anger). The whole
life of the Christian is ultimately exactly that
life from which Christ preached deliverance. . . .

The Church is just as much a factor in the
triumph of the Antichrist, as the modern State
and modern Nationalism. . . . The Church is the
barbarisation of Christianity.

214.

Among the powers that have mastered Chris-
tianity are : Judaism (Paul) ; Platonism (Augustine) ;
The cult of mystery (the teaching of salvation,

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 177

the emblem of the " cross ") ; Asceticism (hostility
towards " Nature," " Reason," the " senses," the
Orient . . .)

215.

Christianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious
morality : under the power of the most complete
misapprehensions and self-deceptions. Demo-
cracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown
with falsehood. It is a fact that the oppressed,
the low, and whole mob of slaves and half-castes,
will prevail.

First step: they make themselves free they
detach themselves, at first in fancy only; they
recognise each other; they make themselves
paramount.

Second step : they enter the lists, they demand
acknowledgment, equal rights, " Justice."

Third step: they demand privileges (they
draw the representatives of power over to their
side).

Fourth step : they alone want all power, and
they have it.

There are three elements in Christianity which
must be distinguished: (a) the oppressed of all
kinds, (If) the mediocre of all kinds, (c) the dis-
satisfied and diseased of all kinds. The first
struggle against the politically noble and their
ideal ; the second contend with the exceptions
and those who are in any way privileged (mentally
or physically) ; the third oppose the natural
instinct of the happy and the sound.

Whenever a triumph is achieved, the second

1 78 THE WILL TO POWER.

element steps to the fore; for then Christianity
has won over the sound and happy to its side (as
warriors in its cause), likewise the powerful (inter-
ested to this extent in the conquest of the crowd)
and now it is the gregarious instinct^ that
mediocre nature which is valuable in every respect,
that now gets its highest sanction through Chris-
tianity. This mediocre nature ultimately becomes
so conscious of itself (gains such courage in
regard to its own opinions), that it arrogates to
itself even political power. . . .

Democracy is Christianity made natural \ a
sort of "return to Nature," once Christianity,
owing to extreme anti-naturalness, might have
been overcome by the opposite valuation. Result :
the aristocratic ideal begins to lose its natural
character (" the higher man," " noble," " artist,"
" passion," " knowledge " ; Romanticism as the cult
of the exceptional, genius, etc. etc.).

216.

When the " masters " may also become Christians.
It is of the nature of a community (race, family,
herd, tribe) to regard all those conditions and
aspirations which favour its survival, as in them-
selves valuable ; for instance : obedience, mutual
assistance, respect, moderation, pity as also, to
suppress everything that happens to stand in the
way of the above.

It is likewise of the nature of the rulers
(whether they are individuals or classes) to
patronise and applaud those virtues which make

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 179

their subjects amenable and submissive (condi-
tions and passions which may be utterly different
from their own).

The gregarious instinct and the instinct of the
rulers sometimes agree in approving of a certain
number of qualities and conditions, but for
different reasons: the first do so out of direct
egoism, the second out of indirect egoism.

The submission to Christianity on the part of
master races is essentially the result of the con-
viction that Christianity is a religion for the herd,
that it teaches obedience: in short, that Christians
are more easily ruled than non-Christians. With
a hint of this nature, the Pope, even nowadays,
recommends Christian propaganda to the ruling
Sovereign of China.

It should also be added that the seductive
power of the Christian ideal works most strongly
upon natures that love danger, adventure, and
contrasts ; that love everything that entails a risk,
and wherewith a nonplus ultra of powerful feeling
may be attained. In this respect, one has only
to think of Saint Theresa, surrounded by the
heroic instincts of her brothers : Christianity
appears in those circumstances as a dissipation of
the will, as strength of will, as a sort of Quixotic
heroism.

3. CHRISTIAN IDEALS.
217.

War against the Christian ideal, against the
doctrine of " blessedness " and " salvation " as the

180 THE WILL TO POWER.

aims of life, against the supremacy of the fools, of
the pure in heart, of the suffering and of the
botched !

When and where has any man, of any note at all,
resembled the Christian ideal ? at least in the eyes
of those who are psychologists and triers of the
heart and reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes !

2 1 8.

Our claim to superiority : we live in an age of
Comparisons; we are able to calculate as men
have never yet calculated ; in every way we are
history become self-conscious. We enjoy things
in a different way ; we suffer in a different way :
our instinctive activity is the comparison of an
enormous variety of things. We understand
everything; we experience everything, we no
longer have a hostile feeling left within us. How-
ever disastrous the results may be to ourselves, our
plunging and almost lustful inquisitiveness, attacks,
unabashed, the most dangerous of subjects. . . .

" Everything is good " it gives us pain to say
" nay " to anything. We suffer when we feel that
we are sufficiently foolish to make a definite stand
against anything. ... At bottom, it is we
scholars who to-day are fulfilling Christ's teaching
most thoroughly.

219.

We cannot suppress a certain irony when we
contemplate those who think they have overcome
Christianity by means of modern natural science.
Christian values are by no means overcome by

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. l8l

such people. "Christ on the cross" is still the
most sublime symbol even now

220.

The two great Nihilistic movements are: (a)
Buddhism, (V) Christianity. The latter has only
just about reached a state of culture in which it
can fulfil its original object, it has found its
level, and now it can manifest itself without
disguise. . . .

221.

We have re-established the Christian ideal, it
now only remains to determine its value.

(1) Which values does it denyl What does
the ideal that opposes it stand for ? Pride, pathos
of distance, great responsibility, exuberant spirits,
splendid animalism, the instincts of war and of
conquest, the deification of passion, revenge,
cunning, anger, voluptuousness, adventure, know-
ledge ; the noble ideal is denied : the beauty,
wisdom, power, pomp, and awfulness of the type
man : the man who postulates aims, the " future "
man (here Christianity presents itself as the
logical result of Judaism}.

(2) Can it be realised ? Yes, of course, when the
climatic conditions are favourable as in the case
of the Indian ideal. Both neglect the factor work.
It separates a creature from a people, a state,
a civilised community, and jurisdiction ; it rejects
education, wisdom, the cultivation of good man-
ners, acquisition and commerce; it cuts adrift

1 82 THE WILL TO POWER.

everything which is of use and value to men by
means of an idiosyncrasy of sentiment it isolates
a man. It is non-political, anti-national, neither
aggressive nor defensive, and only possible
within a strictly-ordered State or state of society,
which allows these holy parasites to flourish at
the cost of their neighbours. . . .

(3) It has now become the will to be happy
and nothing else ! " Blessedness " stands for
something self-evident, that no longer requires
any justification everything else (the way to
live and let live) is only a means to an end. . . .

But what follows is the result of a low order of
thought-, the fear of pain, of defilement, of cor-
ruption, is great enough to provide ample grounds
for allowing everything to go to the dogs. . . .
This is a poor way of thinking, and is the sign of
an exhausted race ; we must not allow ourselves
to be deceived. (" Become as little children."
Natures of the same order-. Francis of Assisi,
neurotic, epileptic, visionary, like Jesus.)

222.

The higher man distinguishes himself from the
lower by his fearlessness and his readiness to
challenge misfortune : it is a sign of degeneration
when eudemonistic values begin to prevail (physio-
logical fatigue and enfeeblement 'of will-power),
Christianity, with its prospect of " blessedness," is
the typical attitude of mind of a suffering and
impoverished species of man. Abundant strength
will be active, will suffer, and will go under : to it

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 183

the bigotry of Christian salvation is bad music and
hieratic posing and vexation.

223.

Poverty^ humility, and chastity are dangerous
and slanderous ideals ; but like poisons, which are
useful cures in the case of certain diseases, they
were also necessary in the time of the Roman
Empire.

All ideals are dangerous : because they lower
and brand realities; they are all poisons, but
occasionally indispensable as cures.

224.

God created man, happy, idle, innocent, and
immortal : our actual life is a false, decadent, and
sinful existence, a punishment. . . . Suffering,
struggle, work, and death are raised as objections
against life, they make life questionable, unnatural
something that must cease, and for which one
not only requires but also has remedies !

Since the time of Adam, man has been in an
abnormal state : God Himself delivered up His
Son for Adam's sin, in order to put an end to
the abnormal condition of things : the natural
character of life is a curse ; to those who believe
in Him, Christ restores normal life: He makes
them happy, idle, and innocent. But the world
did not become fruitful without labour; women
do not bear children without pain ; illness has not
ceased : believers are served just as badly as un-
believers in this respect. All that has happened

184 THE WILL TO POWER.

is, that man is delivered from death and sin
two assertions which allow of no verification, and
which are therefore emphasised by the Church
with more than usual heartiness. " He is free
from sin," not owing to his own efforts, not
owing to a vigorous struggle on his part, but
redeemed by the death of the Saviour^ conse-
quently, perfectly innocent and paradisaical.

Actual life is nothing more than an illusion
(that is to say, a deception, an insanity). The
whole of struggling, fighting, and real existence
so full of light and shade, is only bad and false :
everybody's duty is to be delivered from it.

" Man, innocent, idle, immortal, and happy "
this concept, which is the object of the " most
supreme desires," must be criticised before any-
thing else. Why should guilt, work, death, and
pain (and, from the Christian point of view, also
knowledge . . .) be contrary to all supreme desires ?
The lazy Christian notions: "blessedness,"
" innocence," " immortality."

225.

The eccentric concept " holiness " does not
exist " God " and " man " have not been divorced
from each other. " Miracles " do not exist such
spheres do not exist: the only one to be con-
sidered is the " intellectual " (that is to say, the
symbolically-psychological). As decadence : a
counterpart to "Epicureanism." . . . Paradise
according to Greek notions was only " Epicurus'
Garden."

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 185

A life of this sort lacks a purpose : it strives
after nothing ; a form of the " Epicurean gods "
there is no longer any reason to aim at anything,
not even at having children : everything has
been done.

226.

They despised the body : they did not reckon
with it : nay, more they treated it as an enemy.
It was their delirium to think that a man could
carry a " beautiful soul " about in a body that was
a cadaverous abortion. ... In order to inoculate
others with this insanity they had to present the
concept " beautiful soul " in a different way, and
to transvalue the natural value, until, at last, a
pale, sickly, idiotically exalted creature, some-
f hing angelic, some extreme perfection and trans-
figuration was declared to be the higher man.

227.

Ignorance in matters psychological. The
Christian has no nervous system ; contempt for,
and deliberate and wilful turning away from, the
demands of the body, from discoveries about the
body ; it is assumed that all this is in keeping
with man's nature, and must perforce work the
ultimate good of the soul; all functions of the
body are systematically reduced to moral values ;
illness itself is regarded as determined by morality,
it is held to be the result of sin, or it is a trial
or a state of salvation, through which man becomes
more perfect than he could become in a state

1 86 THE WILL TO POWER.

of health (Pascal's idea); under certain circum-
stances, there are wilful attempts at inducing
illness.

228.

What in sooth is this struggle " against Nature "
on the part of the Christian ? We shall not, of
course, let ourselves be deceived by his words and
explanations. It is Nature against something
which is also Nature. With many, it is fear;
with others, it is loathing ; with yet others, it is
the sign of a certain intellectuality, the love of a
bloodless and passionless ideal ; and in the case
of the most superior men, it is love of an abstract
Nature these try to live up to their ideal. It is
easily understood that humiliation in the place of
self-esteem, anxious cautiousness towards the
passions, emancipation from the usual duties
(whereby a higher notion of rank is created), the
incitement to constant war on behalf of enormous
issues, habituation to effusiveness of feelings all
this goes to constitute a type : in such a type
the hypersensitiveness of a perishing body pre-
ponderates ; but the nervousness and the in-
spirations it engenders are interpreted differently.
The taste of this kind of creature tends either (i)
to subtilise, (2) to indulge in bombastic eloquence,
or (3) to go in for extreme feelings. The natural
inclinations do get satisfied, but they are interpreted
in a new way ; for instance, as "justification before
God," " the feeling of redemption through grace,"
(every undeniable feeling of pleasure becomes
interpreted in this way !) pride, voluptuousness,

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 187

etc. General problem : what will become of the
man who slanders and practically denies and
belittles what is natural ? As a matter of fact,
the Christian is an example of exaggerated self-
control : in order to tame his passions, he seems
to find it necessary to extirpate or crucify them.

229.

Man did not know himself physiologically
throughout the ages his history covers : fyjg,..dQfi&
not even kno^bipi^^nQ^^JlThe knowledge^ for
instance, that man has a neryous^sYstgrn (but no
^ sour^)js" stifl the privijege.,Qf the, most. educated
people. J But man is not satisfied, in this respect,
tcTsay We does not know, A man must be very-
human to be able to say: " I do not know this/'
that is to say, to be able to admit his ignorance.

Suppose he is in pain or in a good mood, he
never questions that he can find the reason of
either condition if only he seeks. . . . And so he
seeks for it. In truth he cannot find the reason ;
for he does not even suspect where it lies. . . .
What happens? . . . He takes a result of his
condition for its cause ; for instance, if he should
undertake some work (really undertaken because
his good mood gave him the courage to do so)
and carry it through successfully : behold, the
work itself is the reason of his good mood. . . .
As a matter of fact, his success was determined by
the same cause as that which brought about his
^ood mood that is to say, the happy co-ordina-
tion of physiological powers and functions.

1 88 THE WILL TO POWER.

He feels bad : consequently he cannot overcome
a care, a scruple, or an attitude of self-criticism.
. . He really fancies that his disagreeable con-
dition is the result of his scruple, of his " sin," or
of his " self-criticism."

But after profound exhaustion and prostration,
a state of recovery sets in. " How is it possible
that I can feel so free, so happy? It is a
miracle; only a God could have effected this
change." Conclusion : " He has forgiven my
sin." . . .

From this follow certain practices : in order to
provoke feelings of sinfulness and to prepare the
way for crushed spirits it is necessary to induce
a condition of morbidity and nervousness in
the body. The methods of doing this are well
known. Of course, nobody suspects the causal
logic of the fact : the maceration of the flesh is
interpreted religiously, it seems like an end in
itself, whereas it is no more than a means of
bringing about that morbid state of indigestion
which is known as repentance (the " fixed idea "
of sin, the hypnotising of the hen by means of the
chalk-line " sin ").

The mishandling of the body prepares the
ground for the required range of " guilty feelings "
that is to say, for that general state of pain
which demands an explanation. . . .

On the other hand, the method of " salvation "
may also develop from the above: every dis-
sipation of the feelings, whether prayers, move-
ments, attitudes, or oaths, has been provoked, and
exhaustion follows ; very often it is acute, or it

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 189

appears in the form ot epilepsy. And behind this
condition of deep somnolence there come signs of
recovery or, in religious parlance, " Salvation."

230.

Formerly, the conditions and results of physio-
logical exhaustion were considered more important
than healthy conditions and their results, and this
was owing to the suddenness, fearfulness, and
mysteriousness of the former. Men were terrified
by themselves, and postulated the existence of a
higher world. People have ascribed the origin
of the idea of two worlds one this side of the
grave and the other beyond it to sleep and
dreams, to shadows, to night, and to the fear of
Nature : but the symptoms of physiological ex-
haustion should, above all, have been considered.

Ancient religions have quite special methods
of disciplining the pious into states of exhaustion,
in which they must experience such things. . . .
The idea was, that one entered into a new order
of things, where everything ceases to be known.
The semblance of a higher power, . . .

231-

Sleep is the result of every kind of exhaus-
tion ; exhaustion follows upon all excessive
excitement. . . .

In all pessimistic religions and philosophies
there is a yearning for sleep ; the very notion
" sleep " is deified and worshipped.

In this case the exhaustion is racial; sleep

190 THE WILL TO POWER.

regarded psychologically is only a symbol of a
much deeper and longer compulsion to rest. . . .
In praxi it is death which rules here in the
seductive image of its brother sleep. . . .

232.

The whole of the Christian training in repent-
ance and redemption may be regarded as a folie
circulaire arbitrarily produced ; though, of course,
it can be produced only in people who are pre-
disposed to it that is to say, who have morbid
tendencies in their constitutions.

233.

Against remorse and its purely psychical treat-
ment. To be unable to have done with an ex-
perience is already a sign of decadence. This
reopening of old wounds, this wallowing in self-
contempt and depression, is an additional form of
disease ; no " salvation of the soul " ever results
from it, but only a new kind of spiritual illness. . . .

These " conditions of salvation " of which the
Christian is conscious are merely variations of the
same diseased state the interpretation of an
attack of epilepsy by means of a particular
formula which is provided, not by science, but by
religious mania.

When a man is ill his very goodness is sickly.
... By far the greatest portion of the psychical
apparatus which Christianity has used, is now
classed among the various forms of hysteria and
epilepsy.

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 19 1

The whole process of spiritual healing must be
remodelled on a physiological basis : the " sting
of conscience " as such is an obstacle in the way
of recovery as soon as possible the attempt
must be made to counterbalance everything by
means of new actions, so that there may be an
escape from the morbidness of self-torture. . . .
The purely psychical practices of the Church and
of the various sects should be decried as dangerous
to the health. No invalid is ever cured by prayers
or by the exorcising of evil spirits : the states
of " repose " which follow upon such methods of
treatment, by no means inspire confidence, in the
psychological sense. . . .

A man is healthy when he can laugh at the
seriousness and ardour with which he has allowed
himself to be hypnotised to any extent by
any detail in his life when his remorse
seems to him like the action of a dog biting a
stone when he is ashamed of his repentance.

The purely psychological and religious practices,
which have existed hitherto, only led to an altera-
tion in the symptoms : according to them a man
had recovered when he bowed before the cross,
and swore that in future he would be a good
man. . . . But a criminal, who, with a certain
gloomy seriousness cleaves to his fate and refuses
to malign his deed once it is done, has more
spiritual health. . . . The criminals with whom
Dostoiewsky associated in prison, were all,
without exception, unbroken natures, are they
not a hundred times more valuable than a
" broken-spirited " Christian ?

THE WILL TO POWER.

(For the treatment of pangs of conscience I
recommend Mitchell's Treatment.*)

234.

A pang of conscience in a man is a sign that
his character is not yet equal to his deed. There
is such a thing as a pang of conscience after good
deeds : in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their
incompatibility with an old environment.

235.

Against remorse. I do not like this form of
cowardice in regard to one's own actions, one
must not leave one's self in the lurch under the
pressure of sudden shame or distress. Extreme
pride is much more fitting here. What is the
good of it all in the end ! No deed gets
undone because it is regretted, no more than
because it is " forgiven" or " expiated." A man must
be a theologian in order to believe in a power that
erases faults : we immoralists prefer to disbelieve
in " faults." We believe that all deeds, of what
kind soever, are identically of the same value at
root ; just as deeds which turn against us may

* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. -In The New Sydenham Society's
Lexicon of Medicine and the Allied Sciences ', the following
description of Mitchell's treatment is to be found: "A
method of treating cases of neurasthenia and hysteria . . .
by removal from home, rest in bed, massage twice a day,
electrical excitation of the muscles, and excessive feeding,
at first with milk."

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 193

be useful from an economical point of view, and
even generally desirable. In certain individual
cases, we admit that we might well have been
spared a given action; the circumstances alone
predisposed us in its favour. Which of us, if
favoured by circumstances, would not already
have committed every possible crime ? . , . That
is why one should never say : " Thou shouldst
never have done such and such a thing," but only :
" How strange it is that I have not done such and
such a thing hundreds of times already ! " As a
matter of fact, only a very small number of acts
are typical acts and real epitomes of a personality,
and seeing what a small number of people really
are personalities, a single act very rarely character-
ises a man. Acts are mostly dictated by circum-
stances; they are superficial or merely reflex
movements performed in response to a stimulus,
long before the depths of our beings are affected
or consulted in the matter. A fit of temper, a
gesture, a blow with a knife : how little of the
individual resides in these acts! A deed very
often brings a sort of stupor or feeling of con-
straint in its wake : so that the agent feels almost
spellbound at its recollection, or as though he
belonged to it, and were not an independent
creature. This mental disorder, which is a form
of hypnotism, must be resisted at all costs: surely
a single deed, whatever it be, when it is compared
with all one has done, is nothing, and may be
deducted from the sum without making the
account wrong. The unfair interest which society
manifests in controlling the whole of our lives
VOL. L N

194 THE WILL TO POWER.

in one direction, as though the very purpose of its
existence were to cultivate a certain individual
act, should not infect the man of action: but
unfortunately this happens almost continually.
The reason of this is, that every deed, if followed
by unexpected consequences, leads to a certain
mental disturbance, no matter whether the con-
sequences be good or bad. Behold a lover who
has been given a promise, or a poet while he is
receiving applause from an audience: as far as
intellectual torpor is concerned, these men are in
no way different from the anarchist who is
suddenly confronted by a detective bearing a
search warrant.

There are some acts which are unworthy of us :
acts which, if they were regarded as typical, would
set us down as belonging to a lower class of man.
The one fault that has to be avoided here, is to
regard them as typical. There is another kind of
act of which we are unworthy : exceptional acts,
born of a particular abundance of happiness and
health ; they are the highest waves of our spring
tides, driven to an unusual height by a storm
an accident: such acts and "deeds" are also
not typical. An artist should never be judged
according to the measure of his works.

236.

A. In proportion as Christianity seems necessary
to-day, man is still wild and fatal. . . .

B. In another sense, it is not necessary, but
extremely dangerous, though it is captivating and

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 195

seductive, because it corresponds with the morbid
character of whole classes and types of modern
humanity, . . . they simply follow their inclinations
when they aspire to Christianity they are de-
cadents of all kinds.

A and B must be kept very sharply apart.
In the case of A, Christianity is a cure, or at least
a taming process (under certain circumstances
it serves the purpose of making people ill : and
this is sometimes useful as a means of subduing
savage and brutal natures). In the case of B, it
is a symptom of illness itself, it renders the state
of decadence more acute ; in this case it stands
opposed to a corroborating system of treatment, it
is the invalid's instinct standing against that which
would be most salutary to him.

237.

On one side there are the serious^ the dignified,
and reflective people : and on the other the bar-
barous, the unclean, and the irresponsible beasts :
it is merely a question of taming animals and
in this case the tamer must be hard, terrible, and
awe-inspiring, at least to his beasts.

All essential requirements must be imposed upon
the unruly creatures with almost brutal distinct-
ness that is to say, magnified a thousand times.

Even the fulfilment of the requirement must
be presented in the coarsest way possible, so
that it may command respect, as in the case of
the spiritualisation of the Brahmins.

*

196 THE WILL TO POWER.

The struggle with the rabble and the herd. If
any degree of tameness and order has been
reached, the chasm separating these purified and
regenerated people from the terrible remainder
must have been bridged. . . .

This chasm is a means of increasing self-respect
in higher castes, and of confirming their belief in
that which they represent hence the Chandala.
Contempt and its excess are perfectly correct
psychologically that is to say, magnified a
hundred times, so that it may at least be felt.

238.

The struggle against brutal Instincts is quite
different from the struggle against morbid instincts ;
it may even be a means of overcoming brutality
by making the brutes ill. The psychical treatment
practised by Christianity is often nothing more
than the process of converting a brute into a sick
and therefore tame animal.

The struggle against raw and savage natures
must be a struggle with weapons which are able
to affect such natures : superstitions and such means
are therefore indispensable and essential.

239-

Our age, in a certain sense, is mature (that is to
say, decadent), just as Buddha's was. . . . That
is why a sort of Christianity is possible without
all the absurd dogmas (the most repulsive offshoots
of ancient hybridism).

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 197

240.

Supposing it were impossible to disprove Chris-
tianity, Pascal thinks, in view of the terrible
possibility that it may be true, that it is in the
highest degree prudent to be a Christian. As a
proof of how much Christianity has lost of its
terrible nature, to-day we find that other attempt
to justify it, which consists in asserting, that even
if it were a mistake, it nevertheless provides the
greatest advantages and pleasures for its adherents
throughout their lives : it therefore seems that
this belief should be upheld owing to the peace
and quiet it ensures not owing to the terror of
a threatening possibility, but rather out of fear of a
life that has lost one of its charms. This hedonistic
turn of thought, which uses happiness as a proof,
is a symptom of decline: it takes the place of the
proof resulting from power or from that which
to the Christian mind is most terrible namely,
fear. With this new interpretation, Christianity
is, as a matter of fact, nearing its stage of
exhaustion. People are satisfied with a Christianity
which is an opiate, because they no longer have the
strength to seek, to struggle, to dare, to stand
alone, nor to take up Pascal's position and to
share that gloomily brooding self-contempt, that
belief in human unworthiness, and that anxiety
which believes that it " may be damned." But a
Christianity the chief object of which is to soothe
diseased nerves, does not require the terrible
solution consisting of a 4 * God on the cross " ; that

198 THE WILL TO POWER.

is why Buddhism is secretly gaining ground all
over Europe.

241.

The humour of European culture: people
regard one thing as true, but do the other. For
instance, what is the use of all the art of reading
and criticising, if the ecclesiastical interpretation
of the Bible, whether according to Catholics or
Protestants, is still upheld 1

242.

No one is sufficiently aware of the barbarity ot
the notions among which we Europeans still live.
To think that men have been able to believe that
the " Salvation of the soul " depended upon a
book ! . . . And I am told that this is still
believed.

What is the good of all scientific education, all
criticism and all hermeneutics, if such nonsense as
the Church's interpretation of the Bible has not
yet turned the colours of our bodies permanently
into the red of shame ?

243.

Subject for reflection : To what extent does the
fatal belief in " Divine Providence " the most
paralysing belief for both the hand and the under-
standing that has ever existed continue to pre-
vail ; to what extent have the Christian hypothesis
and interpretation of Life continued their lives

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 199

under the cover of terms like " Nature/' " Progress,"
" perfectionment," " Darwinism," or beneath the
superstition that there is a certain relation between
happiness and virtue, unhappiness and sin ? That
absurd belief in the course of things, in " Life "
and in the " instinct of Life " ; that foolish resig-
nation which arises from the notion that if only
every one did his duty all would go well all this
sort of thing can only have a meaning if one
assumes that there is a direction of things sub
specie boni. Even fatalism, our present form of
philosophical sensibility, is the result of a long
belief in Divine Providence, an unconscious result :
as though it were nothing to do with us how
everything goes ! (As though we might let things
take their own course ; the individual being only
a modus of the absolute reality.)

244.

It is the height of psychological falsity on the
part of man to imagine a being according to his
own petty standard, who is a beginning, a " thing-
in-itself," and who appears to him good, wise,
mighty, and precious ; for thus he suppresses in
thought all the causality by means of which every
kind of goodness, wisdom, and power comes into
existence and has value. In short, elements of
the most recent and most conditional origin were
regarded not as evolved, but as spontaneously
generated and " things-in-themselves," and perhaps
as the cause of all things. . . . Experience
teaches us that, in every case in which a man has

200 THE WILL TO POWER.

elevated himself to any great extent above the
average of his fellows, every high degree of power
always involves a corresponding degree of freedom
from Good and Evil as also from "true'' and
" false," and cannot take into account what good-
ness dictates: the same holds good of a high
degree of wisdom in this case goodness is just
as much suppressed as truthfulness, justice, virtue,
and other popular whims in valuations. In fact,
is it not obvious that every high degree of goodness
itself presupposes a certain intellectual myopia
and obtuseness? as also an inability to dis-
tinguish at a great distance between true and false,
useful and harmful ? not to mention the fact that
a high degree of power in the hands of the highest
goodness might lead to the most baleful conse-
quences (" the suppression of evil "). In sooth it
is enough to perceive with what aspirations the
"God of Love" inspires His believers: they ruin
mankind for the benefit of " good men." In
practice, this same God has shown Himself to be
a God of the most acute myopia, devilry r , and im-
potence, in the face of the actual arrangement of
the universe, and from this the value of His con-
ception may be estimated.

Knowledge and wisdom can have no value in
themselves, any more than goodness can : the goal
they are striving after must be known first, for
then only can their value or worthlessness be
judged a goal might be imagined which would
make excessive wisdom a great disadvantage (if,
for instance, complete deception were a prerequisite
to the enhancement of life ; likewise, if goodness

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 2OI

were able to paralyse and depress the main springs
of the great passions). . . .

Taking our human life as it is, it cannot be
denied that all " truth," "goodness," "holiness,"
and " Godliness " in the Christian sense, have
hitherto shown themselves to be great dangers
even now mankind is in danger of perishing owing
to an ideal which is hostile to life.

245.

Let any one think of the loss which all human
institutions suffer, when a divine and transcend-
ental, higher sphere is postulated which must first
sanction these institutions ! By recognising their
worth in this sanction alone (as in the case of
marriage, for instance) their natural dignity is
reduced, and under certain circumstances denied.
. . . Nature is spitefully misjudged in the same
ratio as the anti-natural notion of a God is held
in honour. " Nature " then comes to mean no more
than " contemptible," " bad." . . .

The fatal nature of a belief in God as the reality
of the highest moral qualities : through it, all real
values were denied and systematically regarded
as valueless. Thus Anti-Nature ascended the
throne. With relentless logic the last step was
reached, and this was the absolute demand to deny
Nature

246.

By pressing the doctrine of disinterestedness
and love into the foreground, Christianity by no

202 THE WILL TO POWER.

means elevated the interests of the species above
those of the individual. Its real historical effect,
its fatal effect, remains precisely the increase of
egotism^ of individual egotism, to excess (to the
extreme which consists in the belief in individual
immortality). The individual was made so
important and so absolute, by means of Christian
values, that he could no longer be sacrificed^ despite
the fact that the species can only be maintained
by human sacrifices. All " souls " became equal
before God : but this is the most pernicious of all
valuations ! If one regards individuals as equals,
the demands of the species are ignored, and a
process is initiated which ultimately leads to its
ruin. Christianity is the reverse of the principle of
selection. If the degenerate and sick man (" the
Christian") is to be of the same value as the
healthy man (" the pagan "), or if he is even to be
valued higher than the latter, as Pascal's view of
health and sickness would have us value him, the
natural course of evolution is thwarted and the
unnatural becomes law. ... In practice this
general love of mankind is nothing more than
deliberately favouring all the suffering, the botched,
and the degenerate : it is this love that has reduced
and weakened the power, responsibility, and lofty
duty of sacrificing men. According to the scheme
of Christian values, all that remained was the
alternative of self-sacrifice, but this vestige of
human sacrifice, which Christianity conceded and
even recommended, has no meaning when regarded
in the light of rearing a whole species. The pro-
sperity of the species is by no means affected by

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 203

the sacrifice of one individual (whether in the
monastic and ascetic manner, or by means of crosses,
stakes, and scaffolds, as the " martyrs " of error).
What the species requires is the suppression of
the physiologically botched, the weak and the
degenerate : but it was precisely to these people
that Christianity appealed as a preservative force,
it simply strengthened that natural and very strong
instinct of all the weak which bids them protect,
maintain, and mutually support each other. What
is Christian " virtue " and " love of men," if not
precisely this mutual assistance with a view to
survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting
of selection ? What is Christian altruism, if it is
not the mob-egotism of the weak which divines
that, if everybody looks after everybody else,
every individual will be preserved for a longer
period of time ? . . . He who does not consider
this attitude of mind as immoral, as a crime against
life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also
shares their instincts. . . . Genuine love of man-
kind exacts sacrifice for the good of the species
it is hard, full of self-control, because it needs
human sacrifices. And this pseudo-humanity
which is called Christianity, would fain establish
the rule that nobody should be sacrificed.

247.

Nothing could be more useful and deserves
more promotion than systematic Nihilism in action.
As I understand the phenomena of Christianity
and pessimism, this is what they say : " We are

2O4 THE WILL TO POWER.

ripe for nonentity, for us it is reasonable not to be."
This hint from " reason " in this case, is simply
the voice of selective Nature.

On the other hand, what deserves the most
rigorous condemnation, is the ambiguous and
cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like
Christianity r , or rather like the Church, which,
instead of recommending death and self-destruction,
actually protects all the botched and bungled, and
encourages them to propagate their kind.

Problem : with what kind of means could one
lead up to a severe form of really contagious
Nihilism a Nihilism which would teach and prac-
tise voluntary death with scientific conscientious-
ness (and not the feeble continuation of a vegetative
sort of life with false hopes of a life after death) ?

Christianity cannot be sufficiently condemned
for having depreciated the value of a great cleansing
Nihilistic movement (like the one which was pro-
bably in the process of formation), by its teaching
of the immortality of the private individual, as
also by the hopes of resurrection which it held out :
that is to say, by dissuading people from perform-
ing the deed of Nihilism which is suicide. ... In
the latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and
gradually a puny, meagre, but durable life ; gradu-
ally a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre life,
etc.

248.

Christian moral quackery. Pity and contempt
succeed each other at short intervals, and at the
sight of them I feel as indignant as if I were in

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 2O5

the presence of the most despicable crime. Here
error is made a duty a virtue, misapprehension
has become a knack, the destructive instinct is
systematised under the name of "redemption";
here every operation becomes a wound, an amputa-
tion of those very organs whose energy would be
the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the
best of cases no cure is effected ; all that is done
is to exchange one set of evil symptoms for another
set. . . . And this pernicious nonsense, this system-
atised profanation and castration of life, passes for
holy and sacred ; to be in its service, to be an
instrument of this art of healing that is to say,
to be a priest, is to be rendered distinguished,
reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have
been the Author of this supreme art of healing ;
redemption is only possible as a revelation, as an
act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the
Creator Himself.

Proposition I. : Spiritual healthiness is regarded
as morbid, and creates suspicion. . . .

Proposition II.: The prerequisites of a strong,
exuberant life strong desires and passions are
reckoned as objections against strong and ex-
uberant life.

Proposition III.: Everything which threatens
danger to man, and which can overcome and ruin
him, is evil, must be rejected and should be torn
root and branch from his soul.

Proposition IV. : Man converted into a weak
creature, inoffensive to himself and others, crushed
by humility and modesty, and conscious of his
weakness, in fact, the "sinner," this is the

206 THE WILL TO POWER.

desirable type, and one which one can produce by
means of a little spiritual surgery. . . .

249.

What is it I protest against? That people
should regard this paltry and peaceful mediocrity,
this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing of
the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength,
as something high, or possibly as the standard of
all things.

Bacon of Verulam says : Infimarum virtutum
apud vulgus laus est, mediarum admiratio^ supre-
marum sensus nullus. Christianity as a religion,
however, belongs to the vulgus : it has no feeling
for the highest kind of virtus.

250.

Let us see what the " genuine Christian " does
with all the things which his instincts forbid : he
covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy,
knowledge, and power with suspicion and mud
in short, all culture : his object is to deprive the
latter of its clean conscience.

251.

The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto,
have been not only timid but false. So long as
Christian morality was not felt to be a capital
crime against Life> its apologists had a good time.
The question concerning the mere "truth" of

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 2O/

Christianity whether in regard to the existence
of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin,
not to speak of its astronomy and natural science
is quite beside the point so long as no inquiry
is made into the value of Christian morality. Are
Christian morals worth anything^ or are they a
profanation and an outrage, despite all the arts of
holiness and seduction with which they are en-
forced? The question concerning the truth of
the religion may be met by all sorts of subterfuges ;
and the most fervent believers can, in the end,
avail themselves of the logic used by their
opponents, in order to create a right for their side
to assert that certain things are irrefutable that
is to say, they transcend the means employed to
refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is
called " Kantian Criticism ").

252.

Christianity should never be forgiven for having
ruined such men as Pascal. This is precisely
what should be combated in Christianity, namely,
that it has the will to break the spirit of the
strongest and noblest natures. One should take
no rest until this thing is utterly destroyed : the
ideal of mankind which Christianity advances, the
demands it makes upon men, and its " Nay " and
"Yea" relative to humanity. The whole of the
remaining absurdities, that is to say, Christian
fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and
principles, and Christian theology, do not concern
us ; they might be a thousand times more absurd

208 THE WILL TO POWER.

and we should not raise a finger to destroy them.
But what we do stand up against, is that ideal
which, thanks to its morbid beauty and feminine
seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and slanderous
eloquence, appeals to all the cowardices and
vanities of wearied souls, and the strongest have
their moments of fatigue, as though all that
which seems most useful and desirable at such
moments that is to say, confidence, artlessness,
modesty, patience, love of one's like, resignation,
submission to God, and a sort of self-surrender
were useful and desirable per se ; as though the
puny, modest abortion which in these creatures
takes the place of a soul, this virtuous, mediocre
animal and sheep of the flock which deigns to
call itself man, were not only to take precedence
of the stronger, more evil, more passionate, more
defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who by
virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a
hundred times more dangers than the former, but
were actually to stand as an ideal for man in
general, as a goal, a measure the highest de-
sideratum. The creation of this ideal was the
most appalling temptation that had ever been put
in the way of mankind ; for, with it, the stronger
and more successful exceptions, the lucky cases
among men, in which the will to power and to
growth leads the whole species " man " one step
farther forward, this type was threatened with
disaster. By means of the values of this ideal,
the growth of such higher men would be checked
at the root. For these men, owing to their
superior demands and duties, readily accept a

CRITICISM OF RELIGION. 209

more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is
a case of an increase in the costs of the under-
taking coinciding with a greater chance of failure).
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it
aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their
spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness
and debility, at converting their proud assurance
into anxiety and conscience-trouble ; that it knows
how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect
them with disease, until their strength, their will
to power, turns inwards, against themselves
until the strong perish through their excessive
self-contempt and self-immolation : that gruesome
way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most
famous example.

VOL. i* O

II.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
I. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.

253-

Tins is an attempt at investigating morality
without being affected by its charm, and not
without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling
beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world
which we can admire, which is in keeping with
our capacity for worship which is continually
demonstrating itself in small things or in large :
this is the Christian standpoint which is common
to us all.

But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in
our mistrust, and in our scientific spirit (also
through a more developed instinct for truth, which
again is due to Christian influence), this interpre-
tation has grown ever less and less tenable for us.

The craftiest of subterfuges : Kantian criticism.
The intellect not only denies itself every right to
interpret things in that way, but also to reject the
interpretation once it has been made. People
are satisfied with a greater demand upon their
credulity and faith, with a renunciation of all

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 211

right to reason concerning the proof of their
creed, with an intangible and superior " Ideal "
(God) as a stop-gap.

The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the
Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and
at the same time a symptom of the historical
sense of a new power : " Spirit " itself is the " self-
revealing and self-realising ideal " : we believe
that in the " process of development " an ever
greater proportion of this ideal is being mani-
fested thus the ideal is being realised, faith is
vested in the future, into which all its noble
needs are projected, and in which they are being
worshipped.

In short :

(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be
demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning
behind the whole of the epistemological move-
ment) ;

(2) God may be demonstrated, but as some-
thing evolving, and we are part of it, as our
pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).

It should be observed that criticism is never
levelled at the ideal itself, but only at the
problem which gives rise to a controversy con-
cerning the ideal that is to say, why it has not
yet been realised, or why it is not demonstrable
in small things as in great.

It makes all the difference : whether a man
recognises this state of distress as such owing to

212 THE WILL TO POWER.

a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether
it comes home to him as a problem which he
arrives at only by straining his thinking powers
and his historical imagination to the utmost.

Away from the religious and philosophical
points of view we find the same phenomena.
Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises
the origin of moral valuations, though it believes
in them just as much as the Christian does.
(What guilelessness ! As if morality could remain
when the sanctioning deity is no longer present !
The belief in a " Beyond " is absolutely necessary,
if the faith in morality is to be maintained.)

Fundamental problem ; whence comes this
almighty power of Faith ? Whence this faith in
morality? (It is betrayed by the fact that
even the fundamental conditions of life are
falsely interpreted in favour of it : despite our
knowledge of plants and animals. " Self-preser-
vation " : the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia-
tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles.)

254.

An inquiiy into the origin of our moral
valuations and tables of law has absolutely
nothing to do with the criticism of them, though
people persist in believing it has ; the two
matters lie quite apart, notwithstanding the fact
that the knowledge of the pudenda origo of a
valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre-
pares the way to a critical attitude and spirit
towards it.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 21 3

A '>'"*'

What is the actual worth of our valuations and
tables of moral laws ? What is the outcome of their
dominion ? For whom ? In relation to what ?
answer : for Life. But what is Life ? A new and
more definite concept of what " Life " is, becomes
necessary here. My formula of this concept is :
Life is Will to Power.

What is the meaning of the very act of valuing ?
Does it point back to another, metaphysical
world, or does it point down ? (As Kant believed,
who lived in a period which preceded the great
historical movement.) In short : w/tat is its
origin ? Or had it no human " origin " ?
Answer : moral valuations are a sort of explana-
ation, they constitute a method of interpreting.
Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite
physiological conditions, as also of a definite
spiritual level of ruling judgments. What is it
that interprets ? Our passions.

255.

All virtues should be looked upon as physio-
logical conditions : the principal organic functions,
more particularly, should be considered necessary
and good. All virtues are really refined passions
and elevated physiological conditions.

Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the
developments of sexual relations, justice as the
development of the passion for revenge, virtue
as the love of resistance, the will to power,
honour as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of
an equally powerful, force.

214 THE WILL TO TOWER.

256.

Under " Morality " I understand a system ot
valuations which is in relation with the conditions
of a creature's life.

257.

Formerly it was said of every form of morality,
" Ye shall know them by their fruits." I say of
every form of morality : " It is a fruit, and from
it I learn the Soil out of which it grew."

258.

I have tried to understand all moral judgments
as symptoms and a language of signs in which
the processes of physiological prosperity or the
reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions
of preservation and growth, are betrayed a
mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology,
prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races,
communities, and different stages of existence, as,
for instance, youth or decay, etc.).

Applying this principle to the morality of
Christian Europe more particularly, we find that
our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis-
belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes-
simism.

My leading doctrine is this : there are no moral
phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of
phenomena. The origin of this interpretation
itself lies beyond the pale of morality.

What is the meaning of the fact that we have

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 21$

imagined a contradiction in existence? This is
of paramount importance : behind all other
valuations those moral valuations stand com-
mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according
to what standard shall we then measure ? And
then of what value would knowledge be, etc.
etc.???

259-

A point of view : in all valuations there is a
definite purpose : the preservation of an individ-
ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a
belief, or a culture. Thanks to the fact that
people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one
and the same man may swarm with a host of
contradictory valuations, and therefore ivit/i a host
of contradictory impulses. This is the expression
of disease in man as opposed to the health of
animals, in which all the instincts answer certain
definite purposes.

This creature full of contradictions, however,
has in his being a grand method of acquiring
knowledge : he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself to Justice that is to say, to the ascertain-
ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil.

The wisest man would thus be the richest in
contradictions^ he would also be gifted with
mental antennae wherewith he could understand
all kinds of men ; and with it all he would have
his great moments, when all the chords in his
being would ring in splendid unison the rarest
of accidents even in us ! A sort of planetary
movement.

2 1 6 THE WILL TO POWER.

26O.

" To will " is to will an object. But " object,"
as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do
valuations originate? Is a permanent norm,
" pleasant or painful," their basis ?

But in an incalculable number of cases we
first of all make a thing painful, by investing it
with a valuation.

The compass of moral valuations : they play a
part in almost every mental impression. To us
the world is coloured by them.

We have imagined the purpose and value of
all things : owing to this we possess an enormous
fund of latent power \ but the study of compara-
tive values teaches us that values which were
actually opposed to each other have been held in
high esteem, and that there have been many
tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have
been worth anything per se).

The analysis of individual tables of laws re-
vealed the fact that they were framed (often very
badly) as the conditions of existence for limited
groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.

Upon examining modern men, we found that
there are a large number of very different values
to hand, and that they no longer contain any
creative power the fundamental principle: "the
condition of existence" is now quite divorced
from the moral values. It is much more super-
fluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an
arbitrary matter. Chaos.

Who creates the goal which stands above man*

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 217

kind and above the individual? Formerly
morality was a preservative measure : but nobody
wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to
preserve. Thus we are reduced to an experi-
mental morality > each must postulate a goal for
himself.

261.

What is the criterion of a moral action ? (i) Its
disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation,
etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must
be studied and observed, and, in each case, the
criterion must be discovered, as also the thing
it expresses : a belief such as : " This particular
attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal
condition of our existence." Immoral means " that
which brings about ruin." Now all societies in
which these principles were discovered have met
with their ruin : a few of these principles have
been used and used again, because every newly
established community required them; this was
the case, for instance, with " Thou shalt not steal."
In ages when people could not be expected to
show any marked social instinct (as, for instance,
in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was,
religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of
" spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance,
towards " the greatest happiness." For even the
philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for
their TroXt?.

262.

The necessity of false values. A judgment
may be refuted when it is shown that it was

218 THE WILL TO POWER.

conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is
not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more
eradicate false values than they can alter astig-
matism in a man's eyes.

The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing
to do with reasoning.

263.

To see and reveal the problem of morality
seems to me to be the new task and the principal
thing of all. I deny that this has been done by
moral philosophies heretofore.

264.

How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world ! Here to have no eye ; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's
mouth.

265.

There seems to be no knowledge or conscious-
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that "evil" has really and seriously
been christened " good " and vice versd. I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the
words " Sittlichkeit der Sitte." * Even conscience

* The morality of custom.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 219

has changed its sphere : formerly there was such
a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.

266.

A. Morality as the work of Immorality.

1. In order that moral values may attain to

supremacy \ a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.

2. The establishment of moral values is the

work of immoral passions and considera-
tions.

B. Morality as the ivork of error.

C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital Truthfulness, Doubt, en-o^??, Judging.

The " Immorality " of belief in morality.
The steps :

1. Absolute dominion of morality: all bio-

logical phenomena measured and judged
according to its values.

2. The attempt to identify Life with morality

(symptom of awakened scepticism : mor-
ality must no longer be regarded as
the opposite of Life) ; many means are
sought even a transcendental one.

3. The opposition of Life and Morality.

Morality condemned and sentenced by
Life.

D. To what extent was morality dangerous to
Life?

(a) It depreciated the joy of living and the
gratitude felt towards Life, etc.

22O THE WILL TO POWER.

(K) It checked the tendency to beautify and

to ennoble Life.

(f) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(cf) It checked the unfolding of Life, because
it tried to set the highest phenomena
thereof at variance with itself,
E. Centra-account: the usefulness of morality
to Life.

(1) Morality may be a preservative measure

for the general whole, it may be a pro-
cess of uniting dispersed members : it
is useful as an agent in the production
of the man who is a " tool."

(2) Morality may be a preservative measure

mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to " mediocre people?

(3) Morality may be a preservative measure

resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness : it is
useful to the " sufferers?

(4) Morality may be a preservative measure

opposed to the terrible outbursts of the
mighty : it is useful to the " lowly?

267.

It is an excellent thing when one can use the
expressions "right" and "wrong" in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance
in the sentence : " Do right and fear no one " ; *

* "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand."

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 221

that is to say, to do one's duty, according to
the rough scheme of life within the limit of which
a community exists. Let us not think meanly
of what a few thousand years of morality have
inculcated upon our> minds.

268.

Two types of morality must not be confounded :
the morality with which the instinct that has
remained healthy defends itself from incipient
decadence, and the other morality by means of
which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself,
and leads downwards.

The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran-
nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the
sort of " drag-chain " morality we speak of) ; the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it
has the women and "beautiful feelings" on its
side (Primitive Christianity was an example of
this morality).

269.

I shall try to regard all moralising, with one
glance, as a phenomenon also as a riddle.
Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like
riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply
to the question: why should my neighbour's
welfare be of greater value to me than my own ?
and why is it that my neighbour himself should
value his welfare differently from the way in which

222 THE WILL TO TOWER.

I value it that is to say, why should precisely
my welfare be paramount in his mind? What
is the meaning of this " Thou shalt," which is
regarded as " given " even by philosophers them-
selves ?

The seemingly insane idea that a man should
esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature,
higher than the one he performs for himself, and
that the same fellow-creature should do so too
(that only those acts should be held to be good
which are performed with an eye to the neighbour
and for his welfare) has its reasons namely,
as the result of the social instinct which rests
upon the valuation, that single individuals are
of little importance although collectively their
importance is very great. This, of course, pre-
supposes that they constitute a community with
one feeling and one conscience pervading the
whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for
keeping one's eyes in a certain direction ; it is
the will to a kind of optics which renders a view
of one's self impossible.

My idea : goals are wanting, and these must be
individuals. We see the general drift : every
individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool.
Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets
is not every one he sees a slave ? Whither ? What
is the purpose of it all ?

270.

How is it possible that a man can respect
himself only in regard to moral values, that he

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 223

subordinates and despises everything in favour
of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation,
etc. ? as, for instance, Henri Frd. Amiel. What
is the meaning of the moral idiosyncrasy '? I
mean this both in the psychological and physio-
logical sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal.
In cases, then, in which other great qualities are
not wanting ; and even in the case of Schopen-
hauer, who obviously valued what he did not
and could have ... is it not the result oi
a merely mechanical moral interpretation of real
states of pain and displeasure ? is it not a par-
ticular form of sensibility which does not happen
to understand the cause of its many unpleasurable
feelings, but thinks to explain them with moral
hypotheses! In this way an occasional feeling
of well-being and strength always appears under
the optics of a " clean conscience," flooded with
light through the proximity of God and the
consciousness of salvation. . . . Thus the moral
idiosyncratist has (i) either acquired his real
worth in approximating to the virtuous type of
society : " the good fellow," " the upright man "
a sort of medium state of high respectability:
mediocre in all his abilities, but honest, conscien-
tious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his aspira-
tions; (2) or, he imagines he has acquired that
worth, simply because he cannot otherwise under-
stand all his states he is unknown to himself;
he therefore interprets himself in this fashion.
Morality is the only scheme of interpretation by
means of which this type of man can tolerate
himself: is it a form of pride?

224 THE WILL TO POWER.

271.

The predominance of moral values. The con-
quence of this predominance : the corruption of
psychology, etc. ; the fatality which is associated
with it everywhere. What is the meaning of this
predominance ? What does it point to ?

To a certain greater urgency of saying nay or
yea definitely in this domain. All sorts of im-
peratives have been used in order to make moral
values appear as if they were for ever fixed : they
have been enjoined for the longest period of time :
they almost appear to be instinctive, like inner
commands. They are the expression of society's
preservative measures^ for they are felt to be almost
beyond qttestion. The practice that is to say,
the utility of being agreed concerning superior
values, has attained in this respect to a sort of
sanction. We observe that every care is taken
to paralyse reflection and criticism in this depart-
ment : look at Kant's attitude ! not to speak of
those who believe that it is immoral even to
prosecute " research " in these matters.

272.

My desire is to show the absolute homogeneity
of all phenomena, and to ascribe to moral differ-
entiations but the value of perspective ; to show
that all that which is praised as moral is essentially
the same as that which is immoral, and was only

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 225

made possible, according to the law of all moral
development that is to say, by means of immoral
artifices and with a view to immoral ends just as
all that which has been decried as immoral is,
from the standpoint of economics, both superior
and essential; and how development leading to
a greater abundance of life necessarily involves
progress in the realm of immorality. "Truth/ 1
that is the extent to which we allow ourselves to
comprehend this fact.

273-

But do not let us fear : as a matter of fact, we
require a great deal of morality, in order to be
immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a
parable :

A physiologist interested in a certain illness,
and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that
same illness, have not the same interests. Let
us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,
for morality is an illness, and that we
Europeans are the invalid : what an amount of
subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing
we Europeans were, at once, our own inquisitive
spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned !
Should we under these circumstances earnestly
desire to rid ourselves of morality ? Should we
want to? This is of course irrespective of the
question whether we should be able to do so
whether we can be cured at all ?

VOL. i. p

226 THE WILL TO POWER.

2. THE HERD.

274-

Whose will to power is morality ? The common
factor of all European history since the time of
Socrates is the attempt to make the moral values
dominate all other values, -in order that they
should not be only the leader and judge of life,
but also of: (i) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political
and social aspirations. " Amelioration " regarded as
the only duty, everything else used as a means
thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and
endangering its realisation, and therefore to be
opposed and annihilated . . .). A similar move-
ment to be observed in China and India.

What is the meaning of this will to power on
the part of moral values^ which has played such
a part in the world's prodigious evolutions ?

Answer : Three powers lie concealed behind it :
(i) The instinct of the herd opposed to the strong
and the independent ; (2) the instinct of all
sufferers and all abortions opposed to the happy
and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the
mediocre opposed to the exceptions. Enormous
advantage of this movement, despite the cruelty,
falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped
it along (for the history of the struggle of morality
ivith the fundamental instincts of life is in itself
the greatest piece of immorality that has ever
yet been witnessed on earth . . .).

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 22?

275-

The fewest succeed in discovering a problem
behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and
to which we have become accustomed throughout
the ages our eye does not seem focussed for
such things : at least, this seems to me to be the
case in so far as our morality is concerned.

" Every man should be the preoccupation of his
fellows"; he who thinks in this way deserves
honour : no one ought to think of himself.

"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the
sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart
and is not condemned as all the other instincts
are on the contrary, it is made to be their
standard and their judge !

The problem of " equality," in the face of the
fact that we all thirst for distinction : here, on the
contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we
demand of others. That is so tasteless and
obviously insane ; but it is felt to be holy and
of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to
common sense is not even noticed.

Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered
distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey
morality implicitly, and the belief that one should
be every one's equal in its presence.

The neglect and the surrender of Life and of
well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also
the complete renunciation of individual valuations
and the severe exaction from every one of the
same sacrifice, " The value of an action is once

228 THE WILL TO POWER.

and for all fixed ; every individual must submit
to this valuation."

We see : an authority speaks who speaks ?
We must condone it in human pride, if man tried
to make this authority as high as possible, for he
wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by
the side of it. Thus God speaks !

God was necessary as an unconditional sanction
which has no superior,as a "Categorical Imperator":
or, in so far as people believed in the authority
of reason, what was needed was a "Unitarian
metaphysics " by means of which this view could
be made logical.

Now, admitting that faith in God is dead : the
question arises once more : " who speaks ? " My
answer, which I take from biology and not from
metaphysics, is: "the gregarious instinct speaks''
This is what desires to be master : hence its " thou
shalt ! " it will allow the individual to exist only
as a part of a whole, only in favour of the whole,
it hates those who detach themselves from every-
thing it turns the hatred of all individuals against
him.

276.

The whole of the morality of Europe is based
upon the values which are useful to the herd-, the
sorrow of all higher and exceptional men is
explained by the fact that everything which
distinguishes them from others reaches their con-
sciousness in the form of a feeling of their own
smallness and egregiousness. It is the virtues of
modern men which are the causes of pessimistic

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 22Q

gloominess ; the mediocre, like the herd, are not
troubled much with questions or with conscience
they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong
men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples.)
The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd,
the more completely it is condemned.

277.

The morality of truthfulness in the herd,
" Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express
thy inner nature by means of clear and constant
signs otherwise thou art dangerous : and sup-
posing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is
absolutely the worst thing for the herd. We
despise the secretive and those whom we cannot
identify. Consequently thou must regard thyself
as recognisable, thou mayest not remain concealed
from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the
possibility of thy ever changing'' Thus, the in-
sistence upon truthfulness has as its main object
the recognis ability and the stability of the individual.
As a matter of fact, it is the object of education
to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain
definite dogma concerning the nature of man :
education first creates this dogma and thereupon
exacts " truthfulness."

278.

Within the confines of a herd or of a com-
munity that is to say, inter pares^ the over-estima-
tion of truthfulness is very reasonable. A man

230 THE WILL TO POWER.

must not allow himself to be deceived and con-
sequently he adopts as his own personal morality
that he should deceive no one ! a sort of mutual
obligation among equals ! In his dealings with
the outside world caution and danger demand
that he should be on his guard against deception :
the first psychological condition of this attitude
would mean that he is also on his guard against
his inner self. Mistrust thus appears as the
source of truthfulness.

279.

A criticism of the virtues of the herd. Inertia
is active : (i) In confidence, because mistrust makes
suspense, reflection, and observation necessary.
(2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates
power is great and submission necessary: then,
so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries
to love and esteem, while the difference in power
is interpreted as a difference of value : and thus
the relationship to the powerful no longer has any-
thing revolting in it. (3) In the sense of truth.
What is truth? Truth is that explanation of
things which causes us the smallest amount of
mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely
fatiguing). (4) In sympathy. It is a relief to
know one's self on the same level with all, to feel
as all feel, and to accept a belief which is already
current; it is something passive beside the
activity which appropriates and continually carries
into practice the most individual rights of valua-
tion (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 231

impartiality and coolness of judgment: people
scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be
detached and "objective." (6) In uprightness:
people prefer to obey a law which is to hand
rather than to create a new one, rather than to
command themselves and others: the fear of
commanding it is better to submit than to
rebel. (7) In toleration : the fear of exercising
a right or of enforcing a judgment.

280.

The instinct of the herd values the juste milieu
and the average as the highest and most precious
of all things : the spot where the majority is to
be found, and the air that it breathes there. In
this way it is the opponent of all order of rank ;
it regards a climb from the level to the heights
in the same light as a descent from the majority
to the minority. The herd regards the exception,
whether it be above or beneath its general level,
as something which is antagonistic and dangerous
to itself. Their trick in dealing with the ex-
ceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the
wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to be-
come guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen in fact,
to become their head-servants : thus they convert
a danger into a thing which is useful. In the
middle, fear ceases : here a man is alone with
nothing; here there is not much room even for
misunderstandings; here there is equality; here
a man's individual existence is not felt as a
reproach, but as the right existence; here con-

232 THE WILL TO POWER.

tentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only
towards the exceptions ; to be an exception is to
be a sinner.

281.

If, in compliance with our communal instincts,
we make certain regulations for ourselves and
forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in
common reason, forbid a certain kind of "exist-
ence," nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a
particular application and development of this
"existence" and "attitude of mind." But then
the idealist of virtue, the moralist^ comes along and
says : " God sees into the human heart ! What
matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye
are not any better on that account ! " Answer :
Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not
want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied
with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not
harm one another and that is why we forbid
certain actions when they take a particular direction
that is to say, when they are against our own
interests: but that does not alter the fact that
when these same actions are directed against the
enemies of our community against you, for
instance we are at a loss to know how to pay
them sufficient honour. We educate our children
up to them ; we develop them to the fullest extent.
Did we share that " god-fearing " radicalism which
your holy craziness recommends, if we were green-
horns enough to condemn the source of those for-
bidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and
the " attitude of mind " which recommends them,

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 233

that would mean condemning our very existence,
and with it its greatest prerequisite an attitude
of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with
all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this
attitude of mind from breaking out and venting
itself in a useless way we are prudent when we
prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also
moral in so doing. . . . Have you no idea how-
ever vague what sacrifices it has cost us, how
much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it
has compelled us to exercise ? We are vehement
in our desires ; there are times when we even feel
as if we could devour each other. . . . But the
"communal spirit" is master of us: have you
observed that this is almost a definition of
morality ?

282.

The weakness of the gregarious animal gives
rise to a morality which is precisely similar to
that resulting from the weakness of the decadent
man : they understand each other ; they associate
with each other (the great decadent religions
always rely upon the support of the herd). The
gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid
characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature ;
but it is incapable of taking any initiative ; it
must have a "leader" the priests understand
this. . . . The state is not subtle, not secret
enough ; the art of " directing consciences " slips
its grasp. How is the gregarious animal infected
with illness by the priest ?

234 THE WILL TO POWER.

283.

The hatred directed against the privileged in
body and spirit: the revolt of the ugly and
bungled souls against the beautiful, the proud, and
the cheerful. The weapons used : contempt of
beauty, of pride, of happiness : " There is no such
thing as merit," " The danger is enormous : it is
right that one should tremble and feel ill at ease,"
" Naturalness is evil ; it is right to oppose all that
is natural even ' reason ' " (all that is anti-
natural is elevated to the highest place).

It is again the priests who exploit this condition,
and who win the "people" over to themselves.
" The sinner " over whom there is more joy in
heaven than over " the just person." This is the
struggle against " paganism " (the pang of con-
science, a measure for disturbing the harmony of
the soul).

The hatred of the mediocre for the exceptions,
and of the herd for its independent members.
(Custom actually regarded as " morality.") The
revulsion of feeling against " egotism " : that
only is worth anything which is done " for
another." " We are all equal " ; against the
love of dominion, against " dominion " in general ;
against privilege ; against sectarians, free-
spirits, and sceptics ; against philosophy (a force
opposing mechanical and automatic instincts) ;
in philosophers themselves " the categorical
imperative," the essential nature of morality,
"general and universal."

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY 235

284.

The qualities and tendencies which are praised :
peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, rever-
ence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty,
fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resigna-
tion, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity,
mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience,
disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature,
industry.

We must ascertain to what extent such qualities
are conditioned as means to the attainment of
certain desires and ends (often an "evil" end) ; or
as results of dominating passions (for instance,
intellectuality) : or as the expressions of certain
states of need that is to say, as preservative
measures (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women,
etc.).

In short, every one of them is not considered
"good" for its own sake, but rather because it
approximates to a standard prescribed either by
" society ". or by the " herd," as a means to the
ends of the latter, as necessary for their preserva-
tion and enhancement, and also as the result of
an actual gregarious instinct in the individual ;
these qualities are thus in the service of an
instinct which is fundamentally different from these
states of virtue. For the herd is antagonistic,
selfish^ and pitiless to the outside world ; it is full
of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.

In the " herdsman " this antagonism comes to
the fore: he must have qualities which are the
reverse of those possessed by the herd.

236 THE WILL TO POWER.

The mortal enmity of the herd towards all
order of rank: its instinct is in favour of the
leveller (Christ). Towards all strong individuals
(the sovereigns) it is hostile, unfair, intemperate,
arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false,
lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.

285.

My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to
maintain and preserve one type of man, and that
it defends itself on two sides that is to say,
against those which are decadents from its ranks
(criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior
to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend
to a stationary state of society ; they merely
preserve. They have no creative power.

The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevol-
ence with which the just man fills us (as opposed
to the suspense and the fear to which the great
innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations
of personal security and equality : in this way
the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious
nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This
judgment on the part of the " comfortable " ones
rigs itself out in the most beautiful words and
thus " morality " is born. Let any one observe,
however, the hatred of the herd for all truthful
men.

286.

Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man
hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 237

breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he shows
thereby that he belongs to the herd. When a
man is conscious of the opposite feelings, that
is to say, when he sees his danger and his undoing
in disinterested and unselfish actions, then he
does not belong to the herd.

287.

My philosophy aims at a new order of rank :
not at an individualistic morality.* The spirit of
the herd should rule within the herd but not
beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a
fundamentally different valuation for their actions,
as do also the independent ones or the beasts of
prey, etc.

3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
MORALITY.

288.

Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing
human pride. The " Free-Will " theory is anti-
religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow the
right upon man to regard himself as the cause of
his highest states and actions : it is a form of the
growing feeling of pride.

Man feels his power his " happiness " ; as they
say : there must be a will behind these states

* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Here is a broad distinction be-
tween Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.

238 THE WILL TO POWER.

otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is
an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past
or present, as the necessary antecedent to every
exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the
will to certain actions is regularly present in
consciousness, a sensation of power may be inter-
preted as its result. This is a merely psychological
point of view y based upon the false assumption
that nothing belongs to us which we have not
consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of
responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psycho-
logical rule that the will is the only cause, and
that one must have been aware of having willed
in order to be able to regard one's self as a cause.

Then comes the counter-movement that of the
moral-philosophers. These men still labour under
the delusion that a man is responsible only for
what he has willed. The value of man is then
made a moral value : thus morality becomes a
causa prima ; for this there must be some kind
of principle in man, and " free will " is posited as
prima causa. The arriere penste is always this :
If man is not a causa prima through his will, he
must be irresponsible, therefore he does not
come within the jurisdiction of morals, virtue or
vice is automatic and mechanical. . . .

In short : in order that man may respect
himself he must be capable of becoming evil.

289.

Theatricalness regarded as the result of " Free
Will " morality. It is a step in the development

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 239

of the feeling of power itself, to believe one's self to
be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's
perfection) and to have willed them. . . .

(Criticism : all perfect action is precisely un-
conscious and not deliberate ; consciousness is
often the expression of an imperfect and often
morbid constitution. Personal perfection regarded
as determined by will, as an act of consciousness ', as
reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-
contradiction. . . . Any degree of consciousness
renders perfection impossible. ... A form of
theatricalness^}

290.

The moral hypothesis, designed with a view
to justifying" God, said : evil must be voluntary
(simply in order that the voluntariness of goodness
might be believed in) ; and again, all evil and
suffering have an object which is salvation.

The notion "guilt" was considered as some-
thing which had no connection at all with the
ultimate cause of existence, and the notion
"punishment" was held to be an educating and
beneficent act, consequently an act proceeding from
a good God.

The absolute dominion of moral valuations over
all others: nobody doubted that God could not
be evil and could do no harm that is to say,
perfection was understood merely as moral per-
fection.

291.

How false is the supposition that an action
must depend upon what has preceded it in

240 THE WILL TO POWER.

consciousness ! And morality has been measured
in the light of this supposition, as also crimin-
ality. . . .

The value of an action must be judged by its
results, say the utilitarians: to measure it
according to its origin involves the impossibility
of knowing that origin.

But do we know its results ? Five stages
ahead, perhaps. Who can tell what an action
provokes and sets in motion ? As a stimulus ?
As the spark which fires a powder-magazine ?
Utilitarians are simpletons. . . . And finally,
they would first of all have to know what is
useful ; here also their sight can travel only over
five stages or so. ... They have no notion of
the great economy which cannot dispense with evil.

We do not know the origin or the results:
has an action, then, any value ?

We have yet the action itself to consider : the
states of consciousness that accompany it, the yea
or nay which follows upon its performance : does
the value of an action lie in the subjective states
which accompany it? (In that case, the value of
music would be measured according to the pleasure
or displeasure which it occasions in us ... which
it gives to the composer. . . .) Obviously feelings
of value must accompany it, a sensation of power,
restraint, or impotence for instance, freedom or
lightsomeness. Or, putting the question differently:
could the value of an action be reduced to physio-
logical terms? could it be the expression of
completely free or constrained life? Maybe its
biological value is expressed in this way. . . .

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 24!

If, then, an action can be judged neither in the
light of its origin, nor its results, nor its accom-
paniments in consciousness, then its value must be
#, unknown. . . .

292.

It amounts to a denaturalisation of morality to
separate an action from a man ; to direct hatred
or contempt against " sin " ; to believe that there
are actions which are good or bad in themselves.

The re-establishment of " Nature " : an action in
itself is quite devoid of value ; the whole question
is this: who performed it? One and the same
" crime " may, in one case, be the greatest privi-
lege, in the other infamy. As a matter of fact, it
is the selfishness of the judges which interprets an
action (in regard to its author) according as to
whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or
in relation to its degree of likeness or unlikeness
to them).

293-

The concept " reprehensible action " presents us
with some difficulties. Nothing in all that happens
can be reprehensible in itself: one would not dare
to eliminate it completely \ for everything is so
bound up with everything else, that to exclude
one part would mean to exclude the whole.

A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a
reprehensible world as a whole. . . .

And even then, in a reprehensible world even
reprehending would be reprehensible. . . . And
the consequence of an attitude of mind that

VOL. i. Q

242 THE WILL TO POWER.

condemns everything, would be the affirmation of
everything in practice. ... If Becoming is a huge
ring, everything that forms a part of it is of equal
value, is eternal and necessary. In all correlations
of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love
and hate, all that is expressed is a certain point
of view, peculiar to the interests of a certain type
of living organism : everything that lives says yea
by the very fact of its existence.

294.

Criticism of the subjective feelings of value.
Conscience. Formerly people argued : conscience
condemns this action, therefore this action is
reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience
condemns an action because that action has been
condemned for a long period of time : all conscience
does is to imitate : it does not create values. That
which first led to the condemnation of certain
actions, was not conscience : but the knowledge of
(or the prejudice against) its consequences. . . .
The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-
being, of " inner peace," is of the same order of
emotions as the artist's joy over his work it
proves nothing. . . . Self-contentment proves no
more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than
its absence can prove anything against the value
of the thing which fails to give rise to it. We are
far too ignorant to be able to judge of the value
of our actions : in this respect we lack the ability
to regard things objectively. Even when we
condemn an action, we do not do so as judges,

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 243

but as adversaries. . . . When noble sentiments
accompany an action, they prove nothing in its
favour : an artist may present us with an absolutely
insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of
the most exalted pathos during its production. It
were wiser to regard these sentiments as misleading:
they actually beguile our eye and our power, away
from criticism, from caution and from suspicion,
and the result often is that we makefvo/s of our-
selves . . . they actually make fools of us.

295.

We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and
self-crucifixion of two thousand years : in these two
practices lie perhaps our longest efforts at becoming
perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety ; we
have affiliated natural propensities with a heavy
conscience.

An attempt to produce an entirely opposite
state of affairs would be possible : that is to say,
to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all sympathy
with things which are opposed to the senses, the
intellect, and nature in fact, all the ideals that
have existed hitherto (which were all anti-worldly),
with a heavy conscience.

296.

The great crimes in psychology :

(i) That all pain and unhappiness should have
been falsified by being associated with what is
wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of its
innocence.)

244 THE WILL TO POWER.

(2) That all strong emotions (wantonness,
voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity, know-
ledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were
branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.

(3) That feelings of weakness, inner acts of
cowardice, lack of personal courage, should have
decked themselves in the most beautiful words,
and have been taught as desirable in the highest
degree.

(4) That greatness in man should have been
given the meaning of disinterestedness, self-sacrifice
for another's good, for other people ; that even in
the scientist and the artist, the elimination of the
individual personality is presented as the cause of
the greatest knowledge and ability.

(5) That love should have been twisted round
to mean submission (and altruism), whereas it is
in reality an act of appropriation or of bestowal,
resulting in the last case from a superabundance
in the wealth of a given personality. Only the
wholest people can love; the disinterested ones,
the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just
ask the girls !). This principle also applies to the
love of God or of the " home country " : a man
must be able to rely absolutely upon himself.
(Egotism may be regarded as the pre-eminence of
the ego y altruism as the pre-eminence of others?)

(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness
as a means of seduction) ; the passions regarded
as devilish ; confidence in one's self as godless.

The whole of psychology is a psychology of 'obstacles,
a sort of barricade built out of fear ; on the one
hand we find the masses (the botched and bungled,

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 245

the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of
it, against the strong (and finally destroying 1 them
in their growth . . . ); on the other hand, we
find all the instincts with which these classes are
best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in
honour by them. Let any one examine the
Jewish priesthood.

297.

The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature through
moral transcendence : The value of disinterested-
ness, the cult of altruism ; the belief in a reward in
the play of natural consequences; the belief in
" goodness " and in genius itself, as if the one, like
the other, were the result of disinterestedness \ the
continuation of the Church's sanction of the life of
the citizen ; the absolutely deliberate misunder-
standing of history (as a means of educating up to
morality) or pessimism in the attitude taken up
towards history (the latter is just as much a
result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that
pseudo-justification of history, that refusal to see
history as the pessimist sees it).

298.

" Morality for its own sake " this is an im-
portant step in the denaturalisation of morals : in
itself it appears as a final value. In this phase
religion has generally become saturated with it :
as, for instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise
goes through a phase in which it separates itself

246 THE WILL TO POWER.

from religion, and in which no God is " moral "
enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal
ideal. . . . This is how the case stands at
present.

"Art for Art s sake ": this is a similarly dangerous
principle : by this means a false contrast is lent
to things it culminates in the slander of reality
("idealising" into the hateful). When an ideal
is severed from reality, the latter is debased, im-
poverished, and calumniated. " Beauty for Beauty's
sake,' " Truth for Truth's sake? " Goodness for
Goodness' sake " these are three forms of the evil
eye for reality.

Art, knowledge, and morality are means :
instead of recognising a life-promoting tendency
in them, they have been associated with the
opposite of Life with " God? they have also
been regarded as revelations of a higher world,
which here and there transpires through them. . . .

"Beautiful" and "ugly? "true" and "false?
"good" and "evil" these things are distinctions
and antagonisms which betray the preservative
and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily
of man alone, but of all stable and enduring
organisms which take up a definite stand against
their opponents. The war which thus ensues is
the essential factor : it is a means of separating
things, leading to stronger isolation. . . .

299.

Moral naturalism : The tracing back of ap-
parently independent and supernatural values to

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 247

their real " nature " that is to say, to natural
immorality, to natural " utility," etc.

Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these
observations by the term moral naturalism : my
object is to re-translate the moral values which
have apparently become independent and un-
natural into their real nature that is to say,
into their natural " immorality?

N.B. Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its
natural basis. The case is the same in regard
to the moral law which has been made sovereign^
emancipated from its real nature (until it is
almost the opposite of Nature).

The stages in the denaturalisation of morality
(or so-called " Idealisation ") :

First it is a road to individual happiness,

then it is the result of knowledge,

then it is a Categorical Imperative,

then it is a way to Salvation,

then it is a denial of the will to live.

(The gradual progress of the hostility of morality
to Life.)

300.

The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality.
Concepts : paganism, master-morality, i/irtil.

301.

My problem ; What harm has mankind suffered
hitherto from morals, as also from its own
morality? Intellectual harm, etc.

248 THE WILL TO POWER.

302.

Why are not human values once more deposited
nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right
as routinary values ? Many species of animals
have already become extinct; supposing man
were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking
on earth. A man should be enough of a philo-
sopher to admire even this "nothing" (Nil
admirarf).

303.

Man, a small species of very excitable animals,
which fortunately has its time. Life in general
on earth is a matter of a moment, an incident,
an exception that has no consequence, something
which is of no importance whatever to the general
character of the earth ; the earth itself is, like
every star, a hiatus between two nonentities, an
event without a plan, without reason, will, or self-
consciousness the worst kind of necessity
foolish necessity. . . . Something in us rebels
against this view ; the serpent vanity whispers to
our hearts, " All this must be false because it is
revolting. . . . Could not all this be appearance ?
And man in spite of all, to use Kant's words "

4. How VIRTUE is MADE TO DOMINATE.

304-

Concerning the ideal of the moralist. In this
treatise we wish to speak of the great politics of

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 249

virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who
are interested, not so much in the process of
becoming virtuous as in that of making others
virtuous in how virtue is made to dominate. I
even intend to prove that in order to desire this
one thing the dominion of virtue the other
must be systematically avoided ; that is to say,
one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous.
This sacrifice is great : but such an end is perhaps
a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even
greater sacrifices ! . . . And some of the most
famous moralists have risked as much. For these, ,
indeed, had already recognised and anticipated
the truth which is to be revealed for the first time
in this treatise : that the dominion of virtue is
absolutely attainable only by the use of the same
means which are employed in the attainment of
any other dominion, in any case not by means of
virtue itself. . . .

As I have already said, this treatise deals with
the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of
these politics ; it describes it as it ought to be,
if anything at all can be perfect on this earth.
Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to
what the type of perfection is in politics ; it is, of
course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism
which is pur> sans mtlange^ cru, vert> dans toute sa
force> dans toute son dpret^ is superhuman, divine,
transcendental, and can never be achieved by
man the most he can do is to approximate it.
Even in this narrower kind of politics in the
politics of virtue the ideal never seems to have
been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon it

2 SO THE WILL TO POWER.

Granted that one have eyes for concealed things,
one can discover, even in the most guileless and
most conscious moralists (and this is indeed the
name of these moral politicians and of the
founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing
that they too paid their tribute to human weak-
ness. They all aspired to virtue on their own
account at least in their moments of weariness ;
and this is the leading and most capital error on
the part of any moralist whose duty it is to be
an immoralist in deeds. That he must not exactly
appear to be the latter \ is another matter. Or
rather it is not another matter : systematic self-
denial of this kind (or, expressed morally : dis-
simulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of,
the moralist's canon and of his self-imposed
duties : without it he can never attain to his
particular kind of perfection. Freedom from
morality and from truth when enjoyed for that
purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the
sake of making morality dominate that is the
canon. Moralists are in need of the attitudes of
virtue^ as also of the attitudes of truth; their
error begins when they yield to virtue, when they
lose control of virtue, when they themselves become
moral or true. A great moralist is, among other
thfngs, necessarily a great actor ; his only danger
is that his pose may unconsciously become a
second nature, just like his ideal, which is to keep
his esse and his operari apart in a divine way ;
everything he does must be done sub specie boni
a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal 1 A divine
ideal ! And, as a matter of fact, they say that

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 25 1

the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less
than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist
in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless under-
stands how to remain what He w, the good
God. . . .

305.

The dominion of virtue is not established by
means of virtue itself; with virtue itself, one re-
nounces power, one loses the Will to Power.

306.

The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the
same " immoral " means as any other victory :
violence, lies, slander, injustice.

307.

He who knows the way fame originates will be
suspicious even of the fame virtue enjoys.

308.

Morality is just as " immoral " as any other
thing on earth; morality is in itself a form of
immorality.

The great relief which this conviction brings.
The contradiction between things disappears, the
unity of all phenomena is saved-

309.

There are some who seek for the immoral
side of things. When they say: "this is

252 THE WILL TO POWER.

wrong," they believe it ought to be done away
with or altered. On the other hand, I do not
rest until I am quite clear concerning the im-
morality of any particular thing which happens
to come under my notice. When I discover it,
I recover my equanimity.

310.

A. The ivays which lead to power ; the presenta-
tion of the new virtue under the name of an old
one, the awakening of " interest " concerning it
(" happiness " declared to be its reward, and vice
versfi)) artistic slandering of all that stands in
its way, the exploitation of advantages and
accidents with the view of glorifying it, the con-
version of its adherents into fanatics by means
of sacrifices and separations, symbolism on a
grand scale.

B. Poiver attained: (i) Means of constraint of
virtue ; (2) seductive means of virtue ; (3) the
(court) etiquette of virtue.

By what means does a virtue attain to power f
With precisely the same means as a political party :
slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing
virtues that happen to be already in power, the
changing of their names, systematic persecution
and scorn ; in short, by means of acts of general
" immorality''

How does a desire behave towards itself in

A CRITICISM OF MORALITV. 253

order to become a virtuet A process of re-
christening; systematic denial of its intentions;
practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with
established and recognised virtues; ostentatious
enmity towards its adversaries. If possible, too,
the protection of sacred powers must be purchased ;
people must also be intoxicated and fired with
enthusiasm ; idealistic humbug must be used, and
a party must be won, which either triumphs or
perishes one must be unconscious and naif.

312.

Cruelty has become transformed and elevated
into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise
it as such. The same has happened to the love
of the sexes which has become amour-passion ;
the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian
obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the
disease of the nervus sympathicus y for instance, is
eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.

313.

We should begin to entertain doubts concerning
a man if we heard that he required reasons in
order to remain respectable: we should, in any
case, certainly avoid his society. The little word
"for" in certain cases may be compromising;
sometimes a single " for " is enough to refute one.
If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-
such an aspirant for virtue was in need of bad
reasons in order to remain respectable, it would not

254 THE WILL TO POWER.

conduce to increasing our respect for him. But
he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us
quite openly : " You disturb my morality with
your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic ; so long as you cannot
believe in my bad reasons^ that is to say, in my
God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.,
you put obstacles in the way of my virtue, . . .
Moral, sceptics must be suppressed : they prevent
the moralisation of the masses?

3*4-

Our most sacred convictions, those which are
permanent in us concerning the highest values,
are judgments emanating from our muscles.

315.

Morality in the valuation of races and classes.*
In view of the fact that the passions and funda-
mental instincts in every race and class express
the means which enable the latter to preserve
themselves (or at least the means which have
enabled them to live for the longest period of
time), to call them " virtuous " practically means :

That they change their character, shed their
skins, and blot out their past.

It means that they should cease from differen-
tiating themselves from others.

It means that they are getting to resemble each
other in their needs and aspirations or, more
exactly, that they are declining. . . .

It means that the will to one kind of morality

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 255

is merely the tyranny of the particular species,
which is adapted to that kind of morality, over
other species : it means a process of annihilation
or general levelling in favour of the prevailing
species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing
species harmless, or to exploit them); the
"Abolition of Slavery" a so-called tribute to
"human dignity"; in truth, the annihilation of
a fundamentally different species (the under-
mining of its values and its happiness).

The qualities which constitute the strength of
an opposing race or class are declared to be the
most evil and pernicious things it has: for by
means of them it may be harmful to us (its
virtues are slandered and rechristened).

When a man or a people harm us, their action
constitutes an objection against them : but from
their point of view we are desirable, because we
are such as can be useful to them.

The insistence upon spreading "humaneness"
(which guilelessly starts out with the assumption
that it is in possession of the formula " What is
human ") is all humbug, beneath the cover of
which a certain definite type of man strives to
attain to power: or, more precisely, a very
particular kind of instinct the gregarious instinct.
" The equality of men " : this is what lies concealed
behind the tendency of making ever more and
more men alike as men.

The "interested nature" of the morality of
ordinary people. (The trick was to elevate the
great passions for power and property to the
positions of protectors of virtue.)

256 THE WILL TO POWER.

To what extent do all kinds of business men
and money-grabbers all those who give and
take credit find it necessary to promote the
levelling of all characters and notions of value?
the commerce and the exchange of the world leads
to, and almost purchases, virtue.

The State exercises the same influence, as does
also any sort of ruling power at the head of
officials and soldiers; science acts in the same
way, in order that it may work in security and
economise its forces. And the priesthood does
the same.

Communal morality is thus promoted here,
because it is advantageous ; and, in order to make
it triumph, war and violence are waged against
immorality with what " right " ? Without
any right whatsoever; but in accordance with
the instinct of self-preservation. The same
classes avail themselves of immorality when it
serves their purpose to do so.

316.

Observe the hypocritical colour which all
civil institutions are painted, just as if they were
the offshoots of morality for instance : marriage,
work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, and
rights. But as they were all established in
favour of the most mediocre type of man, to
protect him from exceptions and the need of
exceptions, one must not be surprised to find them
sown with lies.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 2$7

317.

Virtue must be defended against its preachers :
they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue
as an ideal for all\ they divest virtue of the
charm which consists in its rareness, its inimit-
ableness, its exceptional and non - average
character that is to say, of its aristocratic charm.
A stand must also be made against those
embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and
are satisfied to hear them ring hollow : what in-
genuousness ! to demand great and rare things,
and then to declare, with anger and contempt of
one's fellows, that they do not exist ! It is obvious,
for instance, that a marriage is worth only as
much as those are worth whom it joins that is
to say, that on the whole it is something wretched
and indecent: no priest or registrar can make
anything else of it.

Virtue* has all the instincts of the average
man against it: it is not profitable, it is not
prudent, and it isolates. It is related to passion,
and not very accessible to reason ; it spoils the
character, the head, and the senses always, of
course, subject to the medium standard of men ;
it provokes hostility towards order, and towards
the lies which are concealed beneath all order,
all institutions, and all reality when seen in
the light of its pernicious influence upon others ',
it is the worst of vices.

* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Virtue is used here, of course,
in the sense of " the excellence of man,' not in the sense of
the Christian negative virtue.
VOL. i. R

25 8 THE WILL TO POWER.

I recognise virtue in that: (i) it does not
insist upon being recognised ; (2) it does not
presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere,
but precisely something else ; (3) it does not suffer
from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather
as a relation of perspective which throws virtue
into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it
makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to
pose as judge because it is always a personal
virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally
forbidden : virtue as I understand it is the actual
vetitum within all gregarious legislation ; (7) in
short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the
Renaissance style virtfi free from all moralic
acid. . . .

318.

In the first place/* Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you
have no superiority over us; we should like to
make you take modesty a little more to heart:
it is wretched personal interests and prudence which
suggest your virtue to you. And if you had
more strength and courage in your bodies you
would not lower yourselves thus to the level of
virtuous ponentities. You make what you can of
yourselves : partly what you are obliged to make,
that is to say, what your circumstances force
you to make, partly what suits your pleasure and
partly what seems useful to you. But if you do
only what is in keeping with your inclinations,

* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Here Nietzsche returns to
Christian virtue which is negative and moral.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 259

or what necessity exacts from you, or what is
useful to you, you ought neither to praise your-
selves nor let others praise you ! . . . One is a
thoroughly puny kind of man when one is only
virtuous: nothing should mislead you in this
regard ! Men who have to be considered at all,
were never such donkeys of virtue : their inmost
instinct, that which determined their quantum of
power, did not find its reckoning thus : whereas
with your minimum amount of power nothing
can seem more full of wisdom to you than
virtue. But the multitude are on your side : and
because you tyrannise over us, we shall fight
you. . . .

A virtuous man is of a lower species because,
in the first place, he has no " personality," but
acquires his value by conforming with a certain
human scheme which has been once and for ever
fixed. He has no independent value: he may
be compared ; he has his equals, he must not be
an individual.

Reckoning up the qualities of the good man,
why is it they appear pleasant to us ? Because
they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to
caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to
severity : our laziness, our good nature, and our
levity, have a good time. This, our feeling of
well-being, is what we project into the good man
in the form of a quality, in the form of a valuable
possession,

260 THE WILL TO POWER.

320.

Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a
venerable form of stupidity : who could blame
her for it? And this form of virtue has not
been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest
peasant-simplicity, which is possible, however, in all
classes of society, and which one cannot meet with
anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks
to-day that everything is in good hands that is
to say, in " God's hands " : and when it supports
this proposition with that same modest assurance
as that with which it would assert that two and
two are four, we others naturally refrain from
contradiction.

Why disturb this pure foolery ? Why darken
it with our cares concerning man, people, goals,
the future? Even if we wished to do so, we
shouldn't succeed. In all things these people see
the reflection of their own venerable stupidity and
goodness (in them the old God deus myops
still lives); we others see something else in
everything: our problematic nature, our contra-
dictions, our deeper, more painful, and more
suspicious wisdom.

321.

He who finds a particular virtue an easy
matter, ultimately laughs at it. Seriousness
cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As
soon as a man has reached virtue, he jumps out
of it whither ? Into devilry.

Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tend-

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 26 1

encies and impulses have become ! What an
amount of scientific inquisitiveness torments them !
They are all fishhooks of knowledge !

322.

The idea is to associate vice with something so
terrible that at last one is obliged to run away
from it in order to be rid of its associations.
This is the well-known case of Tannhauser.
Tannhauser, brought to his wits' end by Wagner-
ian music, cannot endure life any longer even In
the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue
begins to have a charm for him; a Thuringian
virgin goes up in price, and what is even worse
still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschen-
bach's melody. . , .

323-

The Patrons of Virtue. Lust of property, lust
of power, laziness, simplicity, fear ; all these things
are interested in virtue ; that is why it stands so
securely.

324-

Virtue is no longer believed in ; its powers of
attraction are dead ; what is needed is some one
who will once more bring it into the market in the
form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of
dissipation. It exacts too much extravagance and
narrow-mindedness from its believers to allow of
conscience not being against it to-day. Certainly,
for people without either consciences or scruples,

262 THE WILL TO TOWER.

this may constitute its new charm: it is now
what it has never been before a vice.

325.

Virtue is still the most expensive vice : let it
remain so !

326.

Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as
they are allowed to rule over one as authorities and
laws coming from outside, and not as qualities one
develops one's self. The latter is the only right
way ; they should be the most personal means of
defence and most individual needs the determin-
ing factors of precisely our existence and growth,
which :ve recognise and acknowledge independ-
ently of the question whether others grow with us
with the help of the same or of different principles.
This view of the danger of the virtue which is
understood as impersonal and objective also holds
good of modesty : through modesty many of the
choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty
is the worst possible softening influence for those
souls for which it is pre-eminently necessary that
they become hard betimes.

327.

The domain of morality must be reduced and
limited step by step ; the names of the instincts
which are really active in this sphere must be
drawn into the light of day and honoured, after

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 263

they have lain all this time in the concealment of
hypocritical names of virtue. Out of respect for
one's " honesty," which makes itself heard ever
more and more imperiously, one ought to unlearn
the shame which makes one deny and " explain
away " all natural instincts. The extent to which
one can dispense with virtue is the measure of
one's strength; and a height may be imagined
where the notion " virtue " is understood in such a
way as to be reminiscent of virtu the virtue of
the Renaissance free from moralic acid. But
for the moment how remote this ideal seems !

The reduction of the domain of morality is a
sign of its progress. Wherever, hitherto, thought
has not been guided by causality, thinking has
taken a moral turn.

328.

After all, what have I achieved ? Let us not
close our eyes to this wonderful result : I have
lent new charms to virtue it now affects one
in the same way as something forbidden. It has
our most subtle honesty against it, it is salted in
the "cum grano satis" of the scientific pang of
conscience. It savours of antiquity and of old
fashion, and thus it is at last beginning to draw
refined people and to make them inquisitive in
short, it affects us like a vice. Only after we have
once recognised that everything consists of lies and
appearance, shall we have again earned the right
to uphold this most beautiful of all fictions virtue.
There will then remain no further reason to de-
prive ourselves of it: only when we have shown

264 THE WILL TO POWER.

virtue to be a form of immorality do we again
justify it, it then becomes classified, and likened,
in its fundamental features, to the profound and
general immorality of all existence, of which it is
then shown to be a part. It appears as a form of
luxury of the first order, the most arrogant, the
dearest, and rarest form of vice. We have robbed
it of its grimaces and divested it of its drapery ;
we have delivered it from the importunate famili-
arity of the crowd; we have deprived it of its
ridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff
false hair, and its hieratic muscles.

329.

And is it supposed that I have thereby done
any harm to virtue ? . . . Just as little as anar-
chists do to princes. Only since they have been
shot at, have they once more sat securely on their
thrones. . . . For thus it has always been and
will ever be: one cannot do a thing a better
service than to persecute it and to run it to earth.
. . . This I have done.

5, THE MORAL IDEAL.
A. A Criticism of Ideals.

33.

It were the thing to begin this criticism in such-
wise as to do away with the word u Ideal" \ a
criticism of desiderata.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 265

331-

Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what
is involved, from the standpoint of desirability, in
every " thus should it be, but it is not," or even
" thus it ought to have been " : such expressions
of opinion involve a condemnation of the whole
course of events. For there is nothing quite
isolated in the world : the smallest thing bears the
largest on its back ; on thy small injustice the
whole nature of the future depends ; the whole is
condemned by every criticism which is directed at
the smallest part of it. Now granting that the
moral norm even as Kant understood it is
never completely fulfilled, and remains like a sort
of Beyond hanging over reality without ever
falling down to it ; then morality would contain
in itself a judgment concerning the whole, which
would still, however, allow of the question : whence
does it get the right thereto ? How does the part
come to acquire this judicial position relative to
the whole ? And if, as some have declared, this
moral condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with,
reality, is an ineradicable instinct, is it not possible
that this instinct may perhaps belong to the
ineradicable stupidities and immodesties of our
species ? But in saying this, we are doing pre-
cisely what we deprecate; the point of view of
desirability and of unauthorised fault-finding is
part and parcel of the whole character of worldly
phenomena just as every injustice and imperfection
is it is our very notion of " perfection " which is
never gratified. Every instinct which desires to

266 THE WILL TO POWER.

be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction
with the present state of things : how ? Is the
whole perhaps made up of a host of dissatisfied
parts, which all have desiderata in their heads ? Is
the " course of things " perhaps " the road hence ?
the road leading away from reality " that is to
say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is the concep-
tion of desiderata perhaps the essential motive-
power of all things ? Is it deus ?

#

It seems to me of the utmost importance that
we should rid ourselves of the notion of the whole,
of an entity, and of any kind of power or form of
the unconditioned. For we shall never be able
to resist the temptation of regarding it as the
supreme being, and of christening it " God."
The " All " must be subdivided ; we must unlearn
our respect for it, and reappropriate that which
we have lent the unknown and an imaginary
entity, for the purposes of our neighbour and our-
selves. Whereas, for instance, Kant said : " Two
things remain for ever worthy of honour" (at the
close of his Practical Reason} to-day we should
prefer to say : " Digestion is more worthy of
honour." The concept, " the All," will always
give rise to the old problems, " How is evil
possible?" etc. Therefore, there is no "All?
there is no great sensorium or inventarium or
power-magazine.

332.

A man as he ought to be : this sounds to me in
just as bad taste as : "A tree as it ought to be."

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 267

333-

Ethics : or the " philosophy of desirability."
" Things ought to be otherwise," " things ought to
become different " : dissatisfaction would thus seem
the heart of ethics.

One could find a way out of it, first, by select-
ing only those states in which one is free from
emotion ; secondly, by grasping the insolence and
stupidity of the attitude of mind : for to desire
that something should be otherwise than it is,
means to desire that everything should be different
it involves a damaging criticism of the whole.
But life itself consists in such desiring !

To ascertain what exists^ how it exists seems an
ever so much higher and more serious matter than
every "thus should it be," because the latter, as
a piece of human criticism and arrogance, appears
to be condemned as ludicrous from the start. It
expresses a need which would fain have the
organisation of the world correspond with our
human well-being, and which directs the will as
much as possible towards the accomplishment of
that relationship.

On the other hand, this desire, " thus it ought
to be," has only called forth that other desire,
" what exists ? " The desire of knowing what exists,
is already a consequence of the question, " how ?
is it possible ? Why precisely so ? " Our wonder
at the disagreement between our desires and the
course of the world has led to our learning to
know the course of the world. Perhaps the
matter stands differently : maybe the expression,

268 THE WILL TO POWER.

" thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of
our desire to overcome the world

334.

To-day when every attempt at determining how
man should be is received with some irony, when
we adhere to the notion that in spite of all one
only becomes what one is (in spite of all that
is to say, education, instruction, environment,
accident, and disaster), in the matter of morality
we have learnt, in a very peculiar way, how to
reverse the relation of cause and effect. Nothing
perhaps distinguishes us more than this from the
ancient believers in morality. We no longer say,
for instance, " Vice is the cause of a man's physical
ruin," and we no longer say, " A man prospers with
virtue because it brings a long life and happiness."
Our minds to-day are much more inclined to the
belief that vice and virtue are not causes but only
effects. A man becomes a respectable member of
society because he was a respectable man from the
start that is to say, because he was born in
possession of good instincts and prosperous pro-
pensities. . . . Should a man enter the world poor,
and the son of parents who are neither economical
nor thrifty, he is insusceptible of being improved
that is to say, he is only fit for the prison or the
madhouse. . . . To-day we are no longer able to
separate moral from physical degeneration: the
former is merely a complicated symptom of the
latter; a man is necessarily bad just as he is
necessarily ill. . . . Bad : this word here stands

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 269

for a certain lack of capacity which is related
physiologically with the degenerating type for
instance, a weak will, an uncertain and many-sided
personality, the inability to resist reacting to a
stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain
constraint resulting from every suggestion pro-
ceeding from another's will. Vice is not a cause ;
it is an effect. . . . Vice is a somewhat arbitrary
epitome of certain effects resulting from physio-
logical degeneracy. A general proposition such
as that which Christianity teaches, namely, " Man
is evil," would be justified provided one were
justified in regarding a given type of degenerate
man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration.
Of course, wherever Christianity prospers and pre-
vails, the proposition holds good: for then the
existence of an unhealthy soil of a degenerate
territory is demonstrated.

335.

It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man,
when one sees how he understands the art of
fighting his way, of enduring, of turning circum-
stances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing
opponents ; but when he is seen in the light of
his desires, he is the most absurd of all animals.
... It is just as if he required a playground for
his cowardice, his laziness, his feebleness, his
sweetness, his submissiveness, where he recovers
from his strong virile virtues. Just look at man's
" desiderata " and his " ideals." Man, when he
desires, tries to recover from that which is

270 THE WILL TO POWER.

eternally valuable in him, from his deeds ; and
then he rushes into nonentity, absurdity, valueless-
ness, childishness. The intellectual indigence and
lack of inventive power of this resourceful and
inventive animal is simply terrible. The " ideal "
is at the same time the penalty man pays for the
enormous expenditure which he has to defray
in all real and pressing duties. Should reality
cease to prevail, there follow dreams, fatigue,
weakness : an " ideal " might even be regarded
as a form of dream, fatigue, or weakness. The
strongest and the most impotent men become
alike when this condition overtakes them : they
deify the cessation of work, of war, of passions,
of suspense, of contrasts, of " reality " in short, of
the struggle for knowledge and of the trouble
of acquiring it.

" Innocence " to them is idealised stultification ;
"blessedness" is idealised idleness; "love," the
ideal state of the gregarious animal that will no
longer have an enemy. And thus everything that
lowers and belittles man is elevated to an ideal*

336.

A desire magnifies the thing desired ; and by
not being realised it grows the greatest ideas
are those which have been created by the strongest
and longest desiring. Things grow ever more
valuable in our estimation, the more our desire
for them increases : if " moral values " have become
the highest values, it simply shows that the moral
ideal is the one which has been realised least (and

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 2/1

thus it represented the Beyond to all suffering, as a
road to blessedness). Man, with ever-increasing
ardour, has only been embracing clouds : and
ultimately called his desperation and impotence
" God."

337-

Think of the nawettot all ultimate " desiderata "
when the " wherefore " of man remains unknown.

338.

What is the counterfeit coinage of morality?
First of all we should know what " good and
evil " mean. That is as good as wishing to know
why man is here, and what his goal or his destiny
is. And that means that one would fain know
that man actually has a goal or a destiny.

339.

The very obscure and arbitrary notion that
humanity has a general duty to perform, and that,
as a whole, it is striving towards a goal, is
still in its infancy. Perhaps we shall once more
be rid of it before it becomes a " fixed idea." , . .
But humanity does not constitute a whole : it
is an indissoluble multiplicity of ascending and
descending organisms it knows no such thing
as a state of youth followed by maturity and
then age. But its strata lie confused and
superimposed and in a few thousand years

2/2 THE WILL TO POWER.

there may be even younger types of men than
we can point out to-day. Decadence, on the
other hand, belongs to all periods of human
history : everywhere there is refuse and decaying
matter, such things are in themselves vital pro-
cesses ; for withering and decaying elements must
be eliminated.

#

Under the empire of Christian prejudice this
question was never put at all: the purpose of life
seemed to lie in the salvation of the individual
soul ; the question whether humanity might last
for a long or a short time was not considered.
The best Christians longed for the end to come
as soon as possible ; concerning the needs of the
individual, there seemed to be no doubt whatsoever.
. . . The duty of every individual for the present
was identical with what it would be in any sort
of future for the man of the future: the value,
the purpose, the limit of values was for ever fixed,
unconditioned, eternal, one with God. . . . What
deviated from this eternal type was impious,
diabolic, criminal.

The centre of gravity of all values for each
soul lay in that soul itself: salvation or damnation I
The salvation of the immortal soul 1 The most
extreme form of personalisation. . . . For each
soul there was only one kind of perfection ; only
one ideal, only one road to salvation. . . . The
most extreme form of the principle of equal rights,
associated with an optical magnification of in-
dividual importance to the point of megalomania

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 273

. . . Nothing but insanely important souls, re-
volving round their own axes with unspeakable
terror. . . .

Nobody believes in these assumed airs of im-
portance any longer to-day: and we have sifted
our wisdom through the sieve of contempt.
Nevertheless the optical habit survives, which
would fain measure the value of man by his
proximity to a certain ideal man : at bottom the
personalisation view is upheld as firmly as that of
the equality of rights as regards the ideal. In
short: people seem to think that they know what
the ultimate desideratum is in regard to the ideal
man. . . .

But this belief is merely the result of the
exceedingly detrimental influence of the Christian
ideal, as anybody can discover for himself every
time he carefully examines the " ideal type." In
the first place, it is believed that the approach to
a given " type " is desirable ; secondly ', that this
particular type is known ; thirdly, that every
deviation from this type is a retrograde movement,
a stemming of the spirit of progress, a loss of
power and might in man. . . . To dream of a
state of affairs in which this perfect man will
be in the majority: our friends the Socialists
and even Messrs, the Utilitarians have not gone
farther than this. In this way an aim seems to
have crept into the evolution of man : at any
rate the belief in a certain progress towards an
ideal is the only shape in which an aim is con-

VOL. i. S

THE WILL TO POWER.

ceived in the history of mankind to-day. In
short : the coming of the " Kingdom of God" has
been placed in the future, and has been given an
earthly, a human meaning but on the whole the
faith in the old ideal is still maintained. . . .

340.

TJie more concealed forms of the cult of Christian^
moral ideals. The insipid and cowardly notion
" Nature? invented by Nature-enthusiasts (without
any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the
implacable, and the cynical element in even " the
most beautiful " aspects), is only a sort of attempt
at reading the moral and Christian notion of
" humanity " into Nature ; Rousseau's concept of
Nature, for instance, which took for granted that
" Nature " meant freedom, goodness, innocence,
equity, justice, and Idylls, was nothing more at
bottom than the cult of Christian morality. We
should collect passages from the poets in order
to see what they admired, in lofty mountains, for
instance. What Goethe had to do with them
why he admired Spinoza. Absolute ignorance
concerning the reasons of this cult. . . .

The insipid and coivardly concept " Man" ct la
Comte and Stuart Mill, is at times the subject of
a cult. . . . This is only the Christian moral ideal
again under another name. . . . Refer also to the
freethinkers Guyau for example.

The insipid and cowardly concept " Art? which
is held to mean sympathy with all suffering and
with everything botched and bungled (the same

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 275

thing happens to history \ cf. Thierry) : again it is
the cult of the Christian moral ideal.

And now, as to the whole socialistic ideal: it is
nothing but a blockheaded misunderstanding of
the Christian moral ideal.

341.

The origin of the ideal The examination of
the soil out of which it grows.

A. Starting out from those " aesthetic " mental
states during which the world seems rounder,
fuller, and more perfect : we have the pagan ideal
with its dominating spirit of self-affirmation
(people give of their abundance}. The highest
type : the classical ideal regarded as an expres-
sion of the successful nature of all the more
important instincts. In this classical ideal we
find the grand style as the highest style. An
expression of the "will to power" itself. The
instinct which is most feared dares to acknow-
ledge itself.

B. Starting out from the mental states in
which the world seemed emptier, paler, and thinner,
when " spiritualisation " and the absence of sensu-
ality assume the rank of perfection, and when all
that is brutal, animal, direct, and proximate is
avoided (people calculate and select} : the " sage/ 1
" the angel " ; priestliness = virginity = ignorance,
are the physiological ideals of such idealists : the
ancemic ideal. Under certain circumstances this
anaemic ideal may be the ideal of such natures as

276 THE WILL TO POWER.

represent paganism (thus Goethe sees his " saint "
in Spinoza).

C. Starting out from those mental states in
which the world seemed more absurd, more evil,
pqorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot even
be imagined or desired in it {people deny and
annihilate) ; the projection of the ideal into the
sphere of the anti-natural, anti-actual, anti-logical ;
the state of him who judges thus (the " impover-
ishment" of the world as a result of suffering:
people take, they no longer bestow} : the anti-natural
ideal.

(The Christian ideal is a transitional form
between the second and the third, now inclining
more towards the former type, and anon inclining
towards the latter.)

The three ideals: A. Either a strengthening
of Life (paganism), or B. an impoverishment of Life
(an&mid)) or C. a denial of Life (anti-naturalism).
The state of beatitude in A. is the feeling of
extreme abundance ; in B. it is reached by the
most fastidious selectivencss ; in C. it is the
contempt and the destruction of Life.

342.

A. The consistent type understands that even
evil must not be hated, must not be resisted, and
that it is not allowable to make war against
one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept
the pain which such behaviour brings in its train ;
that one lives entirely in positive feelings; that
one takes the side of one's opponents in word

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 277

and deed ; that by means of a superfoetation of
peaceful, kindly, conciliatory, helpful, and loving
states, one impoverishes the soil of the other
states, . . . that one is in need of unremitting
practice. What is achieved thereby? The
Buddhistic type, or the perfect cow.

This point of view is possible only where no
moral fanaticism prevails that is to say, when
evil is not hated on its own account, but because
it opens the road to conditions which are painful
(unrest, work, care, complications, dependence).

This is the Buddhistic point of view : there is
no hatred of sin, the concept " sin," in fact, is
entirely lacking.

B. The inconsistent type. War is waged
against evil there is a, belief that war waged
for Goodness* sake does not involve the same moral
results or affect character in the same way as
war generally does (and owing to which tend-
encies it is detested as evil}. As a matter of
fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is
much more profoundly pernicious than any sort
of personal hostility; and generally, it is "the
person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the
position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc.).
The attitude of hostile observation and spying in
regard to everything which may be bad in us, or
hail from a bad source, culminates in a most
tormented and most anxious state of mind : thus
"miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and transcendental
solutions of the earth-riddle now became desir-
able. . . . The Christian type : or the perfect bigot.

#

2/8 THE WILL TO POWER.

C. The stoical type. Firmness, self-control,
imperturbability, peace in the form of the rigidity
of a will long active profound quiet, the de-
fensive state, the fortress, the mistrust of war
firmness of principles; the unity of knowledge
and will\ great self-respect. The type of the
anchorite. The perfect blockhead.

343-

An ideal which is striving to prevail or to
assert itself endeavours to further its purpose
(a) by laying claim to a spurious origin ; (ft) by
assuming a relationship between itself and the
powerful ideals already existing; (c) by means
of the thrill produced by mystery, as though
an unquestionable power were manifesting itself;
(rf) by the slander of its opponents' ideals ; (e) by
a lying teaching of the advantages which follow in
its wake, for instance : happiness, spiritual peace,
general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty
God, etc. Contributions to the psychology of
the idealists : Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet.

Supposing all the means of defence and
protection, by means of which an ideal survives,
are discovered, is it thereby refuted? It has
merely availed itself of the means by which every-
thing lives and grows they are all " immoral."

My view: all the forces and instincts which
are the source of life are lying beneath the ban
of morality : morality is the life-denying instinct.
Morality must be annihilated if life is to be
emancipated.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 279

344-

To avoid knowing himself is the prudence of the
idealist. The idealist : a creature who has reasons
for remaining in the dark concerning himself, and
who is also clever enough to remain in the dark
concerning these reasons also.

345-

The tendency of moral evolution. Every one's
desire is that there should be no other teaching
and valuation of things than those by means of
which he himself succeeds. Thus the fundamental
tendency of the weak and mediocre of all times,
has been to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them
to the level of the weak '; their chief weapon in this
process was the moral principle. The attitude of
the strong towards the weak is branded as evil ; the
highest states of the strong become bad bywords.

The struggle of the many against the strong,
of the ordinary against the extraordinary, of the
weak against the strong: meets with one of its
finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the
refined, the more exacting, present themselves as
the weak, and repudiate the coarser weapons of
power,

346.

(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge
of all philosophers is dictated to them by their
moral "truths," and is only seemingly inde-
pendent.

(2) The " Moral Truths," " thus shall things be

280 THE WILL TO POWER.

done," are mere states of consciousness of an
instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus
are things done by us." The " ideal " is supposed
to re-establish and strengthen an instinct; it
flatters man to feel he can obey when he is only
an automaton.

347-

Morality as a means of seduction. " Nature is
good ; for a wise and good God is its cause.
Who, therefore, is responsible for the ' corruption
of man ' ? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling
classes are responsible they must be wiped out " :
this is Rousseau's logic (compare with Pascats logic,
which concludes by an appeal to original sin).

Refer also to Luther's logic, which is similar.
In both cases a pretext is sought for the
introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge
as a moral and religious duty. The hatred
directed against the ruling classes tries to sanctify
itself . . . (the " sin fulness of Israel" is the
basis of the priest's powerful position).

Compare this with Paul's logic, which is
similar. It is always under the cover of God's
business that these reactions appear, under the
cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In
the case of Christ the rejoicings of the people
appear as the cause of His crucifixion. It was
an anti-priestly movement from the beginning.
Even in the anti-Semitic movement we find the
same trick : the opponent is overcome with moral
condemnations, and those who attack him pose
as retributive Justice.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 28 1

348.

The incidents of the fight: the fighter tries to
transform his opponent into the exact opposite of
himself imaginatively, of course. He tries to
believe in himself to such an extent that he may
have the courage necessary for the " good Cause "
(as if he were the good Cause) ; as if reason, taste,
and virtue were being assailed by his opponents.
. . . The belief of which he is most in need, as
the strongest means of defence and attack, is the
belief in himself, which, however, knows how to
misinterpret itself as a belief in God. He never
pictures the advantages and the uses of victory,
but only understands victory for the sake of
victory for God's sake. Every small community
(or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle,
strives to convince itself of this : " Good taste, good
judgment, and virtue are ours." War urges people
to this exaggerated self-esteem. . . .

349-

Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have
(whether as a " Christian," a " free - spirit," an
" immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one
should try to avoid insisting upon its being the
ideal ; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its
privileged nature. One should have an ideal as a
distinction ; one should not propagate it, and thus
level one's self down to the rest of mankind.

How is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the
majority of idealists indulge in propaganda for

282 THE WILL TO POWER.

their ideal, just as if they had no right to it unless
the majority acquiesce therein ? For instance, all
those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this
wa)', who claim the right to study Latin and
mathematics. What is it urges them to do this ?
I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror
of the herd : they fight for the " emancipation of
woman," because they are best able to achieve
their own private little distinction by fighting for
it under the cover of a charitable movement, under
the banner bearing the device " For others."

The cleverness of idealists consists in their per-
sistently posing as the missionaries and "repre-
sentatives " of an ideal : they thus " beautify "
themselves in the eyes of those who still believe
in disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real
heroism consists, not in fighting under the banner
of self-sacrifice, submission, and disinterestedness,
but in not fighting at all. ..." I am thus ; I
will be thus and you can go to the devil 1 "

350.

Every ideal assumes love> hate, reverence, and con-
tempt. Either positive feeling is \htprimum mobile^
or negative feeling is. Hatred and contempt are
the primum mobile in all the ideals which proceed
from resentment.

B. A Criticism of tfie " Good Man? of the Saint ', etc,

The "good man" Or, hemiplegia of virtue.
In the opinion of every strong and natural man,

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 283

love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness
and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong
to each other. A man is good on condition that
he knows how to be evil ; a man is evil, because
otherwise he would not know how to be good.
Whence comes the morbidness and ideological
unnaturalness which repudiates these compounds
which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as
the highest of all things ? Whence this hemiplegia
of virtue, the invention of the good man ? The
object seems to be to make man amputate those
instincts which enable him to be an enemy, to be
harmful, to be angry, and to insist upon revenge.
. . . This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to
that dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a
wholly bad creature (Gad, Spirit, Man) ; in the first
are found all the positive, in the second all the
negative forces, intentions, and states. This
method of valuing thus believes itself to be
" idealistic n ; it never doubts that in its concept
of the " good man/' it has found the highest de-
sideratum. When aspiring to its zenith it fancies
a state in which all evil is wiped out, and in which
only good creatures have actually remained over.
It does not therefore regard the mutual depend-
ence of the opposites good and evil as proved.
On the contrary, the latter ought to vanish, and
the former should remain. The first has a right
to exist, the second ought not to be with us at
all. . . . What, as a matter of fact, is the reason
of this desire ? In all ages, and particularly in the
Christian age, much labour has been spent in
trying to reduce men to this one-sided activity:

284 THE WILL TO POWER.

and even to-day, among those who have been
deformed and weakened by the Church, people
are not lacking who desire precisely the same
thing with their " humanisation " generally, or
with their " Will of God," or with their " Salvation
of the Soul." The principal injunction behind all
these things is, that man should no longer do
anything evil, that he should under no circum-
stances be harmful or desire harm. The way to
arrive at this state of affairs is to amputate all
hostile tendencies, to suppress all the instincts of
resentment, and to establish " spiritual peace " as
a chronic disease.

This attitude of mind, in which a certain type
of man is bred, starts out with this absurd
hypothesis: good and evil are postulated as
realities which are in a state of mutual contradic-
tion (not as complementary values, which they
are), people are advised to take the side of the
good, and it is insisted upon that a good man
resists and forswears evil until every trace of it is
uprooted but with this valuation Life is actually
denied^ for in all its instincts Life has both yea
and nay. But far from understanding these facts,
this valuation dreams rather of returning to the
wholeness, oneness, and strengthfulness of Life : it
actually believes that a state of blessedness will
be reached when the inner anarchy and state of
unrest which result from these opposed impulses
is brought to an end. It is possible that no more
dangerous ideology, no greater mischief in the
science of psychology^ has ever yet existed, than
this will to good : the most repugnant type of man

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 28$

has been reared, the man who is not free, the
bigot ; it was taught that only in the form of a
bigot could one tread the path which leads to
God, and that only a bigot's life could be a godly
life.

And even here, Life is still in the right Life
that knows not how to separate Yea from Nay :
what is the good of declaring with all one's might
that war is an evil, that one must harm no one,
that one must not act negatively? One is still
waging a war even in this, it is impossible to do
otherwise ! The good man who has renounced
all evil, and who is afflicted according to his desire
with the hemiplegia of virtue, does not therefore
cease from waging war, or from making enemies,
or from saying "nay" and doing "nay." The
Christian, for instance, hates " sin " ! and what
on earth is there which he does not call " sin " !
It is precisely because of his belief in a moral
antagonism between good and evil, that the world
for him has grown so full of hatefulness and
things that must be combated eternally. The
" good man " sees himself surrounded by evil, and,
thanks to the continual onslaughts of the latter,
his eye grows more keen, and in the end discovers
traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus
he ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to
him is quite logical, that Nature is evil, that man is
corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace
(that is to say, it is impossible to man when he
stands alone). In short : he denies Life, he sees
how " good," as the highest value, condemns Life.
, . . And thus his ideology concerning good and

286 THE WILL TO POWER.

evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one
cannot refute a disease. Therefore he is obliged
to conceive anotfier life ! . . .

352.

Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a
man, is always understood to consist in the ability
to Jtarm as well as to help. This is the case with
the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all
strong and well-constituted races.

The dualistic separation of the two powers is
fatal. ... In this way morality becomes the
poisoner of life.

353*

A criticism of the good man. Honesty, dignity,
dutifulness, justice, humanity, loyalty, uprightness,
clean conscience is it really supposed that, by
means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities
they stand for are approved and affirmed for their
own sake? Or is it this, that qualities and states
indifferent in themselves have merely been looked
at in a light which lends them some value ? Does
the worth of these qualities lie in themselves, or
in the use and advantages to which they lead (or
to which they seem to lead, to which they are
expected to lead) ?

I naturally do not wish to imply that there is
any opposition between the ego and the alter in
the judgment : the question is, whether it is the
results of these qualities, either in regard to him
who possesses them or in regard to environment!

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 287

society, " humanity," which lend them their value ;
or whether they have a value in themselves. . . .
In other words: is it utility which bids men
condemn, combat, and deny the opposite qualities
(duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack of self-
confidence, inhumanity) ? Is the essence of such
qualities condemned, or only their consequences ?
In other words : were it desirable that there should
exist no men at all possessed of such qualities?
In any case, this is believed. . . . But here lies
the error, the shortsightedness, the monocularity
of narrow egoism.

Expressed otherwise : would it be desirable to
create circumstances in which the whole advan-
tage would be on the side of the just so that all
those with opposite natures and instincts would
be discouraged and would slowly become extinct ?

At bottom, this is a question of taste and of
(esthetics: should we desire the most honourable
types of men that is to say, the greatest bores
alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous,
the upright, the good-natured, the straightforward,
and the " blockheads " ?

If one can imagine the total suppression of the
huge number constituting the "others/' even the
just man himself ceases from having a right to
exist, he is, in fact, no longer necessary, and in
this way it is seen that coarse utility alone could
have elevated such an insufferable virtue to a
place of honour.

Desirability may lie precisely on the other side.
It might be better to create conditions in which
the "just man" would be reduced to the humble

288 THE WILL TO POWER.

position of a "useful instrument" an "ideal
gregarious animal," or at best a herdsman: in
short, conditions in which he would no longer
stand in the highest sphere, which requires other
qualities.

354-

The "good man" as a tyrant. Mankind has
always repeated the same error: it has always
transformed a mere vital measure into the measure
and standard of life; instead of seeking the
standard in the highest ascent of life, in the
problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the
preservative measures of a very definite kind of
life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of
life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select
from among its forms. That is to say, man
ultimately forgets that measures are a means to
an end, and gets to like them for themselves:
they take the place of a goal in his mind, and
even become the standard of goals to him
that is to say, a given species of man regards his
means of existence as the only legitimate means,
as the means which ought to be imposed upon all,
as " truth," " goodness," " perfection " : the given
species, in fact, begins to tyrannise. ... It is a
form of faith, of instinct, when a certain species
of man does not perceive that his kind has been
conditioned, when he does not understand his
relation to other species. At any rate, any species
of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed
as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights,
and no longer desires to be master.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 289

355-

" All good people are weak : they are good
because they are not strong enough to be evil,"
said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.

" Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a
Russian proverb.

356.

Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate :
thus you would that men were ? that good men
were? But such men I can only conceive as
slaves, the slaves of the future.

357-

The metamorphoses of slavery ; its disguise in
the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through
morality.

358.

The ideal slave (the " good man "). He who
cannot regard himself as a " purpose," and who
cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, in-
stinctively honours the morality of unselfishness.
Everything urges him to this morality: his
prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And
even faith is a form of self-denial.

Atavism: delightful feeling, to be able to obey
unconditionally for once.

#

VOL. I. T

2QO THE WILL TO POWER.

Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance,
are just so many obstacles in the way of sovereign
sentiments, of great ingenuity, of an heroic purpose,
of noble existence for one's self.

It is not a question of going ahead (to that end
all that is required is to be at best a herdsman,
that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is
rather a matter of getting along alone, of being
able to be another.

359-

We must realise all that has been accumulated
as the result of the highest moral idealism : how
almost all other values have crystallised round it.
This shows that it has been desired for a very
long time and with the strongest passions and
that it has not yet been attained: otherwise it
would have disappointed everybody (that is to say,
it would have been followed by a more moderate
valuation).

The saint as the most powerful type of man :
this ideal it is which has elevated the value of
moral perfection so high. One would think that
the whole of science had been engaged in proving
that the moral man is the most powerful and most
godly. The conquest of the senses and the
passions everything inspired terror ; the un-
natural seemed to the spectators to be super*
natural and transcendental. . , ,

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.

360.

Francis of Assist : amorous and popular, a poet
who combats the order of rank among souls, in
favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual
hierarchy "all alike before God."

Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish
man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus
Aurelius 1

361.

I have declared war against the anaemic
Christian ideal (together with what is closely
related to it), not because I want to annihilate it,
but only to put an end to its tyranny and clear
the way for other ideals^ for more robust ideals.
. . . The continuance of the Christian ideal belongs
to the most desirable of desiderata: if only for
the sake of the ideals which wish to take their
stand beside it and perhaps above it they must
have opponents, and strong ones too, in order to
grow strong themselves. That is why we im-
moralists require the power of morality : our
instinct of self-preservation insists upon our
opponents maintaining their strength all it
requires is to become master of them.

C. Concerning the Slander of the so-called
Evil Qualities.

362.

Egoism and its problem ! The Christian
gloominess of La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism

2p2 THE WILL TO POWER.

in everything, and imagined that he had therefore
reduced the worth of things and virtues ! In
opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that
nothing else could exist save egoism, that in
those men whose ego is weak and thin, the power
to love also grows weak, that the greatest lovers
are such owing to the strength of their ego, that
love is an expression of egoism, etc. As a matter
of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of
those who find it useful, whom it helps in fact,
the herd ; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards
the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the
most glorious and most well-constituted men (out
of fear) ; it would assist the lowly to have the upper
hand of their conquerors ; it is the cause of uni-
versal dishonesty, especially in the most useful
type of men.

363.

Man is an indifferent egoist : even the cleverest
regards his habits as more important than his
advantage.

364.

Egoism ! But no one has yet asked : what is
the ego like? Everybody is rather inclined to
see all egos alike. This is the result of the slave
theory, of universal suffrage, and of " equality."

365.

The behaviour of a higher man is the result of
a very complex set of motives : any word such as
" pity " betrays nothing of this complexity. The

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 293

most important factor is the feeling, " who am I ?
who is the other relative to me ? " Thus the
valuing spirit is continually active.

366.

To think that the history of all moral pheno-
mena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,
that is to say, that pity is to be found at the
root of every moral impulse that has ever existed
hitherto, is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense
and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who
is devoid of all historical instincts and who has
miraculously succeeded in evading the strong
schooling in history which the Germans, from
Herder to Hegel, have undergone.

367-

My "pity? This is a feeling for which I can
find no adequate term : I feel it when I am in
the presence of any waste of precious capabilities,
as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther : what
power and what tasteless problems fit for back-
woodsmen ! (At a time when the brave and light-
hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already
possible in France !) Or when I see some one
standing below where he might have stood, thanks
to the development of a set of perfectly senseless
accidents. Or even when, with the thought of
man's destiny in my mind, I contemplate with
horror and contempt the whole system of modern
European politics, which is creating the circum-

294 THE WI ^L TO POWER.

stances and weaving the fabric of the whole future
of mankind. Yes, to what could not " mankind "

attain, if 1 This is my " pity " ; despite the

fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I
sympathise in this way.

368.

Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite
which is injurious to the health, " it cannot possibly
be our duty to increase the evil in the world." If
one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self
and not one's neighbour that one is succouring.
Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon
emotions. The suffering we see infects us ; pity
is an infection.

369.

There is no such thing as egoism which keeps
within its bounds and does not exceed them
consequently, the " allowable," the " morally in-
different" egoism of which some people speak,
does not exist at all.

" One is continually promoting the interests of
one's * ego ' at the cost of other people " ; " Living
consists in living at the cost of others " he who
has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first
step towards truth to himself.

370.

The " subject " is a piece of fiction : the ego of
which every one speaks when he blames egoism,
does not exist at all.

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 295

371.

Our " ego " which is not one with the unitary
controlling force of our beings ! is really only an
imagined synthesis ; therefore there can be no
" egoistic " actions.

372.

Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot
represent a standpoint as far as they are concerned.
Every instinct, when it is active, sacrifices strength
and other instincts into the bargain : in the end
it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of
everything owing to the waste it would bring
about. Thus : that which is " unegoistic," self-
sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular
it is common to all the instincts ; they do not
consider the welfare of the whole ego (because they
simply do not think /), they act counter to our
interests, against the ego : and often for the ego
innocent in both cases !

373*

The origin of moral values. Selfishness has as
much value as the physiological value of him who
possesses it. Each individual represents the whole
course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach,
something that begins at his birth. If he re-
present the ascent of the line of mankind, his
value is, in fact, very great ; and the concern about
his maintenance and the promoting of his growth
may even be extreme. (It is the concern about

296 THE WILL TO POWER.

the promise of the future in him which gives the
well-constituted individual such an extraordinary
right to egoism.) If he represent descending
development, decay, chronic sickening, he has
little worth : and the greatest fairness would have
him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as
possible from the well-constituted. In this case
society's duty is to suppress egoism (for the latter
may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid,
and seditious manner) : whether it be a question
of the decline and pining away of single individuals
or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and
a religion of" love," the curbing of the self-affirming
spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, re-
signation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and
deed may be of the highest value within the
confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their
rulers : for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of
resentment, and of envy, feelings which are only
too natural in the bungled and the botched, and
it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of
obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty,
of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why
the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all
ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,
the gospel of the lowly and of " God on the Cross."
The preponderance of an altruistic way of
valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact
that one is botched and bungled. Upon ex-
amination, this point of view turns out to be : " I
am not worth much," simply a psychological valua-
tion ; more plainly still : it is the feeling of im-
potence, <f the lack of the great self-asserting

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 297

impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia).
This valuation gets translated, according to the
particular culture of these classes, into a moral or
religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or
moral precepts is always a sign of low culture) :
it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far
as it is concerned, the notion " value " hails. The
interpretation by means of which the Christian
sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt
at justifying his lack of power and of self-con-
fidence : he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather
than feel bad for nothing : it is in itself a symptom
of decay when interpretations of this sort are used
at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched
do not look for the reason of their unfortunate
condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does),
but in society : when, however, the Socialist, the
Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their
existence is something for which some one must be
guilty, they are very closely related to the Christian,
who also believes that he can more easily endure
his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he
has found some one whom he can hold responsible
for it. The instinct of revenge and resentment
appears in both cases here as a means of enduring
life, as a self-preservative measure, as is also the
favour shown to altruistic theory and practice.
The hatred of egoism^ whether it be one's own (as
in the case of the Christian), or another's (as in
the case of the Socialists), thus appears as a valua-
tion reached under the predominance of revenge ;
and also as an act of prudence on the part of the
preservative instinct of the suffering, ^ the form

298 THE WILL TO POWER.

of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and
unity. ... At bottom, as I have already suggested,
the discharge of resentment which takes place in
the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism
(one's own or that of others) is yet another self-
preservative instinct on the part of the bungled
and the botched. In short : the cult of altruism is
merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly
appears under certain definite physiological cir-
cumstances.

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation,
cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it
only shows that he is oppressed by his inade-
quate culture, and is unable to understand why
he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying; if
he were more at ease he would take jolly good
care not to cry in that way: in that case he
would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same
holds good of the Christian : he curses, condemns,
and slanders the " world " and does not even
except himself. But that is no reason for taking
him seriously. In both cases we are in the
presence of invalids who feel better for crying,
and who find relief in slander.

374-

Every society has a tendency to reduce its
opponents to caricatures^ at least in its own
imagination, as also to starve them. As an
example of this sort of caricature we have our
"criminal? In the midst of the Roman and
aristocratiCgprder of values, the Jew was reduced

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 299

to a caricature. Among artists, " Mrs. Grundy
and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while
among pious people it is the heretics, and among
aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it
is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in my books
becomes a caricature.

375-

All the instincts and forces which morality
praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as
those which it slanders and rejects : for instance,
justice as will to power, will to truth as a means
in the service of the will to power.

376.

The turning 1 of man's nature inwards. The
process of turning a nature inwards arises when,
owing to the establishment of peace and society,
powerful instincts are prevented from venting
themselves outwardly, and strive to survive
harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagi-
nation. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge,
and violence is reverted, "it steps backwards";
in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the
lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the
powers of dissimulation and falsehood find their
scope; the instincts are thus transformed into
demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.

377-

Falsity. Every sovereign instinct makes the
others its instruments, its retainers and its syco-

300 THE WILL TO POWER.

phants : it never allows itself to be called by its
more hateful name : and it brooks no terms of
praise in which it cannot indirectly find its share.
Around every sovereign instinct all praise and
blame in general crystallises into a rigorous
form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is one of
the causes of falsity.

Every instinct which aspires to dominion, but
which finds itself under a yoke, requisitions all
the most beautiful names and the most generally
accepted values to strengthen it and to support its
self-esteem, and this explains why as a rule it
dares to come forward under the name of the
" master " it is combating and from whom it
would be free (for instance, under the domination
of Christian values, the desires of the flesh and of
power act in this way). This is the other cause
of falsity.

In both cases complete ingenuousness reigns:
the falseness never even occurs to the mind of
those concerned. It is the sign of a broken
instinct when man sees the motive force and its
" expression " (" the mask ") as separate things
it is a sign of inner contradiction and is much less
formidable. Absolute innocence in bearing, word,
and passion, a " good conscience " in falseness,
and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and
most pompous words and attitudes are appro-
priated all these things are necessary for
victory.

In the other case: that is to say, when extreme
clearsightedness is present, the genius of the actor
is needful as well as tremendous discipline in self-

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 301

control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why
priests are the cleverest and most conscious hypo-
crites ; and then come princes, in whom their
position in life and their antecedents account
for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and
diplomatists come third, and women fourth.

The fundamental thought; Falsity seems so
deep, so many-sided, and the will is directed so
inexorably against perfect self-knowledge and
accurate self-classification, that one is very pro-
bably right in supposing that Truth and the will to
truth are perhaps something quite different and
only disguises. (The need of faith is the greatest
obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)

378.

"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood": people
insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledg-
ment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be
lied to) has always been greatest with liars : they
actually recognised the ^//reality of this popular
" truthfulness." There is too much or too little
being said continually : to insist upon people's
exposing themselves with every word they say, is
a piece of nai'vetd

People say what they think, they are " truth-
ful " ; but only under certain circumstances : that is
to say, provided they be understood (inter par es\
and understood with good will into the bargain
(once more inter pares). One conceals one's self in
the presence of the unfamiliar : and he who would
attain to something, says what he would fain have

302 THE WILL TO POWER.

people think about him, but not what he thinks.
(" The powerful man is always a liar.")

379-

The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism con*
cealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values :

(a) Love regarded as self-effacement; as also
pity.

(b) Only the most impersonal intellect (" the
philosopher") can know the truth, "the true
essence and nature of things."

(c) Genius, great men are great, because they
do not strive to further their own interests : the
value of man increases in proportion as he effaces
himself.

(d) Art as the work of the "pure free-willed
subject " ; misunderstanding of " objectivity."

\e) Happiness as the object of life : virtue as a
means to an end.

The pessimistic condemnation of life by Scho-
penhauer is a moral one. Transference of the
gregarious standards into the realm of meta-
physics.

The " individual " lacks sense, he must there-
fore have his origin in "the thing in itself" (and
the significance of his existence must be shown
to be " error ") ; parents are only an " accidental
cause." The mistake on the part of science in
considering the individual as the result of all
past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is
pow becoming known,

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 303

380.

1. Systematic falsification of history \ so that
it may present a proof of the moral valua-
tions :

(a) The decline of a people and corruption.
(V) The rise of a people and virtue.
(c) The zenith of a people ("its culture")
regarded as the result of high moral excellence.

2. Systematic falsification of great men, great
creators, and great periods. The desire is to make
faith that which distinguishes great men : whereas
carelessness in this respect, scepticism, " immoral-
ity," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to
greatness (Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon ;
but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).
The principal fact their " free will " is always
suppressed.

381.

A great lie in history ; as if the corruption of
the Church were the cause of the Reformation !
This was only the pretext and self-deception of
the agitators very strong needs were making
themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely re-
quired a spiritual dressing.

382.

Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to
be the emancipation from the will : he did not
wish to recognise the freedom from moral pre-
judices which is coincident with the emancipation

304 THE WILL TO POWER.

of a great mind ; he refused to see what is the
typical immorality of genius ; he artfully contrived
to set up the only moral value he honoured
self-effacement, as the one condition of highest
intellectual activity : " objective " contemplation.
" Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after
the withdrawal of the will. . . .

Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a
fundamentally different valuation. Such absurd
distinctions as " genius " and the world of will, of
morality and immorality, / know nothing about at
all. The moral is a lower kind of animal than
the immoral, he is also weaker ; indeed he is a
type in regard to morality, but he is not a type
of his own. He is a copy ; at the best, a good
copy the standard of his worth lies without him.
I value a man according to the quantum of power
and fullness of his will\ not according to the
enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I con-
sider that a philosophy which teaches the denial
of will is both defamatory and slanderous. ... I
test the power of a will according to the amount
of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain
and torture it can endure and know how to turn
to its own advantage ; I do not point to the evil
and pain of existence with the finger of reproach,
but rather entertain the hope that life may one
day be more evil and more full of suffering than
it has ever been.

The zenith of intellectuality, according to
Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge
that all is to no purpose in short, to recognise
what the good man already does instinctively. . . ,

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 305

He denies that there can be higher states of
intellectuality he regards his view as a non plus
ultra. . . . Here intellectuality is placed much
lower than goodness ; its highest value (as art, for
instance) would be to lead up to, and to advise
the adoption of, morality, the absolute predomin-
ance of moral values.

Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise
Kant : there was nothing Greek in Kant ; he was
quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in regard to
the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see
Goethe's words concerning the radically evil
element in human nature *). Saintliness also
lurked somewhere in his soul. ... I require a
criticism of the saintly type.

Hegel's value : " Passion."

Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy : total
absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.

* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. This is doubtless a reference to a
passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June
1 793, from tne camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which
the following words occur : " Dagegen hat aber auch Kant
seinen philosophischen Ma?itel^ nachdem er ein langes
Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancheriei sudel-
haften Vorurteilen zu reinigen^freventlich mit detn Schand-
fleck des radikalen Bosen beschlabbert^ damit dock auch
Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu kiissen?
(" Kant, on the other hand, after he had tried throughout
his life to keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul pre-
judices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the disreputable
stain of the * radical evil' in human nature, in order that
Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem.") From
this passage it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated
Nietzsche's view of Kant ; namely, that he was a Christian
in disguise.

VOL. i. U

306 THE WILL TO POWER.

Fundamental instinct of all philosophers,
historians, and psychologists : everything of value
in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and
technology must be shown to be morally valuable
and morally conditioned^ in its aim, means, and
result. Everything is seen in the light of this
highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question
concerning civilisation, " Will it make man grow
better?" a funny question, for the reverse is
obvious, and is a fact which speaks in favour of
civilisation. ?

4 , , >

-' 383-

Religious morality. Passion, great desire ; the
passions of power, love, revenge, and property :
the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all
these things, and "purify" the soul by driving
them out of it.

The argument is : the passions often lead to
disaster therefore, they are evil and ought to be
condemned. Man must wring himself free from
them, otherwise he cannot be a good man. . . .

This is of the same nature as : "If thy right eye
offend thee, pluck it out." In this particular case
when, with that " bucolic simplicity," the Founder
of Christianity recommended a certain practice to
His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement,
the result would not be only the loss of a parti-
cular member, but the actual castration of the
whole of the man's character. . . . And the same
applies to the moral mania, which, instead of
insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 307

their extirpation. Its conclusion always is : only
the emasculated man is a good man.

Instead of making use of and of economising
the great sources of passion, those torrents of the
soul which are often so dangerous, overwhelming,
and impetuous, morality this most shortsighted
and most corrupted of mental attitudes would
fain make them dry up.

384.

Conquest over the passions ? No, not if this is
to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation.
They must be enlisted in our service : and to this
end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good
deal (not as individuals, but as communities, races,
etc.). At length we should trust them enough to
restore their freedom to them : they love us like
good servants, and willingly go wherever our best
interests lie.

3BS.

Intolerance on the part of morality is a sign of
man's weakness : he is frightened of his own
" immorality," he must deny his strongest instincts^
because he does not yet know how to use them.
Thus the most fruitful quarters of the globe
remain uncultivated longest: the power is lack-
ing that might become master here. . , .

386.

There are some very simple peoples and men
who believe that continuous fine weather would be

308 THE WILL TO POWER.

a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in
rebus moralibus, that the " good man " alone and
nothing else than the " good man " is to be desired,
and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will
be that only the good man will remain on earth
(and that it is only to that end that all efforts
should be directed). This is in the highest
degree an uneconomical thought; as we have
already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity,
and it is nothing more than the expression of the
agreeableness which the " good man " creates (he
gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation,
he gives what one is able to take).

With a more educated eye one learns to desire
exactly the reverse that is to say, an ever
greater dominion of evil, man's gradual emancipa-
tion from the narrow and aggravating bonds of
morality, the growth of power around the greatest
forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the
passions in one's service.

387.

The whole idea of the hierarchy of the passions :
as if the only right and normal thing were to be
led by reason whereas the passions are abnormal,
dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as
their end is concerned, nothing more than desires
for pleasure. . . .

Passion is deprived of its dignity (i) as if it
only manifested itself in an unseemly way and
were not necessary and always the motive force,

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 309

(2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high
purpose merely at pleasure. . . .

The misinterpretation of passion and reason^ as
if the latter were an independent entity, and not
a state of relationship between all the various
passions and desires ; and as though every passion
did not possess its quantum of reason. . . .

388.

How it was that, under the pressure of the
dominion of an ascetic and self-effacing morality^
it was precisely the passions love, goodness, pity,
even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were
necessarily misunderstood :

It is the richness of a personality \ the fullness of
it, its power to flow over and to bestow, its
instinctive feeling of ease, and its affirmative
attitude towards itself, that creates great love
and great sacrifices : these passions proceed from
strong and godlike personalism as surely as do
the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner
certainty that one has a right to everything. The
opposite views, according to the most accepted
notions, are indeed common views; and if one
does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs,
one has nothing to give, and it is perfectly useless
to stretch out one's hand either to protect or to
support others. . . .

How was it possible to transform these instincts
to such an extent that man could feel that to be
of value which is directed against himself, so that
he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the

310 THE WILL TO POWER.

psychological baseness and falseness which hither-
to has laid down the law in the Church and in
Church-infected philosophy !

If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do
is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought
not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he
does himself; the love of man requires a justifi-
cation, and it is found in the fact that God
commanded it. From this it follows that all the
natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to
him to be, in themselves, prohibited ; and that he
re-acquires a right to them only after having
denied them as an obedient worshipper of God.
. . . Pascal, the admirable logician of Christianity,
went as far as this \ let any one examine his
relations to his sister. " Not to make one's self
loved," seemed Christian to him,

389.

Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such
as this (" an ideal ") makes us pay. (Its enemies
are well ? The " egoists.")

The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in
Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld) inner en-
feeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption
of the non-gregarious man.

The perpetual process of laying stress upon
mediocre qualities as being the most valuable
(modesty in rank and file, the creature who is an
instrument).

Pangs of conscience associated with all that

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 311

is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the
unhappiness the gloominess of the world from
the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted
men !

Gregarious consciousness and timorousness
transferred to philosophy and religion.

Let us leave the psychological impossibility of
a purely unselfish action out of consideration !

390.

My ultimate conclusion is, that the real man
represents a much higher value than the " de-
sirable" man of any ideal that has ever existed
hitherto ; that all " desiderata " in regard to man-
kind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations
by means of which a particular kind of man has
sought to establish his measures of preservation
and of growth as a law for all ; that every
" desideratum " of this kind which has been made
to dominate has reduced man's worth, his strength,
and his trust in the future; that the indigence
and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most
apparent, even to-day, when he reveals a desire \
that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been
developed too inadequately to do justice to the
actual, not merely to the "desirable," worth of
man \ that, up to the present, ideals have really
been the power which has most slandered man
and the world, the poisonous fumes which have
hung over reality, and which have seduced men to
yearn for nonentity. . . .

312 THE WILL TO POWER.

D. A Criticism of the Words : Improving,
Perfecting^ Elevating.

391-

The standard according to which the value of
moral valuations is to be determined.

The fundamental fact that has been overlooked \
The contradiction between " becoming more
moral " and the elevation and the strengthening
of the type man.

Homo natura : The " will to power."

392.

Moral values regarded as values of appearance
and compared with physiological values.

393-

Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde:
the ultimate "desiderata" concerning men, for
instance, have never been regarded as problems
by philosophers. They always postulate the
" improvement " of man, quite guilelessly, as
though by means of some intuition they had been
helped over the note of interrogation following
the question, why necessarily " improve " ? To
what extent is it desirable that man should be
more virtuous^ or more intelligent^ or happier 1
Granting that nobody yet knows the " wherefore ? "
of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense
whatever; and if one aspires to one of them

A CRITICISM QF MORALITY. 313

who knows? perhaps one is frustrating the
other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with
an increase of intelligence and insight ? Dubito :
only too often shall I have occasion to show that
the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the
strict sense of the word, not always been opposed
to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not
require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation
as a necessary means ? And if the aim were to
arrive at the highest insight, would it not therefore
be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase
in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure,
mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlighten-
ment ? . . . And suppose one will have happiness ;
maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor
in spirit/'

394.

The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called
moral improvement.

We do not believe that one man can be another
if he is not that other already that is to say, if
he is not, as often happens, an accretion of person-
alities or at least of parts of persons. In this
case it is possible to draw another set of actions
from him into the foreground, and to drive back
" the older man." . . . The man's aspect is altered,
but not his actual nature. ... It is but the
merest factum brutum that any one should cease
from performing certain actions, and the fact
allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither
does it always follow therefrom that the habit of
performing a certain action is entirely arrested,

314 THE WILL TO POWER.

nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated.
He whose destiny and abilities make him a
criminal never unlearns anything, but is con-
tinually adding to his store of knowledge: and
long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his
talent. . . . Certainly, as far as society is con-
cerned, the only interesting fact is that some one
has ceased from performing certain actions ; and
to this end society will often raise a man out of
those circumstances which make him able to per-
form those actions : this is obviously a wiser course
than that of trying to break his destiny and his
particular nature. The Church, which has done
nothing except to take the place of, and to
appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,
starting out from another standpoint and wishing
to secure a " soul " or the " salvation " of a soul,
believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as
also in the obliterating power of forgiveness : both
of which supposed processes are deceptions due to
religious prejudice punishment expiates nothing,
forgiveness obliterates nothing ; what is done can-
not be undone. Because some one forgets some-
thing it by no means proves that something has
been wiped out. . . . An action leads to certain
consequences, both in a man and outside him, and
it matters not whether it has met with punishment,
or whether it has been "expiated," " forgiven,"
or " obliterated," it matters not even if the Church
meanwhile canonises the man who performed
it. The Church believes in things that do not
exist, it believes in " Souls " ; it believes in
"influences" that do not exist in divine in-

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 315

fluences; it believes in states that do not exist,
in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation : in all
things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with
signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an
arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method
of counterfeit psychology which is thought out
quite systematically.

395-

" Illness makes men better," this famous
assumption which is to be met with in all ages,
and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as
in the mouth and jaws of the people, really
makes one ponder. In view of discovering
whether there is any truth in it, one might be
allowed to ask whether there is not perhaps a
fundamental relationship between morality and
illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the
" improvement of mankind " that is to say, the
unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming
which the European has undergone within the
last two centuries be regarded as the result of a
long course of secret and ghastly suffering, failure,
abstinence, and grief? Has illness made " Euro-
peans " " better " ? Or, put into other words, is
not our modern soft-hearted European morality,
which could be likened to that of the Chinese,
perhaps an expression of physiological deteriora-
tion ? ... It cannot be denied, for instance, that
wherever history shows us " man " in a state of
particular glory and power, his type is always
dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares

316 THE WILL TO POWER.

little for humanity ; and perhaps, in those cases
in which it seems otherwise, all that was required
was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently
below the surface in psychological matters, in
order even in them to discover the general pro-
position : " the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful,
and enterprising a man may feel, the more
immoral he will be as well." A terrible thought, to
which one should on no account give way. Pro-
vided, however, that one take a few steps forward
with this thought, how wondrous does the future
then appear! What will then be paid for more
dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing
which we are all trying to promote, by all means
in our power the humanising, the improving,
and the increased " civilisation " of man ? Noth-
ing would then be more expensive than virtue :
for by means of it the world would ultimately be
turned into a hospital : and the last conclusion of
wisdom would be, " everybody must be everybody
else's nurse." Then we should certainly have
attained to the " Peace on earth," so long desired !
But how little "joy we should find in each
other's company"! How little beauty, wanton
spirits, daring, and danger ! So few " actions "
which would make life on earth worth living!
Ah ! and no longer any " deeds " ! But have not
all the great things and deeds which have re-
mained fresh in the memory of men, and which
have not been destroyed by time, been immoral
in the deepest sense of the word ? . , ,

r MUKA1A1X. 3 I/

396.

The priests and with them the half-priests or
philosophers of all ages have always called that
doctrine true, the educating influence of which
was a benevolent one or at least seemed so
that is to say, tended to " improve." In this way
they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and
miracle-worker who, because he had tried a
certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no
poison. " By their fruits ye shall know them "
that is to say, " by our truths." This has been
the reasoning of priests until this day. They
have squandered their sagacity, with results that
have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the
" proof of power " (or the proof " by the fruits ")
pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all
other forms of proof. " That which makes good
must be good ; that which is good cannot lie "
these are their inexorable conclusions " that
which bears good fruit must consequently be
true; there is no other criterion of truth." . . .

But to the extent to which " improving " acts as
an argument, deteriorating must also act as a refuta-
tion. The error can be shown to be an error, by
examining the lives of those who represent it : a
false step, a vice can refute. . . . This indecent
form of opposition, which comes from below and
behind the doglike kind of attack, has not died
out either. Priests, as psychologists, never dis-
covered anything more interesting than spying out
the secret vices of their adversaries they prove
their Christianity by looking about for the world's

318 THE WILL TO POWER.

filth. They apply this principle more particu-
larly to the greatest on earth, to the geniuses:
readers will remember how Goethe has been
attacked on every conceivable occasion in Ger-
many (Klopstock and Herder were among the
first to give a " good example " in this respect
birds of a feather flock together).

397-

One must be very immoral in order to make
people moral by deeds. The moralist's means are
the most terrible that have ever been used ; he
who has not the courage to be an immoralist in
deeds may be fit for anything else, but not for
the duties of a moralist.

Morality is a menagerie ; it assumes that iron
bars may be more useful than freedom, even for
the creatures it imprisons ; it also assumes that
there are animal-tamers about who do not shrink
from terrible means, and who are acquainted with
the use of red-hot iron. This terrible species,
which enters into a struggle with the wild animal,
is called " priests."

*

Man, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has
become a caricature of man ; he is sick, emaciated,
ill-disposed towards himself, filled with a loathing
of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of
all that is beautiful and happy in life in fact,
he is a wandering monument of misery. How
shall we ever succeed in vindicating this pheno-

A CRITICISM Otf* MORALITY. 319

menon this artificial, arbitrary, and recent mis-
carriage the sinner which the priests have bred
on their territory?

In order to think fairly of morality, we must
put two biological notions in its place : the taming
of the wild beasts, and the rearing of a particular
species.

The priests of all ages have always pretended
that they wished to " improve." . . . But we, of
another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer
ever wished to speak to us of his " improved "
animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only
achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man,
is not a better man; he is rather a weaker
member of his species. But he is less harm-
ful. . . .

398.

What I want to make clear, with all the means
in my power, is :

(a) That there is no worse confusion than that
which confounds rearing and taming \ and these
two things have always been confused. . . ,
Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of hus-
banding the enormous powers of humanity in
such a way that whole generations may build
upon the foundations laid by their progenitors
not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically,
developing from the already existing stem and
growing stronger. . . .

(I)) That there is an exceptional danger in
believing that mankind as a whole is developing

320 THE WILL TO POWER.

and growing stronger, if individuals are seen to
grow more feeble and more equally mediocre.
Humanity mankind is an abstract thing: the
object of rearing, even in regard to the most
individual cases, can only be the strong man
(the man who has no breeding is weak, dissipated,
and unstable).

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE
CRITICISM OF MORALITY.

399-

These are the things I demand of you how-
ever badly they may sound in your ears: that
you subject moral valuations themselves to
criticism. That you should put a stop to your
instinctive moral impulse which in this case
demands submission and not criticism with the
question : " why precisely submission ? " That
this yearning for a " why ? " for a criticism of
morality should not only be your present form of
morality, but the sublimest of all moralities, and
an honour to yourselves and to the age you live
in. That your honesty, your will, may give an
account of itself, and not deceive you : " why
not ? " Before what tribunal ?
400.

The three postulates \

All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the

" vulgar man ").
All that is contrary to Nature is high (the

protest of the physiologically botched).

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 321

All that is of average worth is high (the pro-
test of the herd, of the " mediocre ").

Thus in the history of morality a will to power
finds expression, by means of which, either the
slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and the botched,
those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre,
attempt to make those valuations prevail which
favour their existence.

From a biological standpoint, therefore, the
phenomenon Morality is of a highly suspicious
nature. Up to the present, morality has developed
at the cost of: the ruling classes and their specific
instincts, the well - constituted and beautiful
natures, the independent and privileged classes in
all respects.

Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement
opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a higher
type. Its effects are : mistrust of life in general
(in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral),
hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the
highest values are felt to be opposed to the
higher instincts), Degeneration and self-destruc-
tion of " higher natures," because it is precisely in
them that the conflict becomes conscious.

401.

Which values have been paramount hitherto f
Morality as the leading value in all phases of
philosophy (even with the Sceptics). Result : this
world is no good, a "true world" must exist
somewhere.

What is it that here determines the highest
VOL. i. X

322 THE WILL TO POWER.

value ? What, in sooth, is morality ? The instinct
of decadence; it is the exhausted and the dis-
inherited who take their revenge in this way and
play the masters. . . .

Historical proof: philosophers have always been
decadents and always in the pay of Nihilistic
religions.

The instinct of decadence appears as the will
to power. The introduction of its system of
means : its means arc absolutely immoral.

General aspect: the values that have been
highest hitherto have been a special instance of
the will to power ; morality itself is a particular
instance of immorality.

Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.

1. How was this actually possible ? Question :
why did life and physiological well-constitutedness
succumb everywhere ? Why was there no affirma-
tive philosophy, no affirmative religion ?

The historical signs of such movements : the
pagan religion. Dionysos versus the Christ.
The Renaissance. Art.

2. The strong and the weak : the healthy and
the sick ; the exception and the rule. There is
no doubt as to who is the stronger. . . .

General view of history ; Is man an exception in
the history of life on this account ? An objection
to Darwinism. The means wherewith the weak suc-
ceed in ruling have become : instincts, " humanity,"
"institutions." . . .

3. The proof of this rule on the part of the

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 323

weak is to be found in our political instincts, in
our social values, in our arts, and in our science.

*

The instincts of decadence have become master
of the instincts of ascending life. . . . The will to
nonentity has prevailed over the will to life \

Is this true! is there not perhaps a stronger
guarantee of life and of the species in this victory
of the weak and the mediocre ? is it not perhaps
only a means in the collective movement of life, a
mere slackening of the pace, a protective measure
against something even more dangerous?

Suppose the strong were masters in all respects,
even in valuing : let us try and think what their
attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and
sacrifice ! Self -contempt on the part of tJie weak
would be the result : they would do their utmost
to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And
would this be desirable ? should we really like a
world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the
intellectuality, the plasticity in fact, the whole
influence of the weak was lacking ? * . . .

* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. We realise here the great differ-
ence between Nietzsche and those who draw premature con-
clusions from Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of
modern problems in Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not
advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of
the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to resist and
to overthrow was their supremacy^ their excessive power. He
felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was
in need of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld
in defiance of Christian values,

324 THE WILL TO POWER.

We have seen two " wills to power M at war (in
this special case we had a principle : that of agree-
ing with the one that has hitherto succumbed, and
of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto
triumphed) : we have recognised the " real world "
as a " world of lies? and morality as a form of
immorality. We do not say "the stronger is
wrong."

We have understood what it is that has deter-
mined the highest values hitherto, and why the
latter should have prevailed over the opposite
value : it was numerically the stronger.

If we now purify the opposite value of the in-
fection, the half-heartedness, and the degeneration^
with which we identify it, we restore Nature to
the throne, free from moralic acid.

402.

Morality, a useful error ; or, more clearly still,
a necessary and expedient lie according to the
greatest and most impartial of its supporters.

403-

ought to be able to acknowledge the truth
upTo \hat point where one is sufficiently elevated
no longer to require the disciplinary school of moral
error. When one judges life morally, it disgusts
one.

Neither should false personalities be invented ;
one should not say, for instance, " Nature is cruel."
It is precisely when one perceives that there is no

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 325

such central controlling and responsible force that

one is relieved!

Evolution of man. A. He tried to attain to
a certain power over Nature and over
himself. (Morality was necessary in
order to make man triumph in his
struggle with Nature and the "wild
animal.")

B. If power over Nature has been attained,
this power can be used as a help in
our development: Will to Power as a
self-enhancing and self-strengthening
principle.

404.

Morality may be regarded as the illusion of
a species, fostered with the view of urging the
individual to sacrifice himself to the future, and
seemingly granting him such a very great value,
that with that self-consciousness he may tyrannise
over, and constrain, other sides of his nature, and
find it difficult to be pleased with himself.

We ought to be most profoundly thankful for
what morality has done hitherto: but now it is
no more than a burden which may prove fatal.
Morality itself in the form of honesty urges us
to deny morality.

405.

To what extent is the self-destruction of morality
still a sign of its own strength ? We Europeans
have within us the blood of those who were ready
to die for their faith; we have taken morality

326 THE WILL TO POWER.

frightfully seriously, and there is nothing which
we have not, at one time, sacrificed to it. On the
other hand, our intellectual subtlety has been
reached essentially through the vivisection of our
consciences. We do not yet know the " whither "
towards which we are urging our steps, now that
we have departed from the soil of our forebears.
But it was on this very soil that we acquired the
strength which is now driving us from our homes
in search of adventure, and it is thanks to that
strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded
by untried possibilities and things undiscovered
we can no longer choose, we must be conquerors,
now that we have no land in which we feel at
home and in which we would fain " survive." A
concealed "yea " is driving us forward, and it is
stronger than all our " nays." Even our strength
no longer bears with us in the old swampy land :
we venture out into the open, we attempt the task.
The world is still rich and undiscovered, and even
to perish were better than to be half-men or
poisonous men. Our very strength itself urges
us to take to the sea ; there where all suns have
hitherto sunk we know of a new world. . . .

III.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.

i. GENERAL REMARKS.

406.

LET us rid ourselves of a few superstitions
which heretofore have been fashionable among
philosophers 1

407.

Philosophers are prejudiced against appearance,
change, pain, death, the things of the body, the
senses, fate, bondage, and all that which has no
purpose.

In the first place, they believe in : absolute
knowledge, (2) in knowledge for its own sake,

(3) in virtue and happiness as necessarily related,

(4) in the recognisability of men's acts. They are
led by instinctive determinations of values, in
which former cultures are reflected (more danger*
ous cultures too).

408.

What have philosophers lacked^ (i) A sense
of history, (2) a knowledge of physiology, (3) a

328 THE WILL TO POWER.

goal in the future. The ability to criticise without
irony or moral condemnation.

409.

Philosophers have had (i) from times im-
memorial a wonderful capacity for the contradictio
in adjecto, (2) they have always trusted concepts
as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the
senses : it never seems to have occurred to them
that notions and words are our inheritance of past
ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor
very exact

What seems to dawn upon philosophers last of
all : that they must no longer allow themselves to
be presented with concepts already conceived, nor
must they merely purify and polish up those con-
cepts ; but they must first make them, create them,
themselves, and then present them and get people
to accept them. Up to the present, people have
trusted their concepts generally, as if they had
been a wonderful dowry from some kind of
wonderland: but they constitute the inheritance
of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelli-
gent forefathers. This piety towards that which
already exists in us is perhaps related to the moral
element in science. What we needed above all is
absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts
(like that which a certain philosopher may already
have possessed and he was Plato, of course : for
he taught the reverse).

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 329

410.

Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of
the theory of knowledge, I liked to look now out
of this window, now out of that, though I took
good care not to become finally fixed anywhere,
indeed I should have thought it dangerous to
have done so though finally : is it within the
range of probabilities for an instrument to criticise
its own fitness? What I noticed more particu-
larly was, that no scientific scepticism or dog-
matism has ever arisen quite free from all arrieres
penstes that it has only a secondary value as
soon as the motive lying immediately behind it is
discovered.

Fundamental aspect : Kant's, Hegel's, Schopen-
hauer's, the sceptical and epochistical, the histori-
fying and the pessimistic attitudes all have a
moral origin. I have found no one who has
dared to criticise the moral valuations, and I soon
turned my back upon the meagre attempts that
have been made to describe the evolution of these
feelings (by English and German Darwinians).

How can Spinoza's position, his denial and
repudiation of the moral values, be explained ?
(It was the result of his Theodicy 1)

411.

Morality regarded as the highest form of
protection. Our world is either the work and
expression (the modus) of God, in which case it
must be in the highest degree perfect (Leibnitz's

330 THE WILL TO POWER.

conclusion . . .), and no one doubted that he
knew what perfection must be like, and then all
evil can only be apparent (Spinoza is more radical^
he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part
of God's high purpose (a consequence of a particu-
larly great mark of favour on God's part, who thus
allows man to choose between good and evil : the
privilege of being no automaton ; " freedom," with
the ever-present danger of making a mistake and
of choosing wrongly. . . . See Simplicius, for
instance, in the commentary to Epictetus).

Or our world is imperfect ; evil and guilt are
real, determined, and are absolutely inherent to
its being; -in that case it cannot be the real
world: consequently knowledge can only be a
way of denying the world, for the latter is error
which may be recognised as such. This is
Schopenhauer's opinion, based upon Kantian
first principles. Pascal was still more desperate :
he thought that even knowledge must be corrupt
and false that revelation is a necessity if only
in order to recognise that the world should be
denied. . . .

412.

Owing to our habit of believing in uncondi-
tional authorities, we have grown to feel a
profound need for them: indeed, this feeling is
so strong that, even in an age of criticism such
as Kant's was, it showed itself to be superior to
the need for criticism, and, in a certain sense, was
able to subject the whole work of critical acumen,
and to convert it to its own use. It proved its

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 331

superiority once more in the generation which
followed, and which, owing to its historical
instincts, naturally felt itself drawn to a relative
view of all authority, when it converted even the
Hegelian philosophy of evolution (history re-
christened and called philosophy) to its own use,
and represented history as being the self-revela-
tion and self-surpassing of moral ideas. Since
Plato, philosophy has lain under the dominion of
morality. Even in Plato's predecessors, moral
interpretations play a most important r61e (Anaxi-
mander 'declares that all things are made to perish
as a punishment for their departure from pure
being; Heraclitus thinks that the regularity of
phenomena is a proof of the morally correct
character of evolution in general).

413.

The progress of philosophy has been hindered
most seriously hitherto through the influence of
moral arrieres-pensfos.

414-

In all ages, " fine feelings " have been regarded
as arguments, " heaving breasts '* have been the
bellows of godliness, convictions have been the
"criteria" of truth, and the need of opposition
has been the note of interrogation affixed to
wisdom. This falseness and fraud permeates the
whole history of philosophy. But for a few
respected sceptics, no instinct for intellectual
uprightness is to be found anywhere. Finally,

332 THE WILL TO POWER.

Kant guilelessly sought to make this thinker's
corruption scientific by means of his concept,
"practical reason? He expressly invented a
reason which, in certain cases, would allow one
not to bother about reason that is to say, in cases
where the heart's desire, morality, or " duty " are
the motive power.

415-

Hegel; his popular side, the doctrine of war
and of great men. Right is on the side of the
victorious : he (the victorious man) stands for the
progress of mankind. His is an attempt at
proving the dominion of morality by means of
history.

Kant: a kingdom of moral values withdrawn
from us, invisible, real.

Hegel : a demonstrable process of evolution,
the actualisation of the kingdom of morality.

We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived
either in Kant's or Hegel's way : We no longer
believe, as they did, in morality, and therefore have
no philosophies to found with the view of justify-
ing morality. Criticism and history have no
charm for us in this respect : what is their charm,
then? *

416.

The importance of German philosophy (Hegel)^
the thinking out of a kind of pantheism which
would not reckon evil, error, and suffering as
arguments against godliness. This grand initia-
tive was misused by the powers that were (State,

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 333

etc.) to sanction the rights of the people that
happened to be paramount.

Schopenhauer appears as a stubborn opponent
of this idea ; he is a moral man who, in order to
keep in the right concerning his moral valuation,
finally becomes a denier of the world. Ultimately
he becomes a " mystic."

I myself have sought an cesthetic justification
of the ugliness in this world. I regarded the
desire for beauty and for the persistence of certain
forms as a temporary preservative and recupera-
tive measure: what seemed to me to be funda-
mentally associated with pain, however, was the
eternal lust of creating and the eternal compulsion
to destroy.

We call things ugly when we look at them with
the desire of attributing some sense, some new
sense, to what has become senseless: it is the
accumulated power of the creator which compels
him to regard what has existed hitherto as no
longer acceptable, botched, worthy of being sup-
pressed ugly !

417-

My first solution of the problem : Dionysian
wisdom. The joy in the destruction of the most
noble thing y and at the sight of its gradual undoing,
regarded as the joy over what is coming and what
lies in the future, which triumphs over actual
things^ however good they may be. Dionysian :
temporary identification with the principle of life
(voluptuousness of the martyr included).

My innovations. The Development of Pessim-

334 THE WILI - TO POWER.

ism: intellectual pessimism; moral criticism, the
dissolution of the last comfort. Knowledge, a
sign of decay i veils by means of an illusion all
strong action; culture isolates, is unfair and
therefore strong.

(1) My fight against decay and the increas-
ing weakness of personality. I sought a new
centrum.

(2) The impossibility of this endeavour is
recognised.

(3) I therefore travelled farther along the road
of dissolution and along it I found new sources
of strength for individuals. We must be destroyers \
I perceived that the-state^oj^^j^/^ is one m .

are qblejo arrive at aj&ind

o/ peiJ^tlon^nOt'pvssiftte hitjierto^it is an image and
i^ut^ed'l^amfle~'of life in general. To the para-
lysing feeling of general dissolution and imperfec-
tion, I opposed the Eternal Recurrence.

418.

People naturally seek the picture of life in that
philosophy which makes them most cheerful
that is to say, in that philosophy which gives the
highest sense of freedom to tJteir strongest instinct.
This is probably the case with me.

419-

German philosophy, as a whole, Leibnitz,
Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, to mention the
greatest, is the most out-and-out form of

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 335

romanticism and home-sickness that has ever yet
existed : it is a yearning for the best that has
ever been known on earth. One is at home no-
where ; that which is ultimately yearned after is a
place where one can somehow feel at home ; be-
cause there alone one would like to be at home, and
that place is the Greek world ! But it is precisely
in that direction that all bridges are broken down
save, of course, the rainbow of concepts ! And
the latter lead everywhere, to all the homes and
" fatherlands " that ever existed for Greek souls !
Certainly, one must be very light and thin in
order to cross these bridges ! But what happiness
lies even in this desire for spirituality, almost for
ghostliness! With it, how far one is from the
" press and bustle " and the mechanical boorish-
ness of the natural sciences, how far from the
vulgar din of " modern ideas " ! One wants to get
back to the Greeks via the Fathers of the Church,
from North to South, from formulae to forms ; the
passage out of antiquity Christianity is still a
source of joy as a means of access to antiquity,
as a portion of the old world itself, as a glistening
mosaic of ancient concepts and ancient valuations.
Arabesques, scroll-work, rococo of scholastic
abstractions always better, that is to say, finer
and more slender, than the peasant and plebeian
reality of Northern Europe, and still a protest
on the part of higher intellectuality against the
peasant war and insurrection of the mob which
have become master of the intellectual taste of
Northern Europe, and which had its leader in a
man as great and unintellectual as Luther: in

336 THE WILL TO POWER.

this respect German philosophy belongs to the
Counter-Reformation, it might even be looked
upon as related to the Renaissance, or at least to
the will to Renaissance, the will to get ahead with
the discovery of antiquity, with the excavation of
ancient philosophy, and above all of pre-Socratic
philosophy the most thoroughly dilapidated of
all Greek temples ! Possibly, in a few hundred
years, people will be of the opinion that all
German philosophy derived its dignity from this
fact, that step by step it attempted to reclaim the
soil of antiquity, and that therefore all demands
for " originality " must . appear both petty and
foolish when compared with Germany's higher
claim to having refastened the bonds which
seemed for ever rent the bonds which bound us to
the Greeks, the highest type of " men " ever evolved
hitherto. To-day we are once more approach-
ing all the fundamental principles of the cosmogony
which the Greek mind in Anaximander, Hera-
clitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and
Anaxagoras, was responsible for. Day by day
we are growing more Greek ; at first, as is only
natural, the change remains confined to concepts
and valuations, and we hover around like Grecis-
ing spirits : but it is to be hoped that some day
our body will also be involved 1 Here lies (and
has always lain) my hope for the German nation.

420.

I do not wish to convert anybody to philosophy :
it is both necessary and perhaps desirable that the

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 337

philosopher should be a rare plant. Nothing is
more repugnant to me than the scholarly praise
of philosophy which is to be found in Seneca and
Cicero. Philosophy has not much in common
with virtue. I trust I may be allowed to say that
even the scientific man is a fundamentally different
person from the philosopher. What I most desire
is, that the genuine notion " philosopher " should
not completely perish in Germany. There are so
many incomplete creatures in Germany already
who would fain conceal their ineptitude beneath
such noble names.

421.

I must set up the highest ideal of a philosopher.
Learning is not everything ! The scholar is the
sheep in the kingdom of learning ; he studies be-
cause he is told to do so, and because others have
done so before him.

422.

The superstition concerning philosophers 9 . They
are confounded with men of science. As if the
value of things were inherent in them and required
only to be held on to tightly ! To what extent
are their researches carried on under the influence
of values which already prevail (their hatred of
appearance of the body, etc.)? Schopenhauer
concerning morality (scorn of Utilitarianism).
Ultimately the confusion goes so far that
Darwinism is regarded as philosophy, and thus at
the present day power has gone over to the men
of science. Even Frenchmen like Taine prosecute
VOL. i. Y

338 THE WILL TO POWER.

research, or mean to prosecute research, without
being already in possession of a standard of
valuation. Prostration before " facts " of a kind
of cult. As a matter of fact, they destroy the
existing valuations.

The explanation of this misunderstanding. The
man who is able to command is a rare phenomenon ;
he misinterprets himself. What one wants to do,
above all, is to disclaim all authority and to
attribute it to circumstances. In Germany the
critic's estimations belong to the history of
awakening manhood. Lessing, etc. (Napoleon
concerning Goethe). As a matter of fact, the
movement is again made retrograde owing to
German romanticism : and the fame of German
philosophy relies upon it as if it dissipated the
danger of scepticism and could demonstrate faith.
Both tendencies culminate in Hegel : at bottom,
what he did was to generalise the fact of German
criticism and the fact of German romanticism, a
kind of dialectical fatalism, but to the honour of
intellectuality, with the actual submission of the
philosopher to reality. The critic prepares the way :
that is all I

With Schopenhauer the philosopher's mission
dawns; it is felt that the object is to determine
values ; still under the dominion of eudemonism.
The ideal of Pessimism,

Theory and practice. This is a pernicious dis-
tinction, as if there were an instinct of knowledge^

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 339

which, without inquiring into the utility or harm-
fulness of a thing, blindly charged at the truth ;
and then that, apart from this instinct, there were
the whole world of practical interests.

In contradiction of this, I try to show what
instincts are active behind all these pure theorists,
and how the latter, as a whole, under the
dominion of their instincts, fatally make for some-
thing which to their minds is " truth," to their
minds and only to their minds. The struggle
between systems, together with the struggle
between epistemological scruples, is one which
involves very special instincts (forms of vitality, of
decline, of classes, of races, etc.).

The so-called thirst for knowledge may be traced
to the lust of appropriation and of conquest: in
obedience to this lust the senses memory, and
the instincts, etc., were developed. The quickest
possible reduction of the phenomena, economy,
the accumulation of spoil from the world of know-
ledge (i.e. that portion of the world which has
been appropriated and made manageable). . . .

Morality is therefore such a curious science,
because it is in the highest degree practical \ the
purely scientific position, scientific uprightness, is
thus immediately abandoned, as soon as morality
calls for replies to its questions. Morality says :
I require certain answers reasons, arguments ;
scruples may come afterwards, or they may not
come at all.

" How must one act ? " If one considers that
one is dealing with a supremely evolved type a
type which has been " dealt with M for countless

340 THE WILL TO POWER.

thousands of years, and in which everything has
become instinct, expediency, automatism, fatality,
the urgency of this moral question seems rather
funny.

" How must one act ? " Morality has always
been a subject of misunderstanding : as a matter
of fact, a certain species, which was constituted to
act in a certain way, wished to justify itself by
making its norm paramount.

" How must one act ? " this is not a cause, but
an effect. Morality follows, the ideal comes
at the end. . . .

On the other hand, the appearance of moral
scruples (or in other words, the coming to conscious-
ness of the values which guide action) betray a
certain morbidness ; strong ages and people do
not ponder over their rights, nor over the principles
of action, over instinct or over reason. Conscious-
ness is a sign that the real morality that is to say,
the certainty of instinct which leads to a definite
course of action is going to the dogs. . . . Every
time a new world of consciousness is created, the
moralists are signs of a lesion, of impoverishment
and of disorganisation. Those who are deeply
instinctive fear bandying words over duties : among
them are found pyrrhonic opponents of dialectics
and of knowableness in general. ... A virtue is
refuted with a " for." . . .

Thesis: The appearance of moralists belongs
to periods when morality is declining.

Thesis: The moralist is a dissipator of moral
instincts, however much he may appear to be their
restorer.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 34!

Thesis : That which really prompts the action
of a moralist is not a moral instinct, but the
instincts of decadence, translated into the forms of
morality (he regards the growing uncertainty of
the instincts as corruption).

Thesis : The instincts of decadence which, thanks
to moralists, wish to become master of the in-
stinctive morality of stronger races and ages,
are:

(1) The instincts of the weak and of the botched ;

(2) The instincts of the exceptions, of the
anchorites, of the unhinged, of the abortions of
quality or of the reverse ;

(3) The instincts of the habitually suffering, who
require a noble interpretation of their condition,
and who therefore require to be as poor physi-
ologists as possible.

424.

The humbug of the scientific spirit. One should
not affect the spirit of science, when the time to
be scientific is not yet at hand; but even the
genuine investigator has to abandon vanity, and
has to affect a certain kind of method which is
not yet seasonable. Neither should we falsify
things and thoughts, which we have arrived at
differently, by means of a false arrangement of
deduction and dialectics. It is thus that Kant in
his "morality" falsifies his inner tendency to
psychology ; a more modern example of the same
thing is Herbert Spencer's Ethics. A man should
neither conceal nor misrepresent the facts con-
cerning the way in which he conceived his

342 THE WILL TO POWER.

thoughts. The deepest and most inexhaustible
books will certainly always have something of the
aphoristic and impetuous character of Pascal's
Penstes. The motive forces and valuations have
lain long below the surface; that which comes
uppermost is their effect.

I guard against all the humbug of a false
scientific spirit:

(1) In respect of the manner of demonstration,
if it does not correspond to the genesis of the
thoughts ;

(2) In respect of the demands for methods which,
at a given period in science, may be quite
impossible ;

(3) In respect of the demand for objectivity, for
cold impersonal treatment, where, as in the case
of all valuations, we describe ourselves and our
intimate experiences in a couple of words. There
are ludicrous forms of vanity, as, for instance,
Sainte-Beuve's. He actually worried himself all
his life because he had shown some warmth or
passion either "pro " or " con" and he would fain
have lied that fact out of his life.

425.

" Objectivity " in the philosopher : moral in-
difference in regard to one's self, blindness in regard
to either favourable or fatal circumstances. Un-
scrupulousness in the use of dangerous means ;
perversity and complexity of character considered
as an advantage and exploited.

My profound indifference to myself: I refuse

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 343

to derive any advantage from my knowledge, nor
do I wish to escape any disadvantages which it
may entail. I include among these disadvantages
that which is called the perversion of character ;
this prospect is beside the point : I use my char-
acter, but I try neither to understand it nor to
change it the personal calculation of virtue has
not entered my head once. It strikes me that one
closes the doors of knowledge as soon as one
becomes interested in one's own personal case or
even in the " Salvation of one's soul " ! . . . One
should not take one's morality too seriously, nor
should one forfeit a modest right to the opposite
of morality. . . .

A sort of heritage of morality is perhaps pre-
supposed here : one feels that one can be lavish
with it and fling a great deal of it out of the
window without materially reducing one's means.
One is never tempted to admire " beautiful souls,"
one always knows one's self to be their superior.
The monsters of virtue should be met with inner
scorn ; dtniaiser la vertu Oh, the joy of it !

One should revolve round one's self, have no
desire to be " better " or " anything else " at all than
one is. One should be too interested to omit
throwing the tentacles or meshes of every mor-
ality out to things.

426.

Concerning the psychology of philosophers.
They should be psychologists this was possible
only from the nineteenth century onwards and
no longer little Jack Homers, who see three or

344 THE WILL TO POWER.

four feet in front of them, and are almost satisfied
to burrow inside themselves. We psychologists of
the future are not very intent on self-contempla-
tion : we regard it almost as a sign of degeneration
when an instrument endeavours " to know itself" : *
we are instruments of knowledge and we would
fain possess all the precision and ingenuousness of
an instrument consequently we may not analyse
or " know " ourselves. The first sign of a great
psychologist's self-preservative instinct: he never
goes in search of himself, he has no eye, no interest,
no inquisitiveness where he himself is concerned.
. . . The great egoism of our dominating will
insists on our completely shutting our eyes to
ourselves, and on our appearing " impersonal, "
" disinterested " ! Oh to what a ridiculous degree
we are the reverse of this !

We are no Pascals, we are not particularly in-
terested in the " Salvation of the soul," in our own
happiness, and in our own virtue. We have neither
enough time nor enough curiosity to be so con-
cerned with ourselves. Regarded more deeply, the
case is again different, we thoroughly mistrust all
men who thus contemplate their own navels : be-
cause introspection seems to us a degenerate form
of the psychologist's genius, as a note of interroga-
tion affixed to the psychologist's instinct : just as
a painter's eye is degenerate which is actuated by
the will to see for the sake of seeing.

* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. Goethe invariably inveighed
against the c * yv5>6t a-eavrov n of the Socratic school ; he was
of the opinion that an animal which tries to see its inner self
must be sick.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 34$

2. A CRITICISM OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

427.

The apparition of Greek philosophers since the
time of Socrates is a symptom of decadence ; the
anti- Hellenic instincts become paramount.

The "Sophist" is still quite Hellenic as are
also Anaxagoras, Democritus, and the great
lonians ; but only as transitional forms. The
polis loses its faith in the unity of its culture, in
its rights of dominion over every other polis. . . .
Cultures, that is to say, " the gods," are exchanged,
and thus the belief in the exclusive prerogative
of the deus autochthonus is lost. Good and Evil of
whatever origin get mixed : the boundaries separ-
ating good from evil gradually vanish. . . . This
is the " Sophist." . . .

On the other hand, the " philosopher " is the
reactionary : he insists upon the old virtues. He
sees the reason of decay in the decay of institu-
tions : he therefore wishes to revive ^institutions ;
he sees decay in the decline of authority : he
therefore endeavours to find new authorities (he
travels abroad, explores foreign literature and
exotic religions. . . .) ; he will reinstate the ideal
polis, after the concept " polis " has become super-
annuated (just as the Jews kept themselves to-
gether as a "people" after they had fallen into
slavery). They become interested in all tyrants :
their desire is to re-establish virtue with force
majeure.

346 THE WILL TO POWER.

Gradually everything genuinely Hellenic is held
responsible for the state of decay (and Plato is just
as ungrateful to Pericles, Homer, tragedy, and
rhetoric as the prophets are to David and Saul).
The downfall of Greece is conceived as an objection
to the fundamental principles of Hellenic culture :
tlieprofounderror of philosophers. Conclusion : the
Greek world perishes. The cause thereof: Homer,
mythology, ancient morality, etc.

The #tf#-Hellenic development of philosophers'
valuations : the Egyptian influence (" Life after
death " made into law. . . .) ; the Semitic influence
(the " dignity of the sage," the " Sheik ") ; the
Pythagorean influence, the subterranean cults,
Silence, means of terrorisation consisting of appeals
to a " Beyond," mathematics : the religious valua-
tion consisting of a sort of intimacy with a cosmic
entity ; the sacerdotal, ascetic, and transcendental
influences; the dialectical influence, I am of
opinion that even Plato already betrays revolting
and pedantic meticulousness in his concepts!
Decline of good intellectual taste : the hateful
noisiness of every kind of direct dialectics seems
no longer to be felt.

The two decadent tendencies and extremes run
side by side : (a) the luxuriant and more charming
kind of decadence which shows a love of pomp and
art, and (V) the gloomy kind, with its religious and
moral pathos, its stoical self-hardening tendency,
its Platonic denial of the senses, and its preparation
of the soil for the coming of Christianity.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 347

428.

To what extent psychologists have been cor-
rupted by the moral idiosyncrasy! Not one of
the ancient philosophers had the courage to
advance the theory of the non-free will (that is
to say, the theory that denies morality); not
one had the courage to identify the typical
feature of happiness, of every kind of happiness
("pleasure"), with the will to power: for the
pleasure of power was considered immoral ; not
one had the courage to regard virtue as a result
of immorality (as a result of a will to power) in
the service of a species (or of a race, or of spoils) ;
for the will to power was considered immoral.

In the whole of moral evolution, there is no
sign of truth : all the conceptual elements which
come into play are fictions ; all the psychological
tenets are false ; all the forms of logic employed
in this department of prevarication are sophisms.
The chief feature of all moral philosophers is their
total lack of intellectual cleanliness and self-control :
they regard " fine feelings " as arguments : their
heaving breasts seem to them the bellows of
godliness. . . . Moral philosophy is the most
suspicious period in the history of the human
intellect.

The first great example: in the name of
morality and under its patronage, a great wrong
was committed, which as a matter of fact was
in every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient
stress cannot be laid upon this fact, that the
great Greek philosophers not only represented

348 THE WILL TO POWER.

the decadence of every kind of Greek ability \ but
also made it contagious. . . . This " virtue " made
wholly abstract was the highest form of seduction ;
to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back
on the world.

The moment is a very remarkable one : the
Sophists are within sight of the first criticism of
morality \ the first knowledge of morality: they
classify the majority of moral valuations (in view
of their dependence upon local conditions) together;
they lead one to understand that every form of
morality is capable of being upheld dialectically :
that is to say, they guessed that all the funda-
mental principles of a morality must be sophistical
a proposition which was afterwards proved in
the grandest possible style by the ancient philoso-
phers from Plato onwards (up to Kant); they
postulate the primary truth that there is no such
thing as a " moral per se" a " good per se y " and
that it is madness to talk of "truth" in this
respect.

Wherever was intellectual uprightness to be found
in those days ?

The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown
out of all the Greek instincts ; it belongs to the
culture of the age of Pericles as necessarily as
Plato does not : it has its predecessors in Hera-
clitus, Democritus, and in the scientific types of
the old philosophy; it finds expression in the
elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance. And
it has ultimately shown itself to be right : every
step in the science of epistemology and morality
has confirmed the attitude of the Sophists. . . . Our

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 349

modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent,
Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean . . .
to say that it is Protagorean is even sufficient:
because Protagoras was in himself a synthesis of
the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.

(Plato : a great Cagliostro> let us think of how
Epicurus judged him ; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend,

judged him Is Plato's integrity by any chance

beyond question? . . . But we at least know
what he wished to have taught as absolute truth
namely, things which were to him not even
relative truths : the separate and immortal life of
" souls.")

429.

The Sophists are nothing more nor less than
realists : they elevate all the values and practices
which are common property to the rank of values
they have the courage, peculiar to all strong
intellects, which consists in knoiving their im-
morality. . . .

Is it to be supposed that these small Greek
independent republics, so filled with rage and envy
that they would fain have devoured each other,
were led by principles of humanity and honesty ?
Is Thucydides by any chance reproached with
the words he puts into the mouths of the Athenian
ambassadors when they were treating with the
Melii anent the question of destruction or sub-
mission ? Only the most perfect Tartuffes could
have been able to speak of virtue in the midst of
that dreadful strain or if not Tartuffes, at least
detached philosopJters ', anchorites, exiles, and fleers

3 JO THE WILL TO POWER.

from reality. . . . All of them, people who denied
things in order to be able to exist.

The Sophists were Greeks : when Socrates and
Plato adopted the cause of virtue and justice, they
were Jews or I know not what. Grote's tactics
in the defence of the Sophists are false : he would
like to raise them to the rank of men of honour
and moralisers but it was their honour not to
indulge in any humbug with grand words and
virtues.

430.

The great reasonableness underlying all moral
education lay in the fact that it always attempted
to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that
neither good intentions nor good means, as such,
first required to enter consciousness. Just as the
soldier learns his exercises, so should man learn
how to act in life. In truth this unconsciousness
belongs to every kind of perfection : even the
mathematician carries out his calculations un-
consciously. . . .

What, then, does Socrates 1 reaction mean, which
recommended dialectics as the way to virtue, and
which was amused when morality was unable to
justify itself logically? But this is precisely what
proves its superiority without unconsciousness it
is worth nothing\

In reality it means the dissolution of Greek
instincts^ when demonstrability is posited as the
first condition of personal excellence in virtue.
All these great " men of virtue " and of words are
themselves types of dissolution.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 351

In practice, it means that moral judgments have
been torn from the conditions among which they
grew and in which alone they had some sense, from
their Greek and Graeco-political soil, in order to
be denaturalised under the cover of being sub-
limated* The great concepts " good * and " just "
are divorced from the first principles of which they
form a part, and, as " ideas " become free, degenerate
into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is
sought behind them ; they are regarded as entities
or as symbols of entities : a world is invented where
they are "at home," and from which they are
supposed to hail.

In short \ the scandal reaches its apotheosis in
Plato. . . . And then it was necessary to invent
the abstract perfect man also : good, just, wise,
and a dialectician to boot in short, the scarecrow
of the ancient philosopher : a plant without any
soil whatsoever; a human race devoid of all
definite ruling instincts ; a virtue which " justifies "
itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd "in-
dividual" per se\ the highest form of Artifici-
ality. . . .

Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values
resulted in the creation of a degenerate type of
man "the good man," "the happy man," "the
wise man." Socrates represents a moment of the
most prof ound perversity in the history of values.

431-

Socrates. This veering round of Greek taste
in favour of dialectics is a great question. What

35* THE WILL TO POWER.

really happened then? Socrates, the roturter
who was responsible for it, was thus able to
triumph over a more noble taste, the taste of t/ie
noble : the mob gets the upper hand along with
dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners
were repudiated in good society; they were re-
garded as indecent; the youths were warned
against them. What was the purpose of this
display of reasons ? Why demonstrate ? Against
others one could use authority. One commanded,
and that sufficed. Among friends, inter pares^
there was tradition also a form of authority:
and last but not least, one understood each other.
There was no room found for dialectics. Besides,
all such modes of presenting reasons were dis-
trusted. All honest things do ,not carry their
reasons in their hands in such fashion. It is
indecent to show all the five fingers at the same
time. That which can be "demonstrated" is
little worth. The instinct of every party-speaker
tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and
carries little conviction. Nothing is more easily
wiped away than the effect of a dialectician. It can
only be a means of self -defence. One must be in an
extremity ; it is necessary to have to extort one's
rights ; otherwise one makes no use of dialectics.
That is why the Jews were dialecticians, Reynard
the Fox was a dialectician, and so was Socrates.
As a dialectician a person has a merciless instru-
ment in his hand: he can play the tyrant with
it; he compromises when he conquers. The
dialectician leaves it to his opponent to demon-
strate that he is not an idiot ; he is made furious

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 353

and helpless, while the dialectician himself remains
calm and still possessed of his triumphant reason-
ing powers he paralyses his opponent's intellect.
The dialectician's irony is a form of mob-
revenge : the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the
cold knife-cuts of the syllogism. . . .

In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality
and wild fancies, the charm of concepts was so
great, that he involuntarily honoured and deified
the concept as a form of ideal. Dialectical intoxi-
cation : as the consciousness of being able to
exercise control over one's self by means of it
as an instrument of the Will to Power.

432.

The problem of Socrates. The two antitheses :
the tragic and the Socratic spirits measured
according to the law of Life.

To what extent is the Socratic spirit a
decadent phenomenon ? to what extent are
robust health and power still revealed by the
whole attitude of the scientific man, his dialectics,
his ability, and his severity? (the health of the
plebeian ; whose malice, esprit frondeur, whose
astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in
check by his cleverness ; the whole type is " ugly ").

Uglification : self-derision, dialectical dryness,
intelligence in the form of a tyrant against the
"tyrant" (instinct). Everything in Socrates is
exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is a
buffoon with the blood of Voltaire in his veins.

VOL. i. Z

354 THE WILL TO POWER.

He discovers a new form of agon ; he is the first
fencing-master in the superior classes of Athens ;
he stands for nothing else than the highest form of
cleverness \ he calls it "virtue" (he regarded it
as a means of salvation ; he did not choose to be
clever , cleverness was de rigueur)\ the proper
thing is to control one's self in suchwise that one
enters into a struggle not with passions but with
reasons as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem
the unravelment of the errors of passion) ; it is
desirable to discover how every one may be caught
once he is goaded into a passion, and to know
how illogically passion proceeds ; self-mockery is
practised in order to injure the very roots of the
feelings of resentment,

It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic
states form a part of the Socratic problem : its
association of reason, virtue, and happiness. With
this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things
it succeeded in charming the world : ancient philo-
sophy could not rid itself of this doctrine. . . .

Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of
science : the idiosyncrasy of considering one's self
a problem. Acoustic hallucinations in Socrates :
morbid element. When the intellect is rich and
independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying
itself with morality. How is it that Socrates is
a moral-maniac ? Every " practical " philosophy
immediately steps into the foreground in times of
distress. When morality and religion become the
chief interests of a community, they are signs of a
state of distress,

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 355

433-

Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as
weapons against the wildness of the instincts.
The latter must be dangerous and must threaten
ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by
developing intelligence to this degree of tyranny.
In order to make a tyrant of intelligence the
instincts must first have proved themselves tyrants.
This is the problem. It was a very timely one
in those days. Reason became virtue virtue
equalled happiness.

Solution ; Greek philosophers stand upon the
same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as
Socrates does ; five feet from excess, from anarchy
and from dissolution all decadent men. They
regard him as a doctor : Logic as will to power, as
will to control self, as will to " happiness." The
wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a
sign of decadence, as is also the superfcetation
of logic and clear reasoning in him. Both are
abnormities, each belongs to the other.

Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this con-
cern about " happiness " (i.e. about the " salvation
of the soul " ; i.e. to feel that one's condition is a
danger). Its fanatical interest in "happiness"
shows the pathological condition of the subcon-
scious self: it was a vital interest. The alternative
which faced them all was : to be reasonable or to
perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows
that they felt they were in danger.

356 THE WILL TO POWER.

434-

Why everything resolved itself into mummery.
Rudimentary psychology, which only considered
the conscious lapses of men (as causes), which re-
garded " consciousness " as an attribute of the soul,
and which sought a will behind every action (i.e.
an intention), could only answer " Happiness " to
the question : " What does man desire ? " (it was
impossible to answer " Power," because that would
have been immoral] ; consequently behind all
men's actions there is the intention of attaining
to happiness by means of them. Secondly : if
man as a matter of fact does not attain to happi-
ness, why is it ? Because he mistakes the means
thereto. What is the unfailing means of acquiring
happiness f Answer : virtue. Why virtue ? Be-
cause virtue is supreme rationalness, and rational-
ness makes mistakes in the choice of means
impossible: virtue in the form of reason is the
way to happiness. Dialectics is the constant
occupation of virtue, because it does away with
passion and intellectual cloudiness.

As a matter of fact, man does not desire
"happiness." Pleasure is a sensation of power:
if the passions are excluded, those states of the
mind are also excluded which afford the greatest
sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The
highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness,
which is very far from being able to bring about
that feeling of power which every kind of exalta-
tion involves. . . .

The ancient philosophers combat everything

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 357

that intoxicates and exalts everything that im-
pairs the perfect coolness and impartiality of the
mind. . . . They were consistent with their first
false principle : that consciousness was the highest ',
the supreme state of mind, the prerequisite of
perfection whereas the reverse is true. . . .

Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as
it has been willed or conscious. The philosophers
of antiquity were the greatest duffers in practice,
because they condemned themselves theoretically
to dufferdom. ... In practice everything resolved
itself into theatricalness : and he who saw through
it, as Pyrrho did, for instance, thought as every-
body did that is to say, that in goodness and
uprightness " paltry people " were far superior to
philosophers.

All the deeper natures of antiquity were dis-
gusted at the philosophers of virtue ; all people
saw in them was brawlers and actors. (This was
the judgment passed on Plato by Epicurus and
Pyrrho?)

Result : In practical life, in patience, goodness,
and mutual assistance, paltry people were above
them : this is something like the judgment
Dostoiewsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks :
they are more philosophical in practice, they are
more courageous in their way of dealing with the
exigencies of life. . . ,

435-

A criticism of the philosopher. Philosophers and
moralists merely deceive themselves when they

358 THE WILL TO POWER.

imagine that they escape from decadence by
opposing it. That lies beyond their wills: and
however little they may be aware of the fact, it
is generally discovered subsequently that they
were among the most powerful promoters of
decadence.

Let us examine the philosophers of Greece
Plato, for instance. He it was who separated the
instincts from the/0/w, from the love of contest,
from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the
mysteries, and the belief in tradition and in
ancestors. ... He was the seducer of the nobles :
he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
, . . He denied all the first principles of the
" noble Greek " of sterling worth ; he made
dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled in politics for the future, and
was the example of a man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He is
profound and passionate in everything that is

One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms of decadence: the
moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(ahdfapa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon-
ism, and reaction,

The question of " happiness," of " virtue, 11 and
of the " salvation of the soul/' is the expression of
physiological contradictoriness in these declining
natures: their instincts lack all balance and
purpose.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 359

To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices ? With Plato
we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in-
telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics
taking its root in goodness leads to everything
good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead
" backwards "). Even Descartes had a notion of
the fact that, according to a thoroughly Christian
and moral attitude of mind, which includes a
belief in a good God as the Creator of all things,
the truthfulness of God guarantees the judgments
of our senses for us. But for this religious sanction
and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence
should we obtain our right to trust in existence ?
That thinking must be a measure of reality, that
what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot
exist) is a coarse non plus ultra of a moral blind
confidence (in the essential principle of truth at
the root of all things); this in itself is a mad
assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think of anything precisely
as it is. ...

437.

The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates something
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
usage ; they have travelled ; they are earnest to

360 THE WILL TO POWER.

the point of sombreness, their eyes are calm, and
they are not unacquainted with the business of
state and diplomacy. They anticipated all the
great concepts which coming sages were to have
concerning things in general : they themselves re-
presented these concepts, they made systems out
of themselves. Nothing can give a higher idea
of Greek intellect than this sudden fruitfulness in
types, than this involuntary completeness in the
drawing up of all the great possibilities of the
philosophical ideal. I can see only one original
figure in those that came afterwards: a late
arrival, but necessarily the last Pyrrho the
nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the in-
fluences which had become ascendant in the mean-
time : the Socratic school, Plato, and the artistic
optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes back to
Democritus via Protagoras. . . .)

Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly
among the humble. Devoid of pride. To live
in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what
every one believes. To be on one's guard against
science and intellect, and against everything that
puffs one out. ... To be simply patient in the
extreme, careless and mild ; airddeia, or, better
still, irpavrrjs. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid
the tumult of the Schools ; born after his time ;
weary; an example of the protest of weariness
against the eagerness of dialecticians ; the in-
credulity of the tired man in regard to the im-

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 361

portance of everything. He had seen Alexander \
he had seen the Indian penitents. To such late-
arrivals and creatures of great subtlety, every-
thing lowly, poor, and idiotic, is seductive. It
narcoticises : it gives them relaxation (Pascal).
On the other hand, by mixing with the crowd,
and getting confounded with the rest, they get
a little warmth. These weary creatures need
warmth. . . . To overcome contradiction ; to do
away with contests ; to have no will to excel in
any way : to deny the Greek instincts. (Pyrrho
lived with his sister, who was a midwife.) To rig
out wisdom in such a way that it no longer dis-
tinguishes ; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty ;
to perform the lowest offices, and to go to market
and sell sucking-pigs. . . . Sweetness, clearness,
indifference ; no need of virtues that require atti-
tudes ; to be equal to all even in virtue : final
conquest of one's self, final indifference.

Pyrrho and Epicurus: two forms of Greek
decadence: they are related in their hatred of
dialectics and all theatrical virtues. These two
things together were then called philosophy;
Pyrrho and Epicurus intentionally held that which
they loved in low esteem ; they chose common and
even contemptible names for it, and they re-
presented a state in which one is neither ill,
healthy, lively, nor dead. . . . Epicurus was more
naif, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more
experience of the world, had travelled more, and
was more nihilistic. His life was a protest against
the great doctrine of Identity (Happiness = Virtue
= Knowledge). The proper way of living is not
promoted by science: wisdom does not make

362 THE WILL TO POWER.

"wise.". . . The proper way of living does not desire
happiness, it turns away from happiness. . . .

438.

The war against the " old faith," as Epicurus
waged it, was, strictly speaking, a struggle against
pre-existing Christianity the struggle against a
world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified
throughout with feelings of guilt, and grown old
and sick.

Not the " moral corruption " of antiquity, but
precisely its moral infectedness was the prerequisite
which enabled Christianity to become its master.
Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed
paganism by transvaluing its values and poisoning
its innocence. We ought at last to understand
that what was then destroyed was higher than what
prevailed ! Christianity grew on the soil of
psychological corruption, and could only take
root in rotten ground.

439-

Science ; as a disciplinary measure or as an
instinct. I see a decline of the instincts in Greek
philosophers : otherwise they could not have been
guilty of the profound error of regarding the
conscious state as the more valuable state. The
intensity of consciousness stands in the inverse
ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmis-
sion. Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view,
which is always the sign of weakened instincts.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 363

We must, in sooth, seek perfect life there where
it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is
least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its
intentions, and its utility). The return to the
facts of common sense, the facts of the common
man and of " paltry people/' Honesty and intelli-
gence stored up for generations by people who are
quite unconscious of their principles, and who
even have some fear of principles. It is not
reasonable to desire a reasoning virtue. ... A
philosopher is compromised by such a desire.

440.

When morality that is to say, refinement,
prudence, bravery, and equity have been stored
up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts
of a whole succession of generations, the collec-
tive power of this hoard of virtue projects its
rays even into that sphere where honesty is most
seldom present the sphere of intellect. When
a thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a
state of ill-ease in the organism ; something new
has got to be found, the organism is not satisfied
or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and
it is hypersensitive precisely all this is con-
sciousness. . . .

Genius lies in the instincts; goodness does
too. One only acts perfectly when one acts in-
stinctively. Even from the moral point of view
all thinking which is conscious is merely a process
of groping, and in the majority of cases an attack
on morality. Scientific honesty is always sacrificed

364 THE WILL TO POWER.

when a thinker begins to reason : let any one try
the experiment: put the wisest man in the
balance, and then let him discourse upon
morality. . . .

It could also be proved that the whole of a
man's conscious thinking shows a much lower
standard of morality than the thoughts of the
same man would show if they were led by his
instincts.

441-

The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all
the Socratic schools, proceeds from the profound
instinct that man is not made better when he is
shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based
upon reason. . . . This in the end is the nig-
gardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these
born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify
their personal abilities as the highest of all qualities ',
and to represent every other form of goodness as
conditioned by them. The anti-scientific spirit
of all this " philosophy " : it will never admit that
it is not right.

442.

This is extraordinary. From its very earliest
beginnings, Greek philosophy carries on a struggle
against science with the weapons of a theory of
knowledge, especially of scepticism : and why is
this? It is always in favour of morality. . . .
(Physicists and medical men are hated.) Socrates,
Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,
EpicuruS) and Pyrrho a general onslaught upon

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 365

knowledge in favour of morality. . . . (Hatred of
dialectics also.) There is still a problem to be
solved : they approach sophistry in order to be
rid of science. On the other hand, the physicists
are subjected to such an extent that, among
their first principles, they include the theory of
truth and of real being : for instance, the atom,
the four elements {juxtaposition of being, in order
to explain its multiformity and its transformations).
Contempt of objectivity in interests is taught :
return to practical interest, and to the personal
utility of all knowledge. . . .

The struggle against science is directed at:
(l) its pathos (objectivity); (2) its means (that is
to say, at its utility) ; (3) its results (which are
considered childish). It is the same struggle
which is taken up later on by the CJturch in the
name of piety : the Church inherited the whole
arsenal of antiquity for her war with science.
The theory of knowledge played the same part
in the affair as it did in Kant's or the Indians 1
case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled
with it, a free hand is wanted for the " purpose "
that is envisaged.

Against what powers are they actually defend-
ing themselves ? Against dutifulness, against
obedience to law, against the compulsion of going
hand in hand I believe this is what is called
Freedom. . . .

This is how decadence manifests itself: the
instinct of solidarity is so degenerate that solidarity
itself gets to be regarded as tyranny : no authority
or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer

366 THE WILL TO POWER.

desires to fall in with the rank and file, and to
adopt its ignobly slow pace. The slow move-
ment which is the tempo of science is generally
hated, as are also the scientific man's indifference
in regard to getting on, his long breath, and his
impersonal attitude.

443-

At bottom, morality is hostile to science:
Socrates was so already too and the reason is,
that science considers certain things important
which have no relation whatsoever to " good "
and " evil," and which therefore reduce the gravifr
of our feelings concerning " good " and " eVil."
What morality requires is that the whole of a
man should serve it with all his power: it
considers it waste on the part of a creature that
can ill afford waste > when a man earnestly troubles
his head about stars or plants. That is why
science very quickly declined in Greece, once
Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the
disease of morality. The mental altitudes
reached by a Democritus, a Hippocrates, and a
Thucydides, have not been reached a second
time.

444.

The problem of the philosopher and of the
scientific man. The influence of age ; depressing
habits (sedentary study d la Kant ; over-work ;
inadequate nourishment of the brain ; reading).
A more essential question still : is it not already
perhaps a symptom of decadence when thinking
tends to establish generalities ?

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 367

Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the
will (to be able to remain as detached as
possible . . .). This presupposes a tremendous
adiaphora in regard to the strong passions : a
kind of isolation, an exceptional position, opposi-
tion to the normal passions.

Type : desertion of home-country ; emigrants go
ever greater distances afield ; growing exoticism ;
the voice of the old imperative dies away ; and
the continual question " whither ? " (" happiness ")
is a sign of emancipation from forms of organisa-
tion, a sign of breaking loose from everything.

Problem : is the man of science more of a
decadent symptom than the philosopher ? as a
whole the scientific man is not cut loose from
everything, only>a part of his being is consecrated
exclusively to the service of knowledge and
disciplined to maintain a special attitude and
point of view; in his department he is in need
of all the virtues of a strong race, of robust
health, of great severity, manliness, and intelli-
gence. He is rather a symptom of the great
multiformity of culture than of the effeteness of
the latter. The decadent scholar is a bad
scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has
always been reckoned hitherto as the typical
philosopher.

445.

Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than
intellectual uprightness : they perhaps say the very
reverse, and even believe it. But the prerequisite
of all their work is, that they can only admit of

368 THE WILL TO POWER.

certain truths ; they know what they have to
prove ; and the fact that they must be agreed as to
these " truths " is almost what makes them recog-
nise one another as philosophers. There are, for
instance, the truths of morality. But belief in
morality is not a proof of morality : there are
cases and the philosopher's case is one in point
when a belief of this sort is simply a piece of
immorality.

446.

What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher ?
He teaches that the qualities which he happens
to possess are the only qu all ties that exist, that
they are indispensable to those who wish to attain
to the " highest good " (for instance, dialectics with
Plato). He would have all men raise themselves,
gradatim, to his type as the highest. He de-
spises what is generally esteemed by him a gulf
is cleft between the highest priestly values and the
values of the world. He knows what is true, who
God is, what every one's goal should be, and the
way thereto. . . . The typical philosopher is
thus an absolute dogmatist ; if he requires scepti-
cism at all it is only in order to be able to speak
dogmatically of his principal purpose.

447-

When the philosopher is confronted with his
rival science, for instance, he becomes a sceptic ;
then he appropriates a form of knowledge which
he denies to the man of science ; he goes hand in

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 369

hand with the priest so that he may not be sus-
pected of atheism or materialism ; he considers
an attack made upon himself as an attack upon
morals, religion, virtue, and order he knows how
to bring his opponents into ill repute by calling
them " seducers " and " underminers " : then he
marches shoulder to shoulder with power.

The philosopher at war with other philosophers :
he does his best to compel them to appear like
anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of authority.
In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a
priest and like the priesthood.

3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF
PHILOSOPHERS.

448.

Philosophy defined by Kant : " The science of
the limitations of reason " ! 1

449.

According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art
of discovering truth. On the other hand, the
Epicureans, who availed themselves of Aristotle's
sensual theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical
opposition to the search for truth : " Philosophy is
the art of Life?

450.

The three great naivete's :

Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if . . .) ;

VOL. I. 2 A

370 THE WILL TO POWER.

Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if . . .) ;

Knowledge as a means to the " denial of Life "
inasmuch as it leads to disappointment (as
if . . .>

451-

As if there were one " truth " which one could
by some means approach !

452.

Error and ignorance are fatal. The assump-
tion that truth has been found and that ignorance
and error are at an end, constitutes one of the
most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted
that it be generally accepted, it paralyses the will
to test, to investigate, to be cautious, and to
gather experience: it may even be regarded as
criminal that is to say, as a doubt concerning
truth. . . .

" Truth " is therefore more fatal than error* and
ignorance, because it paralyses the forces which
lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The
passion for idleness now stands up for "truth"
(" Thought is pain and misery ! "), as also do order,
rule, the joy of possession, the pride of wisdom
in fact, vanity \ it is easier to obey than to
examine ; it is more gratifying to think " I possess
the truth," than to see only darkness in all direc-
tions ; . . . but, above all, it is reassuring, it lends
confidence, and alleviates life it " improves " the
character inasmuch as it reduces mistrust. " Spirit-
ual peace," "a quiet conscience" these things

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 371

are inventions which are only possible provided
" Truth be found? " By their fruits ye shall know
them." . . . "Truth" is the truth because it
makes men better. . . . The process goes on :
all goodness and all success is placed to the credit
of " truth."

This is the proof by success : the happiness,
contentment, and the welfare of a community or
of an individual, are now understood to be the
result of the belief in morality. . . , Conversely ;
failure is ascribed to a lack of faith.

453-

The causes of error lie just as much in the good
as in the bad will of man : in an incalculable
number of cases he conceals reality from himself,
he falsifies it, so that he may not suffer from his
good or bad will. God, for instance, is considered
the shaper of man's destiny; he interprets his
little lot as though everything were intentionally
sent to him for the salvation of his soul, this
act of ignorance in u philology," which to a more
subtle intellect would seem unclean and false, is
done, in the majority of cases, with perfect good
faith. Goodwill, " noble feelings," and " lofty
'states of the soul" are just as underhand and
deceptive in the means they use as are the passions
love, hatred, and revenge, which morality has
repudiated and declared to be egotistic.

Errors are what mankind has had to pay for
most dearly : and taking them all in all, the errors
which have resulted from goodwill are those which

372 THE WILL TO POWER.

have wrought the most harm. The illusion which
makes people happy is more harmful than the
illusion which is immediately followed by evil
results : the latter increases keenness and mistrust,
and purifies the understanding; the former
merely narcoticises. . . .

Fine feelings and noble impulses ought, speak-
ing physiologically, to be classified with the
narcotics : their abuse is followed by precisely the
same results as the abuse of any other opiate
weak nerves.

454-

Error is the most expensive luxury that man
can indulge in : and if the error happen to be a
physiological one, it is fatal to life. What has
mankind paid for most dearly hitherto ? For its
" truths " : for every one of these were error% in
physiologicis. . . .

455-

Psychological confitsions : the desire for belief
is confounded with the " will to truth " (for instance,
in Carlyle). But the desire for disbelief has also
been confounded with the "will to truth" (a
need of ridding one's self of a belief for a hundred
reasons : in order to carry one's point against
certain " believers "). What is it that inspires
Sceptics ? The hatred of dogmatists or a need
of repose, weariness as in Pyrrho's case.

The advantages which were expected to come
from truth, were the advantages resulting from
a belief in it : for, in itself, truth could have been

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 373

thoroughly painful, harmful, and even fatal.
Likewise truth was combated only on account
of the advantages which a victory over it would
provide for instance, emancipation from the
yoke of the ruling powers.

The method of truth was not based upon
motives of truthfulness, but upon motives of 'power ,
upon the desire to be superior.

How is \x\tihprovedt By means of the feeling
of increased power, by means of utility, by
means of indispensability, in short, by means of
its advantages (that is to say, hypotheses con-
cerning what truth should be like in order that
it may be embraced by us). But this involves
prejudice : it is a sign that truth does not enter the
question at all. . . .

What is the meaning of the "will to truth,"
for* instance in the Goncourts? and in the
naturalists ? A criticism of " objectivity."

Why should we know: why should we not
prefer to be deceived? . . . But what was
needed was always belief and not truth. . . .
Belief is created by means which are quite
opposed to the method of investigation: it even
depends upon the exclusion of the latter.

456.

A certain degree of faith suffices to-day to
give us an objection to what is believed it does
more, it makes us question the spiritual healthi-
ness of the believer.

3/4 THE WILL TO POWER.

457-

Martyrs. To combat anything that is based
upon reverence, opponents must be possessed of
both daring and recklessness, and be hindered
by no scruples. . . . Now, if one considers that
for thousands of years man has sanctified as
truths only those things which were in reality
errors, and that he has branded any criticism of
them with the hall-mark of badness, one will
have to acknowledge, however reluctantly, that
a goodly amount of immoral deeds were necessary
in order to give the initiative to an attack I
mean to reason. . . . That these immoralists have
always posed as the " martyrs of truth " should
be forgiven them : the truth of the matter is that
they did not stand up and deny owing to an
instinct for truth ; but because of a love of dis-
solution, criminal scepticism, and the love of
adventure. In other cases it is personal rancour
which drives them into the province of problems
they only combat certain points of view in
order to be able to carry their point against
certain people. But, above all, it is revenge
which has become scientifically useful the
revenge of the oppressed, those who, thanks to
the truth that happens to be ruling, have been
pressed aside and even smothered. . . .

Truth, that is to say the scientific method,
was grasped and favoured by such as recognised
that it was a useful weapon of war an instru-
ment of destruction. . . .

In order to be honoured as opponents, they

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 375

were moreover obliged to use an apparatus
similar to that used by those whom they were
attacking : they therefore brandished the concept
" truth " as absolutely as their adversaries did
they became fanatics at least in their poses,
because no other pose could be expected to be
taken seriously. What still remained to be done
was left to persecution, to passion, and the un-
certainty of the persecuted hatred waxed great,
and the first impulse began to die away and to
leave the field entirely to science. Ultimately
all of them wanted to be right in the same absurd
way as their opponents. . . . The word " con-
viction," " faith," the pride of martyrdom these
things are most unfavourable to knowledge. The
adversaries of truth finally adopt the whole
subjective manner of deciding about truth, that
is to say, by means of poses, sacrifices, and heroic
resolutions, and thus prolong the dominion of the
anti-scientific method. As martyrs they com-
promise their very own deed.

458.

The dangerous distinction between " theoretical"
and "practical" in Kant for instance, but also
in the ancient philosophers: they behave as if
pure intellectuality presented them with the prob-
lems of science and metaphysics ; they behave
as if practice should be judged by a measure
of its own, whatever the judgment of theory
may be.

Against the first tendency I set up my

376 THE WILL TO POWER.

psychology of philosophers : their strangest calcula-
tions and " intellectuality " are still but the last
pallid impress of a physiological fact ; spontaneity
is absolutely lacking in them, everything is instinct,
everything is intended to follow a certain direction
from the first. . . .

Against the second tendency I put my question :
whether we know another method of acting
correctly, besides that of thinking correctly ; the
last case is action, the first presupposes thought
Are we possessed of a means whereby we can
judge of the value of a method of life differently
from the value of a theory : through induction or
comparison ? . . . Guileless people imagine that
in this respect we are better equipped, we know
what is " good " and the philosophers are content
to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort
of faith is at work in this matter, and nothing
more. . . .

" Men must act ; consequently rules of conduct
are necessary" this is what even the ancient
Sceptics thought. The urgent need of a definite
decision in this department of knowledge is used
as an argument in favour of regarding something
as true \ . . .

" Men must not act " said their more con-
sistent brothers, the Buddhists, and then thought
out a mode of conduct which would deliver man
from the yoke of action. . . .

To adapt one's self, to live as the " common man "
lives, and to regard as right and proper what
he regards as right: this is submission to the
gregarious instinct* One must carry one's courage

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 377

and severity so far as to learn to consider such
submission a disgrace. One should not live
according to two standards ! . . . One should
not separate theory and practice ! . . .

459-

Of all that which was formerly held to be true,
not one word is to be credited. Everything
which was formerly disdained as unholy, for-
bidden, contemptible, and fatal all these
flowers now bloom on the most charming paths
of truth.

The whole of this old morality concerns us no
longer: it contains not one idea which is still
worthy of respect. We have outlived it we
are no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to
be forced to allow ourselves to be lied to in this
way. ... In more polite language : we are too
virtuous for it. ... And if truth in the old sense
were "true" only because the old morality said
" yea " to it, and had a right to say " yea " to it :
it follows that no truth of the past can any longer
be of use to us. ... Our criterion of truth is
certainly not morality : we refute an assertion
when we show that it is dependent upon morality
and is inspired by noble feelings.

460.

All these values are empirical and conditioned.
But he who believes in them and who honours
them, refuses to acknowledge this aspect of them.

378 THE WILL TO POWER.

All philosophers believe in these values, and one
form their reverence takes is the endeavour to
make a priori truths out of them. The falsifying
nature of reverence. . . .

Reverence is the supreme test of intellectual
honesty \ but in the whole history of philosophy
there is no such thing as intellectual honesty, but
the " love of goodness. . . ."

On the one hand, there is an absolute lack of
method in testing the value of these values;
secondly, there is a general disinclination either
to test them or to regard them as conditioned at
all. All anti- scientific instincts assembled round
moral values in order to keep science out of this
department. . . .

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE CRITICISM
OF PHILOSOPHY.

461.

Why philosophers are slanderers. The artful
and blind hostility of philosophers towards the
senses what an amount of mob and middle-class
qualities lie in all this hatred !

The crowd always believes that an abuse of
which it feels the harmful results, constitutes an
objection to the thing which happens to be abused :
all insurrectionary movements against principles,
whether in politics or agriculture, always follow
a line of argument suggested by this ulterior
motive : the abuse must be shown to be necessary
to, and inherent in, the principle.

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 379

It is a woeful history: mankind looks for a
principle, from the standpoint of which he will be
able to contemn man he invents a world in
order to be able to slander and throw mud at
this world : as a matter of fact, he snatches every
time at nothing, and construes this nothing as
" God," as " Truth," and, in any case, as judge
and detractor of this existence. . . .

If one should require a proof of how deeply
and thoroughly the actually barbarous needs of
man, even in his present state of tameness and
"civilisation," still seek gratification, one should
contemplate the " leitmotifs " of the whole of the
evolution of philosophy : a sort of revenge upon
reality, a surreptitious process of destroying the
values by means of which men live, a dissatisfied
soul to which the conditions of discipline is one
of torture, and which takes a particular pleasure in
morbidly severing all the bonds that bind it to
such a condition.

The history of philosophy is the story of a secret
and mad hatred of the prerequisities of Life, of
the feelings which make for the real values of
Life, and of all partisanship in favour of Life.
Philosophers have never hesitated to affirm a
fanciful world, provided it contradicted this world,
and furnished them with a weapon wherewith
they could calumniate this world. Up to the
present, philosophy has been the grand school of
slander \ and its power has been so great, that
even to-day our science, which pretends to be the
advocate of Life, has accepted the fundamental
position of slander, and treats this world as

380 THE WILL TO POWER.

" appearance," and this chain of causes as though
it were only phenomenal. What is the hatred
which is active here ?

I fear that it is still the Circe of philosophers
Morality, which plays them the trick of compelling
them to be ever slanderers. . . . They believed in
moral " truths," in these they thought they had
found the highest values ; what alternative had
they left, save that of denying existence ever
more emphatically the more they got to know
about it? ... For this life is immoral. . . .
And it is based upon immoral first principles :
and morality says nay to Life.

Let us suppress the real world : and in order
to do this, we must first suppress the highest
values current hitherto morals. ... It is
enough to show that morality itself is immoral^
in the same sense as that in which immorality
has been condemned heretofore. If an end be
thus made to the tyranny of the former values,
if we have suppressed the "real world," a new
order of values must follow of its own accord.

The world of appearance and the world of lies :
this constitutes the contradiction. The latter
hitherto has been the " real world," " truth," " God."
This is the one which we still have to suppress.

The logic of my conception :

(1) Morality as the highest value (it is
master of all the phases of philosophy, even of
the Sceptics). Result ': this world is no good, it
is not the " real world."

(2) What is it that determines the highest
value here ? What, in sooth, is morality ? It is

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 381

the instinct of decadence ; it is the means whereby
the exhausted and the degenerate revenge them-
selves. Historical proof: philosophers have
always been decadents ... in the service of
nihilistic religions.

(3) It is the instinct of decadence coming to
the fore as will to power. Proof: the absolute
immorality of the means employed by morality
throughout its history.

General aspect: the values which have been
highest hitherto constitute a specific case of the
will to power ; morality itself is a specific case of
immorality.

462.

The principal innovations ; Instead of " moral
values," nothing but naturalistic values. Natural-
isation of morality.

In the place of " sociology," a doctrine of the
forms of dominion.

In the place of " society," the complex ivhole of
culture^ which is my chief interest (whether in its
entirety or in parts).

In the place of the " theory of knowledge," a
doctrine which laid down the value of the passions
(to this a hierarchy of the passions would belong :
the passions transfigured ': their superior rank }
their " spirituality ").

In the place of " metaphysics " and religion, the
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence (this being regarded
as a means to the breeding and selection of
men).

382 THE WILL TO POWER.

463.

My precursors : Schopenhauer. To what extent
I deepened pessimism, and first brought its full
meaning within my grasp, by means of its mos f
extreme opposite.

Likewise : the higher Europeans, the pioneers
of great politics.

Likewise : the Greeks and their genesis.

I have named those who were unconsciously
my workers and precursors. But in what direc-
tion may I turn with any hope of finding my
particular kind of philosophers themselves, or at
least my yearning for new philosophers ? In that
direction, alone, where a noble attitude of mind
prevalls^'afi attitude of mind which believes in
slavery andjn manifold orders"ofrank ; as the pre-
requisites of any high degree of culture. In that
direction, alone, where a creative attitude of mind
prevails, an attitude of mind which does not re-
gard the world of happiness and repose, the
" Sabbath of Sabbaths " as an end to be desired,
and which, even in peace, honours the means which
lead to new wars; an attitude of mind which
would prescribe laws for the future, which for the
sake of the future would treat everything that
exists to-day with harshness and even tyranny ;
a daring and " immoral " attitude of mind, which
would wish to see both the good and the evil

CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. 383

jecause it would feel itself able to put each in its
right place that is to say, in that place in which
each would need the other. But what prospect
has he of finding what he seeks, who goes in
search of philosophers to-day ? Is it not probable
*:, even with the best Diogenes-lantern in his
.id, he will wander about by night and day in
vain ? This age is possessed of the opposite in-
stincts. What it wants, above all, is comfort ;
secondly, it wants publicity and the deafening din
of actors' voices, the big drum which appeals to
its Bank-Holiday tastes ; thirdly, that every one
should lie on his belly in utter subjection before
the greatest of all lies which is " the equality of
men" and should honour only those virtues
which make men equal and place them in equal
positions. But in this way, the rise of the philo-
sopher, as I understand him, is made completely
impossible despite the fact that many may re-
gard the present tendencies as rather favourable
to his advent. As a matter of fact, the whole
world mourns, to-day, the hard times that philo-
sophers used to have, hemmed in between the fear
of the stake, a guilty conscience, and the presump-
tuous wisdom of the Fathers of the Church : but
the truth is, that precisely these conditions were
ever so much more favourable to the education
of a mighty, extensive, subtle, rash, and daring
intellect than the conditions prevailing to-day.
At present another kind of intellect, the intellect
of the demagogue, of the actor, and perhaps of the
beaver- and ant-like scholar too, finds the best
possible conditions for its development. But even

384 THE WILL TO POWER.

for artists of a superior calibre the conditions a
already far from favourable: for does not eve
one of them, almost, perish owing to his wa:
of discipline? They are no longer tyrannise
over by an outside power by the tables
absolute values enforced by a Church or by
monarch : and thus they no longer learn to d
velop their " inner tyrant," their will. And wht
holds good of artists also holds good, to a greate
and more fatal degree, of philosophers. Where
then, are free spirits to be found to-day? Let
any one show me a free spirit to-day I

465.

Under " Spiritual freedom " I understand some-
thing very definite : it is a state in which one is a
hundred times superior to philosophers and other;
disciples of "truth" in one's severity towards
one's self, in one's uprightness, in one's courage, and
in one's absolute will to say nay even when it is
dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers
that have appeared 'Heretofore as contemptible

J ~ I1T....L U -- - - - * -"-" " *

libertines hiding Jbehind the petticoats of the

female " Truth/' " * - ~

END OF VOL. L